The Taxation of Punitive Damages: Horton Lays an Egg? by Serven, James
Denver Law Review 
Volume 72 Issue 2 Article 2 
January 2021 
The Taxation of Punitive Damages: Horton Lays an Egg? 
James Serven 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
James Serven, The Taxation of Punitive Damages: Horton Lays an Egg?, 72 Denv. U. L. Rev. 215 (1995). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 




Introduction . .......................................... 216
I. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2): Overview and a Short History .............. 217
II. The Nature of Punitive Damages ......................... 223
III. The Theoretically Correct Treatment of Punitive Damage
Recoveries . ........................................ 226
A. The Return of Capital Theory ........................ 226
B. Deficiencies in the Return of Capital Theory ............. 229
C. Sum m ary . ...................................... 233
IV. Other Factors Influencing the Construction and Application
of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) ................................. 233
A. History of the IRS's Ruling Stance on Punitive Damages ..... 233
B. United States v. Burke . ............................. 236
1. Pre-Burke Case Law Developments ................. 237
2. The Federal Antidiscrimination Cases ............... 245
3. United States v. Burke .......................... 252
4. Evaluation of Burke's Law ....................... 256
C. The Riddle of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989 and its
Amendment of I.R.C. § 104(a) ....................... 260
V. Recent Case Law Developments Involving Punitive Damages
Taxation ........................................... 266
A. Roemer v. Commissioner ........................... 266
B. Commissioner v. Miller ............................ 268
C. Reese v. United States ............................. 274
D. Hawkins v. United States ........................... 278
* Lecturer in Law, University of Denver; B.S.B.A., Accounting, University of Denver,
1977; Masters in Taxation, University of Denver, 1978; .D., Stanford University, 1981.
215
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
E. Horton v. Commissioner ............................ 284
VI. Summary and Conclusions ............................. 290
INTRODUCTION
The recent decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Horton v.
Commissioner,' which affirmed a tax court decision holding that punitive
damages recovered in personal injury tort actions are excludable from the
gross income of the recipient under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2),2 conflicts with three
decisions in other circuits that have reached the opposite conclusion.3 The cir-
cuit courts now stand deeply divided on the important and very basic question
of whether punitive damages are taxable.
This article examines the conflict between the federal courts over the
taxation of punitive damages recovered for personal injury. While this article
focuses on the tax treatment of punitive damages recovered for personal inju-
ries, it is necessary to touch upon the tax consequences of other elements of a
personal injury recovery. To put this discussion in context, consider the exam-
ple of Stella Liebeck. In 1992, Ms. Liebeck, a 79-year-old McDonald's cus-
tomer, suffered third-degree burns when hot coffee spilled on her legs after
she had removed the lid on her coffee cup and held the cup in her lap. Ms.
Liebeck sued McDonald's, and in August 1994, in an outcome widely reported
in the popular media,4 an Albuquerque jury awarded Liebeck $2.9 million in
damages.' On appeal, a state district court ordered the award reduced to
$480,000,6 and while further appeals were pending, the parties settled.7
The Liebeck litigation raises some timely and interesting questions con-
cerning the federal income tax treatment of Ms. Liebeck's original damage
award, had it stood. For example, assume that Ms. Liebeck's $2.9 million
award consisted of the following:
1. 33 F.3d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 1994), affg Horton v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 93, 101
(1993).
2. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1988).
3. See Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 1994); Reese v. United
States, 24 F.3d 228 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
4. See, e.g., Theresa Howard, Jury 'Burns' McD in $2.9M verdict: Scalded Customer's
Victory Puts Chains' Coffee Service in Hotseat, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Aug. 29,
1994, at 1.
5. Liebeck argued that McDonald's had sold a defective product (due to the coffee's
extreme temperature), had failed to wam customers of the coffee's temperature, and had
breached an implied warranty of merchantability because it had failed to ensure that the
coffee was fit for human consumption. Id.
6. See Theresa Howard, Judge Slashes McD Settlement to $480,000, NATION'S RES-
TAURANT NEWS, Sept. 26, 1994, at 1.
7. See Theresa Howard, McD Settles Coffee Suit in Out-of-Court Agreement, NATION'S
RESTAURANT NEWS, Dec. 12, 1994, at i.
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Specific compensatory damages: hospital bills ............. $20,000
lost wages ................. $10,000
loss of future earnings ......... $25,000
General compensatory damages: pain and suffering ........ $170,000
Statutory prejudgment interest ........................ $75,000
Punitive damages ............................... $2,600,000
Had Ms. Liebeck consulted a tax advisor concerning the taxability of her
original award, she would have learned that the federal income tax conse-
quences of the first four components of the award were relatively well-settled:
all the amounts received for those components would have been excludable
under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).8 However, she would also have learned that the tax
treatment of the punitive damage component of her award is very unsettled
and controversial, and may vary among federal districts.'
This article will examine the current state of the law regarding the taxa-
tion of punitive damages. The resolution of the controversy is hampered by the
historically inconsistent ruling and litigating position of the Internal Revenue
Service, the uncertain effect of a 1989 amendment to I.R.C. § 104(a)(2),'0 the
inconclusive application of relevant theories of taxable income to punitive
damages, and the debatable impact of the Supreme Court's recent decision in
United States v. Burke."
The discussion begins by examining the history of the applicable provi-
sions of the Internal Revenue Code 2 governing personal injury damage re-
coveries.
I. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2): OVERVIEW AND A SHORT HISTORY
Under § 61 of the Internal Revenue Code, a taxpayer's gross income
means "all income from whatever source derived." This statutory definition of
8. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1988) states that "lelxcept in the case of amounts attributable
to ... deductions allowed under section 213 . . . gross income does not include . . . the
amount of any damages received .. . on account of personal injuries or sickness." However,
had Mrs. Liebeck previously deducted her hospital bills and received a tax benefit under
I.R.C. § 213 (Supp. V 1993), any recovery for those bills would have been includable in
her income to that extent. For the income tax treatment of prejudgment interest, see discus-
sion infra note 499.
9. The Tenth Circuit, in which Mrs. Liebeck resides, has not yet addressed the issue.
At least one district court in the Tenth Circuit, however, has found punitive damages
excludable from gross income. O'Gilvie v. Commissioner, 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
50,567 (D. Kan. 1992); see infra notes 438 and 504.
10. See discussion infra note 276 and accompanying text. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (Supp. V
1993) was amended as part of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-
239, § 7641, 103 Stat. 2106, 2379 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.)
(hereinafter RRA '891.
11. 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
12. The Internal Revenue Code is sometimes referred to herein as "the Code."
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gross income is "admittedly somewhat tautological"' 3 and of limited assis-
tance, although I.R.C. § 61 does list fifteen types of enumerated receipts and
transactions which constitute gross income. In attempting to interpret and
apply I.R.C. § 61 over the years, the courts have never articulated a true defi-
nition of "income" for purposes of the Code. " However, it is clear that the
courts hold that § 61 is all-encompassing and "sweeps broadly."' 5 It is equal-
ly clear that a personal injury damage recovery falls within the scope of the
section and will be includable in gross income unless specifically excluded
under another section of the Code. 6 Such exclusions from income are con-
strued narrowly. 7
The exclusionary provision of the Code applicable to damage recoveries
for personal injury is I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), entitled "Compensation for injuries or
sickness." The section exempts from gross income "any damages received
(whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic pay-
ments) on account of personal injuries or sickness." This provision raises
many difficult questions of statutory construction. For example, what is the
exact scope of the phrase "personal injuries"?" What is to be made of the
13. Collins v. Commissioner, 3 F.3d 625, 629 (2d Cir. 1993).
14. It is generally recognized that the Supreme Court abandoned its effort to define
"income" in United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931) (holding that the
taxpayer recognized taxable income from a retirement of its bonds at less than par value).
The Court ignored its own earlier description of "income" as a "'gain derived from capital,
from labor, or from both combined,' provided it be understood to include profit gained
through a sale or conversion of capital assets." Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207
(1920) (quoting Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185 (1918)). Writing for the
Court in Kirby Lumber Co., Justice Holmes conceded that there was "nothing to be gained
by the discussion of judicial definitions." Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. at 3; see also Stanley
S. Surrey & William C. Warren, The Income Tax Project of the American Law Institute:
Gross Income, Deductions, Accounting, Gains and Losses, Cancellation of Indebtedness, 66
HARV. L. REv. 761, 771 (1953) (noting that in Kirby Lumber Co. the Court "recognized the
futility of attempting to capture the concept of income and confine it within a phrase" and
"explicitly abandoned the search for a definition" of income). Subsequently, in Commissioner
v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955), the Supreme Court repudiated the Eisner defi-
nition of income, stating that while "[imn that context ... the definition served a useful
purpose," it was "not meant to provide a touchstone to all future gross income questions."
Id. at 431. The Court stated, "Congress applied no limitations as to the source of taxable
receipts, nor restrictive labels as to their nature." Id. at 429-30.
15. United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1870 (1992). The courts recognize that in
I.R.C. § 61 Congress intended "to use the full measure of its taxing power." Helvering v.
Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940). The Code describes income "in sweeping terms and
should be broadly construed in accordance with an obvious purpose to tax income compre-
hensively." Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949).
16. I.R.C. § 61 (1988) states that it applies "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this
subtitle." As noted by the Second Circuit, "the term gross income has been read expansively
to include all realized gains and forms of enrichment, that is, 'all gains except those specifi-
cally exempted."' Collins, 3 F.3d at 630 (quoting Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. at 430).
17. See, e.g., Jacobson, 336 U.S. at 49 (stating that "[t]he exemptions, on the other
hand, as compared to income, are specifically stated and should be construed with restraint
in the light of the same policy.").
18. The major issue that has arisen in this context is whether "personal injuries" means
only physical personal injuries, or whether the phrase also encompasses nonphysical personal
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phrase "any damages"--does it truly mean any and all damages arising out of
a personal injury, or are there some components of a damage recovery that
ought not qualify for the exclusion? Is the phrase "any damages" qualified in
some fashion by the phrase "received on account of personal injuries" which
follows? And is the entire provision in turn qualified by the title of the sec-
tion, which refers to "compensation" for injuries (that is, should damages
which do not demonstrably serve a compensatory purpose fall outside the
scope of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2))?
The applicable Treasury Regulations provide little assistance in answering
these questions. The Regulations are brief, and merely state that "[t]he terms
'damages received (whether by suit or agreement)' mean an amount received
(other than workmen's compensation) through prosecution of a legal suit or
action based upon tort or tort type rights, or through a settlement agreement
entered into in lieu of prosecution.9
The legislative history of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) is enlightening, although not
dispositive. The predecessor of § 104(a)(2), section 213(b)(6) ° of the Reve-
nue Act of 1918,2" excluded from income "[almounts received, through acci-
dent or health insurance or under workmen's compensation acts, as compensa-
tion for personal injuries or sickness, plus the amount of any damages re-
ceived whether by suit or agreement on account of such injuries or sick-
ness."2 2 The legislative history accompanying the Revenue Act of 1918 re-
garding this provision is sparse,23 although the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee Report accompanying this provision stated, "Under the present law, it is
injuries as well (e.g., those arising from torts such as defamation, employment discrimination,
insurance bad faith, denial of first amendment rights, etc.).
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in 1970).
20. When the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 was recodified and reorganized as the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 213(b)(6) became I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). The legislative histo-
ry of 1.R.C. § 104(a)(2), however, gives no indication that its scope or purpose was intended
to be modified in any way.
21. The Revenue Act of 1918 came at a time when the federal income tax was only
five years old:
On February 3, 1913, the sixteenth amendment was ratified by the states and be-
came part of the Constitution. In March of that same year, Woodrow Wilson be-
came President and World War I was imminent. With the entry into the war by
the United States, Congress appropriated nineteen billion dollars toward the war
effort and enacted to raise income taxes and lower exemptions. The Revenue Act
of 1918 was still in the Senate Finance Committee when World War I ended in
November 1918. It eventually became law ....
Douglas K. Chapman, No Pain-No Gain? Should Personal Injury Damages Keep Their Tax
Exempt Status?, 9 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L.J. 407, 413 (1986-87) (footnotes omitted).
22. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066 (1919) (current
version at I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)) (emphasis added). The availability of punitive damages was
well established by 1918. This gives rise to the argument that, had Congress desired to
distinguish between compensatory damages and punitive damages when it enacted §
213(b)(6), it could have easily done so; that it did not is indicative of a congressional intent
to treat these two components of damages identically. See Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d
586 (4th Cir. 1990).
23. See Chapman, supra note 21, at 413-14 ("[On the actual expression of intent, the
silence of Congress is deafening.").
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doubtful whether amounts received ... as compensation for personal injury or
sickness, and damages received on account of such injuries or sickness, are
required to be including gross income. The proposed bill provides that such
amounts shall not be included in gross income. 24
Section 213(b)(6) was enacted against the backdrop of three prior govern-
ment rulings. In early 1915, the Service ruled in Treasury Decision 21355
that insurance proceeds received on account of an accident, as well as recover-
ies for pain and suffering in a lawsuit, were includable in gross income. This
result conflicted with the treatment of life insurance proceeds under the origi-
nal Revenue Act of 1913, which were stated to be excludable.26 The Service
subsequently had misgivings, and in 1918 asked the United States Attorney
General for his views on the tax treatment of the proceeds of an accident
insurance policy. In Attorney General's Opinion 304,27 the Attorney General
replied by invoking what has come to be known as the "return of capital"
theory:
Without affirming that the human body is in a technical sense the
"capital" invested in an accident policy, in a broad, natural sense the
proceeds of the policy do but substitute, so far as they go, capital
which is the source of future periodical income. They merely take the
place of capital in human ability which was destroyed by the acci-
dent. They are therefore "capital" as distinguished from "income" re-
ceipts."
The opinion concluded that "the proceeds of an accident insurance policy
are not 'gains or profits and income' but are instead capital and therefore
nontaxable." On the heels of Attorney General's Opinion 304, the Service
issued Treasury Decision 2747, ruling that proceeds received by an individual
as the result of a suit or compromise for personal injury sustained are an acci-
dent is not income under the Revenue Acts of 1916 and 1917.30 While the
basis for the ruling was not stated, a later ruling by the Solicitor of Internal
Revenue, Solicitor's Opinion 1384,"' interpreted Treasury Decision 2747 as
"rest[ing] ... upon the theory of conversion of capital assets."32
Against the backdrop of the Service's inconsistent rulings in this area,
24. H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1918).
25. T.D. 2135, 17 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 39 (1915).
26. See Internal Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 167 (1913) (providing that
all amounts received in respect of a life insurance policy, including those received at maturi-
ty or upon surrender of the policy, were excludable). This generous provision was said to
have been inserted at the urging of an article appearing in the Wall Street Journal. See
GEORGE F. TUCKER, THE INCOME TAX LAW OF 1913 EXPLAINED 18 (1913). Under the
current Code, amounts received under a life insurance contract are excludable only if paid by
reason of the death of the insured. I.R.C. § 101(a) (1988).
27. Income Tax-Proceeds of Accident Insurance Policy, 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 304 (1918).
28. Id. at 308.
29. Id.
30. T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918).
31. Sol. Op. 1384, 2 C.B. 71 (1920).
32. Id. at 72.
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section 213(b)(6) of the Revenue Act of 1918 attempted to clarify the status of
the law and adopted the conclusions expressed in Treasury Decision 2747 and
Attorney General's Opinion 304. Because those rulings relied on the return of
capital theory, section 213(b)(6) may be viewed, to some extent, as congres-
sional approval of that rationale.
It is important to note that both Treasury Decision 2747 and Attorney
General's Opinion 304 involved a physical injury. After the enactment of
section 213(b)(6), the Solicitor of Internal Revenue held that the "[mioney
received as damages in libel proceedings is subject to income tax. 3 a In the
setting of a nonphysical injury, the government took the position that the sec-
tion 213(b)(6) exclusion did not apply. Thus, very early in the history of
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), a "physical-vs.-nonphysical" injury distinction was read
into the statute.
The following year, the physical-vs.-nonphysical distinction was again
invoked. In Solicitor's Memorandum 1384, damages received by a taxpayer on
account of the alienation of the affections of his wife were found to be
includable in gross income, and not within the scope of section 213(b)(6)'
While the ruling specifically acknowledged that the language of section
213(b)(6), which refers broadly to "injuries of sickness," might arguably be
construed to extend to personal injuries such as the one there involved," the
ruling concluded that "[nievertheless, it appears more probable from the lan-
guage of [the statute] taken as a whole, referring as it does, to accident and
health insurance and workmen's compensation Acts, that the term 'personal
injuries,' as used therein means physical injuries only."36
In distinguishing Attorney General's Opinion 3043" and Treasury Deci-
sion 2747,"s Solicitor's Memorandum 1384 stated that
[t]hese conclusions rest ... upon the theory of conversion of capital
assets. It would follow that personal injury not resulting in the de-
struction or diminution in the value of a capital asset would not be
within the exemption. From no ordinary conception of the term can a
wife's affections be regarded as constituting capital. 9
After Solicitor's Memorandum 1384, the Supreme Court in its 1920
Eisner v. Macomber decision, described income as the "'gain derived from
capital, from labor, or from both combined,' provided it be understood to in-
clude profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets."' Based on
33. Sol. Op. 957, 1 C.B. 65 (1919).
34. See Sol. Mem. 1384, 2 C.B. 71, 72 (1920).
35. Id. at 71.
36. Id.
37. See 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 304 (1918).
38. See T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918).
39. Sol. Mem. 1384, 2 C.B. 71, 72 (1920) (emphasis added). This may be the earliest
articulation of the view that a personal injury recovery, such as punitive damages, which
does not compensate a loss in human capital, is taxable.
40. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920) (quoting Doyle v. Mitchell Bros.
Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185 (1918)). As discussed above, this definition was later abandoned by
the Supreme Court and is no longer held in repute. See supra note 14. For a description of
1995]
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Eisner, in 1922 the Solicitor of Internal Revenue held, in Solicitor's Opinion
132, that damages for alienation of affections, damages for slander or libel of
personal character, and money received by a parent in consideration of the
surrender of his right to the custody of his minor child, were all excludable
from gross income.4" Solicitor's Opinion 132 relied more on the absence of a
"gain or profit" as required by Eisner, and less on the return of capital theory
that formed the basis of the earlier rulings.42 Solicitor's Memorandum 957
was modified in accordance with this opinion, and Solicitor's Memorandum
1384 was revoked.43 Whatever its rationale, Solicitor's Opinion 132 clearly
represented a retreat from the physical-vs.-nonphysical distinction."4
The preceding rulings set the stage for two important issues that will be
discussed later in this article. First, these rulings suggest that the statutory
predecessor of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) was arguably predicated, at least in part, on
the return of capital theory. More recently, the return of capital theory has
played a major role in the cases that have examined the tax treatment of pu-
nitive damages, and its analysis has spawned very different conclusions. This
theory and its weaknesses are discussed in Part 1II.
4
1
Second, these rulings left unresolved the question of whether damages
received for nonphysical injuries should be afforded exclusion under I.R.C. §
104(a)(2). In Hawkins v. Commissioner,46 decided soon after Eisner, the
Board of Tax Appeals (predecessor to the Tax Court) adopted the view that
Eisner as an "Old Stone Age tax case," see Robert J. Henry, Torts and Taxes, Taxes and
Torts: The Taxation of Personal Injury Recoveries, 23 Hous. L. REv. 701, 738 (1986).
41. Sol. Op. 132, 1-1 C.B. 92, 94 (1922).
42. The opinion stated:
In the light of ... [Strattons Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399 (1913)
and Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920)] it must be held that there is no
gain, and therefore no income, derived from the receipt of damages for alienation
of affections or defamation of personal character. In either case the right invaded is
a personal right and is in no way transferable. While a jury endeavors roughly to
compute the amount of damage inflicted, in the very nature of things there can be
no correct estimate of the money value of the invaded rights. The rights on the
one hand and the money on the other are incomparable things which can not be
placed on opposite sides of an equation. If an individual is possessed of a personal
right that is not assignable and not susceptible of any appraisal in relation to mar-
ket values, and thereafter receives either damages or payment in compromis6 for an
invasion of that right, it can not be held tha: he thereby derives any gain or prof-
it. It is clear, therefore, that the Government c:an not tax him on any portion of the
sum received.
Id. at 93 (emphasis added).
43. See Sol. Op. 957, I C.B. 65 (1919).
44. In Revenue Ruling 74-77, the Service stated, without analysis, that damages received
on account of alienation of affections or in consideration of the surrender of the custody of
a minor child were excludable as income. Rev. Rul. 74-77, 1974-1 C.B. 33. These represent-
ed two of the three issues discussed in Solicitor's Opinion 132, and the latter ruling was
declared superseded. Id. Interestingly, in both Solicitor's Opinion 132 and in Revenue Ruling
74-77, the Service failed to cite the applicable statute. Id. The rulings appear to have been
predicated on a conclusion that the recoveries were not even "income" under I.R.C. § 61
and its predecessor.
45. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
46. 6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927).
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nonphysical injuries are "personal injuries" for purposes of the predecessor to
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). While Hawkins may have removed any doubt that non-
physical injuries can constitute "personal injuries" for purposes of I.R.C. §
104(a)(2), the Service and the courts have nevertheless historically afforded
damages for nonphysical injuries less favored treatment under the statute. The
details of this controversy have dominated litigation in the I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)
arena in recent years and ultimately culminated in the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in United States v. Burke,47 discussed in Part IV of this article.
II. THE NATURE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
4 a
Punitive damages49 have a long,"0 contentious, 51 and somewhat uncer-
tain history in American law:52 "sometimes used to punish, and sometimes
used to compensate a plaintiff for injuries to pride, dignity, or reputation that
would not otherwise be compensated through traditional tort awards intended
47. 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
48. See generally Clarence Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV.
1173 (1931) (discussing how punitive damages serve an admonitory function); Tom Riley,
Punitive Damages: The Doctrine of Just Enrichment, 27 DRAKE L. REV. 195 (1977-78)
(examining the development of the law of punitive damages).
49. Punitive damages are also referred to as exemplary damages, vindictive damages,
and in years past, "smart money." See, e.g., WILLIAM B. HALE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 234 (1896) (Punitive damages are allowed "in view of the grossness of the wrong
done, rather than as a measure of compensation. They are 'smart money' added to proper
compensation."); FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF REMEDIES FOR TORTS 598 (1873) (stating
that "[plunitive, vindictive, and exemplary damages are, in legal contemplation, synonymous
terms").
50. See Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851) (recognizing both the
existence and propriety of punitive damages); see also Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont.,
Inc. v. Kelso Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 274 (1989) (noting that the practice of awarding
punitive damages was known to the framers of the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution). Punitive damages appear in reported cases at least as far back as 1791. See
Coryell v. Colbaugh, I N.J.L. 90, 91 (Super. Ct. 1791) (instructing the jury "not to estimate
the damages by any particular proof of suffering or actual loss; but to give damages for
example's sake, to prevent such offenses in the future" and to "mark [the jury's] disapproba-
tion and be an example to others"). See generally Melvin M. Belli, Sr., Punitive Damages:
Their History. Their Use and Their Worth in Present-Day Society. 49 UMKC L. REV. 1
(1980); Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517 (1957).
51. See HILLIARD, supra note 49, at 597 n.(a) (stating that "[nlo question relating to
damages has been so prolific of discussion, and still remains so unsettled, as the one, wheth-
er in any case, and if so in what cases, exemplary damages may be given"); cf. Fay v.
Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873) (The notion of punishing the defendant in such a way "is
a monstrous heresy. It is an unsightly and unhealthy excrescence, deforming the symmetry of
the body of the law."). For Judge Friendly's more recent and oft-cited economics-based criti-
cism of punitive damages in the context of product liability cases, see Roginsky v. Richard-
son-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
52. English law has a long history of punitive or exemplary damages. See, e.g., Wilkes
v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498-99 (K.B. 1763) (stating that "[dlamages are designed not
only as satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as punishment to the guilty, to deter
from any such proceeding for the future and as proof of the detestation of the jury to the
action itself"); see also Browning-Ferris Indus., 492 U.S. at 274 (tracing the roots of puni-
tive damages in England to the Thirteenth Century).
19951
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
to make a plaintiff whole." 3
Under the majority view, punitive or exemplary damages are wholly pe-
nal 4 in nature and are recoverable "where the wrong done to [the victim]
was aggravated by circumstances of violence, oppression, malice, fraud, or
wanton and wicked conduct on the part of the defendant."55 It is the "wanton,
reckless, malicious or oppressive"" conduct of the defendant, and not any
injury suffered by the victim, that is said to be the basis for an award of puni-
tive damages. "Unlike compensatory or actual damages, punitive or exemplary
damages are based upon an entirely different pubic policy consideration-that
of punishing the defendant for his evil behavior or to make an example of
him .... "" These criteria are often statutorily prescribed," and the under-
lying purposes of punitive damages are frequently reflected in jury instructions
describing such damages."
While the foregoing characterization of punitive damages holds true in the
53. Rein v. Pan Am. World Airways Inc., 928 F.2d 1267, 1272 (2d Cir. 1991).
54. Penal statutes have been contrasted with punitive damages statutes in that the former
create an entirely distinct and independent cause of action (while the latter do not) and re-
quire no proof of actual damages as a condition precedent to recovery (contrary to the gen-
eral rule for punitive damages). See, e.g., Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 214
(Colo. 1984).
55. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 390 (6th ed. 1990).
56. Id.
57. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1977) (describing puni-
tive damages as "damages, other than compensatory or nominal damages, awarded against a
person to punish him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from
similar conduct in the future."). In light of the penal nature of punitive damages, an award
of punitive damages is justified only for conduct "that is outrageous, because of the
defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others." Id. § 908(2).
While it is true that "facts [must] be established that, apart from punitive damages, are suffi-
cient to maintain a cause of action," punitive damages are not awarded to compensate for an
injury, they are designed to punish the tortfeasor and to deter him and others from similar
conduct in the future. Id. § 908 cmts. a,c,e; see also Palmer, 684 P.2d at 213-14.
58. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102 (1987 & Supp. 1994) (authorizing the jury
to award exemplary damages in tort actions if "the injury complained of is attended by
circumstances of fraud, malice, or willful and wanton misconduct"). The acknowledged pur-
pose of exemplary damages in Colorado is to punish and penalize the wrongdoer and to
serve as a warning to other possible offenders. See Palmer, 684 P.2d at 213-14 (upholding a
landmark $6.2 million punitive damages award against manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield);
Beebe v. Pierce, 521 P.2d 1263, 1264 (Colo. 1974); Ark Valley Alfalfa Mills v. Day, 263
P.2d 815, 817 (Colo. 1953) (holding that exemplary or punitive damages are not compensa-
tory in nature but are for the purpose of punishing the wrongdoer as an example to others);
Barnes v. Lehman, 193 P.2d 273, 274 (Colo. 1948). But cf Murphy v. Hobbs, 5 P. 119,
122 (Colo. 1884) (rejecting punitive damages as not consistent with reason and justice).
59. See Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'g 79 T.C. 398
(1982), where the trial court stated:
If you find that the Plaintiff has suffered actual damages as a proximate result of
the acts of the Defendant on which you base your findings of liability, you may in
your sole discretion award additional damages against the Defendant known as
punitive or exemplary damages for sake of example and by way of punishing the
Defendant. If, and only if, you find by a preponderance of the evidence that said
Defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud and actual malice.
Roemer, 79 T.C. at 403.
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case of damages awarded in federal actions' and is accepted by a majority of
state courts, 61 some states do not view punitive damages as entirely penal in
nature. Punitive damages are sometimes said to rest "on the theory that the
injury is greater, and the actual damages are increased, by reason of the ag-
gravating circumstances" of the tort. Punitive damages are also sometimes
said to compensate the victim for elements of damage which are not otherwise
legally compensable, such as attorneys' fees and costs63 or wounded feel-
ings.' Thus, some states view punitive damages as at least partially com-
pensatory6" and therefore not entirely penal in nature." An examination of
state law is therefore often necessary to ascertain the nature of punitive dam-
ages in the particular jurisdiction.
60. The Supreme Court views punitive damages as penal in nature rather than compen-
satory. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelso Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,
297 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (characterizing punitive
damages as private fines to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter repetition of the injuri-
ous act); see also International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 48 (1979)
(citing Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974)).
61. Belli, supra note 50, at 6. For example, Wyoming courts are in accord with the
majority view of punitive damages. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Columbia Casualty Co.,
682 P.2d 975, 978 (Wyo. 1984) (holding that the purpose of punitive damages "is to public-
ly condemn some notorious action or inaction, to punish a defendant, and to serve as a
warning and a deterrent to others"); Adel v. Parkhurst, 681 P.2d 886, 890 (Wyo. 1984)
(finding that "lilt is not the purpose of punitive damages to compensate the plaintiff; instead
punitive damages are awarded as a punishment to the defendant and with the purpose of
deterring others from such conduct in the future"). In New Mexico, punitive damages are
awarded as punishment of the offender and as a warning to others. See, e.g., Fredenburgh v.
Allied Van Lines, Inc., 446 P.2d 868, 873 (N.M. 1968) (citing Bank of New Mexico v.
Rice, 429 P.2d 368 (N.M. 1967)).
62. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 735 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
63. See HILLIARD, supra note 49, at 600 ("[Tlhe jury are not limited, in assessing
damages, to mere compensation, but may give exemplary . . . or vindictive damages, in
view of the degree of malice or wantonness, and, as is sometimes held, may take into con-
sideration the plaintiffs expenses of the prosecution of his suit.") (footnote omitted).
64. See W. PAGE KEETON, ET. AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2,
at 9 (5th ed. 1984); Note, supra note 50, at 520-21.
65. Compare CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 78, at
279 (1935) (noting that in some states punitive damages are regarded not as punishment but
as "extra compensation" for injured feelings or sense of outrage, while in other states, al-
though allowed, punitives are limited to litigation costs) with THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREA-
TISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES § 347, at 502 (1891) ("It might be said, indeed, that
the malicious character of the defendant's intent does, in fact, increase the injury, and the
doctrine of exemplary damages might thus be reconciled with the strict notion of compen-
sation; but it will appear from the cases we now proceed to examine that the idea of com-
pensation is abandoned, and that of punishment introduced.").
66. Over the years, many justifications for punitive damages have been offered: (i) pun-
ishment of the defendant; (ii) specific deterrence, aimed at the defendant; (iii) general deter-
rence, to prevent others from committing similar acts; (iv) preservation of the peace; (v)
inducement for private law enforcement; (vi) compensation to victims for otherwise noncom-
pensable losses; and (vii) payment of the victim's litigation costs. See Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr.,
Fairness and Efficiency in the Law, of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. I, 3 (1982);
Stephan Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REV.
1, 7 (1990).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Part V of this article examines in detail the four recent cases that have
created a split among the federal courts over the taxation of punitive damag-
es.6 One of the basic disagreements leading to the current uncertainty over
the taxation of punitive damages is whether (i) the nature and purpose of
punitive damages under state law is irrelevant, making punitive damages com-
pletely excludable as long as the underlying personal injury suffered by the
taxpayer is "tort-like" so as to implicate I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), or (ii) the purpose
of punitive damages controls, the theory being that the statute requires the
recovery to be "on account of" a personal injury. Under the latter view, puni-
tive damages may or may not be awarded "on account of' a personal injury,
depending upon whether such damages are considered under state law to com-
pensate the injury (in which case they are excludable from income) or to
merely punish the tortfeasor's outrageous conduct (in which case they awarded
"on account of" the tortfeasor's conduct, not the injury, and are not
excludable). The nature and purpose of punitive damages under state law
played a particularly key role in Commissioner v. Miller" and Horton v.
Commissioner," as will be explored in Part V.
III. THE THEORETICALLY CORRECT TREATMENT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGE
RECOVERIES
A. The Return of Capital Theory
Any discussion of the theoretically correct income-tax treatment of puni-
tive damage recoveries" must begin with the Haig-Simons" conception of
67. See Horton v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1994); Hawkins v. United
States, 30 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 1994); Reese v. United States, 24 F.3d 228 (Fed. Cir. 1994);
Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
68. See 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
69. See 33 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1994).
70. See generally Joseph W. Blackburn, Taxation of Personal Injury Damages: Recom-
mendations for Reform, 56 TENN. L. REV. 661 (1989); Jennifer J.S. Brooks, Developing a
Theory of Damage Recovery Taxation, 14 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 759 (1988); J. Martin
Burke & Michael K. Friel, Tax Treatment of Employment-Related Personal Injury Awards:
The Need for Limits, 50 MONT. L. REV. 13 (1989); Chapman, supra note 21; Mark W.
Cochran, Should Personal Injury Damage Awards Be Taxed?, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 43
(1987-88); Joseph M. Dodge, Taxes and Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 143 (1992); Robert J.
Henry, Torts and Taxes, Taxes and Torts: The Taxation of Personal Injury Recoveries, 23
Hous. L. REV. 701 (1986); Malcolm L. Morris, Taxing Economic Loss and Recoveries in
Personal Injury Actions: Towards a Capital Idea?, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 735 (1986); Edward
Yorio, The Taxation of Damages: Tax and Non-tax Policy Considerations, 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 701 (1977).
71. See William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax,
87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974) ("Serious thought about personal income tax policy has
come to be dominated by an ideal in which taxable income is set equal to total personal
gain or accretion, without distinctions as to source or use."); William D. Andrews, Personal
Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARv. L. REV. 309, 320 (1972) (recognizing that
the Simons model is "now the most widely accepted definition of personal income for tax
purposes"); Charles 0. Galvin, Tar Reform: What? Again? A Rose by any Other Name ...
1 39 Major Tax Planning 1201, at 12-3 (1987) (The Haig-Simons "classical definition has
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income. 2 In his classic treatise published in 1938," Henry Simons74 de-
fined income as:
the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in con-
sumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property
rights between the beginning and end of the period in question. In
other words, it is merely the result obtained by adding consumption
during the period to "wealth" at the end of the period and then sub-
tracting "wealth" at the beginning.75
Stated in its short form, the Haig-Simons model equates taxable income to
the sum of a taxpayer's "consumption" and his or her "accumulation" during
the taxable period.76
The application of the Haig-Simons model to a personal injury recovery
should result in exclusion of the recovery from the recipient's taxable income
to the extent that the recovery merely compensates the recipient-taxpayer for a
loss in the "accumulation" component of the accretion equation as applied to
the taxpayer. Under this view, an injury suffered by a tort victim does indeed
negatively impact the accumulation component of the Simons equation, as-
suming the taxpayer's accumulation includes a monetary value assignable to
personal rights and well-being-that is, the taxpayer's "human capital." The
subsequent recovery, whether by award or by settlement, serves to compensate
this injury and merely restores the human capital impaired by reason of the
injury. The loss and recovery negate each other; thus, the recovery should be
excludable from gross income.
The Haig-Simons model of taxable income can be illustrated by compar-
ing two hypothetical taxpayers. Taxpayer A has suffered no injury. Taxpayer
B is identical in all respects to Taxpayer A, except that Taxpayer B has suf-
fered a personal injury inflicted by a third-party wrongdoer. Assume also that
Taxpayer B sues the wrongdoer and recovers an award in compensation of
that injury. As a result, Taxpayer B is now in the same economic position as
become the starting point for any in-depth analysis of the income tax system.").
72. It is recognized that while conceptual models such as the Haig-Simons formulation
"are helpful in indicating possible overall objectives of an income tax, they are neither ap-
propriate for statutory use nor intended to be." Surrey & Warren, supra note 14, at 770.
73. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION (1938).
74. The income model formulated by Simons is often referred to as the Haig-Simons
model to reflect the contributions of Robert Haig to an earlier statement of the definition.
Professor Haig viewed income as "the money value of the net accretion to one's economic
power between two points in time," assuming one includes power exercised for consumption
purposes. Robert M. Haig, The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX I. 7 (Robert M. Haig ed., 1921). In deference to Haig's statement of
the definition, the Haig-Simons model is also sometimes referred to as the accretion model.
Simons thought the Haig definition to be interchangeable with his own. See Boris I. Bittker,
A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925,
932 (1967).
75. SIMONS, supra note 73, at 50.
76. Id. at 130 (The definition of taxable income can be restated "as the algebraic sum
of consumption and accumulation. .. (and] affords the best available basis for personal taxa-
tion.").
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Taxpayer A. Therefore, Taxpayer B should be entitled, as a matter of sound
tax policy, and as a legitimate extension of the Haig-Simons model, to exclude
his recovery from taxable income.77
The Haig-Simons conceptualization of taxable income has never been
widely accepted as a model for either the Code"8 or judicial interpretations of
the Code. As discussed in Part III, however, the Haig-Simons model does
have an analogy in the federal income tax law known as the "return of capi-
tal" theory. Under this theory, an injured taxpayer who recovers a compensato-
ry personal injury award should not be taxed on that award because he is
merely recovering human capital impaired as a result of the injury. In other
words, the recovery is a "capital" receipt rather than an "income" receipt.79
This theory has long been recognized by the courts.'
Under the return of capital approach, the $170,000 hypothetically awarded
to Ms. Liebeck as compensatory damages for her pain and suffering would be
viewed as the jury's best approximation8 of the loss in human capital suf-
fered by her as the result of her injury. The $170,000 merely compensates Ms.
Liebeck for a diminution of the value of her pre-injury well-being. Therefore,
the return of capital theory would dictate that the $170,000 be received by Ms.
Liebeck on a tax-free basis. Similar arguments can be fashioned for a wide
range of general compensatory damages, including damages for loss of person-
al reputation recovered in a libel action. 2
Conversely, the return of capital theory would indicate that a recovery of
punitive damages, assuming it is true that such a recovery serves no compen-
satory purpose, should be fully taxed. In that case, "there is no compelling
fairness argument for excluding" punitive damages from taxable income. 3 As
77. This result can also be defended on the additional argument that, given the relative
positions of these taxpayers, it is fair and equitable to exempt Taxpayer B's award from
taxation, or conversely, that it would work an injustice on Taxpayer B if he is taxed on the
award. See, e.g., Victor Thuronyi, The Concept of Income, 46 TAx L. REV. 45, 90-91
(1990).
78. For example, under the Haig-Simons model, individual property transactions are es-
sentially irrelevant and ignored. In applying the accumulation component of taxable income,
the model merely compares a taxpayer's net worth at the beginning of the measurement
period with his net worth at the end of the measuring period. Whether the taxpayer entered
into several property transactions during the period, or none at all, has no direct effect on
the computation. The Internal Revenue Code, on the other hand, does not adopt this "balance
sheet" approach to property transactions, but consistent with the realization principle, imposes
a tax upon the gain or loss incurred by the taxpayer on each individual transaction. See
Eisner v. Maconiber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920).
79. See, e.g., 31 Op. Att'y Gen 304, supra note 27, at 308.
80. See, e.g., Glenshaw Glass Co. v. Commissioner, 348 U.S. 426, 430 n.6. (1955).
81. It is of course arguable that the jury system is imperfect and will often fail in
accurately ascribing a value to a tort victim's loss and that the resulting award may over-
compensate the victim and thereby present him with a windfall. See Thuronyi, supra note
77, at 91.
82. Recoveries for loss of business reputation will also fall within the scope of §
104(a)(2), provided that the underlying theory of recovery involves a tort characterized under
state law as "personal." See, e.g., Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
83. Thuronyi, supra note 77, at 91.
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the Supreme Court stated in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.' in a re-
lated context,
The long history of rulings holding personal injury recoveries nontax-
able on the theory that they roughly correspond to a return of capital
cannot support exemption of punitive damages .... Damages for
personal injury are by definition compensatory only. Punitive damag-
es, on the other hand, cannot be considered a restoration of capital for
taxation purposes."5
Under the return of capital theory, punitive damages are a windfall to the
recipient and as such should be taxed in full. Thus, Ms. Liebeck's hypothetical
$2.6 million punitive damage award should be taxable.
B. Deficiencies in the Return of Capital Theory
Despite its apparent appeal, the return of capital theory suffers from sever-
al deficiencies when applied to the tax treatment of damage recoveries for
personal injury.
1. Treatment of the Uncompensated Victim. First, the return of capital
theory does not adequately describe the Internal Revenue Code's treatment of
a hypothetical Taxpayer C, who is identical to Taxpayer B in all respects
except that Taxpayer C is not compensated for her injury. Here, Taxpayer C is
in a worse economic position than both Taxpayer A and Taxpayer B, and it
can be forcefully argued that Taxpayer C should be entitled to a deduction86
to place her in a relatively equal after-tax position compared to Taxpayers A
and B. The Code, however, does not afford Taxpayer C a deduction in recog-
nition of her reduced economic position. 7 In this respect, the return of capital
theory is an imperfect predictor of the results obtained under the Code and
does not accurately reflect the tax theory underlying the Code.8
84. 348 U.S. 426 (1955). In this landmark case, the taxpayers sued a competitor and
received punitive damages for fraud and treble damages for antitrust violations. Id. at 431.
The taxpayers argued that the punitive damages constituted punishment imposed on the
wrongdoer and a mere windfall, which under the definition of income stated in Eisner, could
not be treated as "income derived from capital, from labor, from both combined." Id. (citing
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920)). The Supreme Court repudiated the Eisner
definition and found damage awards to be taxable because "[hiere we have instances of
undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete
dominion. The mere fact that the payments were extracted from the wrongdoers as punish-
ment for unlawful conduct cannot detract from their character as taxable income to the recip-
ients." Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. at 431.
85. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. at 432 n.8.
86. The deduction would be equal to the monetary value of Taxpayer C's reduced well-
being and loss of human capital. This amount would admittedly be difficult, if not impos-
sible, to determine. Such a deduction would presumably be characterized as a casualty loss
deduction, governed by I.R.C. § 165(c)(3) (1988). See Kovacs v. Commissioner, 100 T.C.
124, 151 n.22 (1993) (Beghe, J. dissenting).
87. See Thuronyi, supra note 77, at 90-91.
88. The absence of a deduction for Taxpayer C can be explained in part by the Inter-
nal Revenue Code's strong bias against allowing a deduction for any expenditure bearing
more than an insubstantial element of personal consumption. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 262 (1988)
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2. Treatment of Recoveries for Lost Income. The return of capital theory
also fails to explain, and is in fact inconsistent with, the established position of
the Service and the courts concerning recoveries for lost wages suffered as the
result of a personal injury. If Ms. Liebeck were awarded $10,000 to compen-
sate her for lost income suffered during her hospital stay, the theoretically
correct treatment of that portion of the recovery would tax it in full. Had Ms.
Liebeck not been injured and continued to work and receive her regular wages
in the amount of $10,000, those wages would have been taxed. The $10,000
recovery received by her in lieu of lost wages should, likewise, be fully taxed,
because it represents not a return of capital but a wage substitute.89 Failing to
tax Ms. Liebeck's lost income recovery places her in a better after-tax eco-
nomic position than had she not been injured at all; this is an anomalous re-
sult.
Even though recoveries for lost income theoretically should be taxed in
full, both the Service' and the courts9  have held that such recoveries (for
both past and future earnings) fall within the scope of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) if
awarded or obtained in respect of a personal injury. They are therefore
excludable from income. The courts have extended this analysis to recoveries
for lost income due to nonphysical injuries as well as physical injuries. In so
doing, the courts have acknowledged that the victim is thereby placed in a bet-
ter after-tax economic position than had he never been injured in the first
place. This anomaly, however, has not led the courts to withhold the §
104(a)(2) exclusion from lost income recoveries.9"
(precluding the deduction of expenditures for personal, living, or family expenses).
89. As has been noted, this notion is so well established in the federal income tax that
the taxpayer in Glenshaw Glass Co. had included the compensatory one-third of its recovery
in income, representing lost revenues, and did not challenge its taxability. Brooks, supra note
70, at 764.
90. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 85-97, 1985-2 C.B. 50, in which the taxpayer was struck by a
bus and settled his multiple count claim prior to trial. The ruling concludes that the "entire
. . . settlement amount, including the amount allocable to the claim for lost wages, repre-
sents compensation for personal injuries" and is therefore excludable. Id. at 51; see also Rev.
Rul. 61-1, 1961-1 C.B. 14.
91. See, e.g., Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 696-97 (9th Cir. 1983); see also
Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294, 1300 (1986), where this approach was:
graphically illustrated by considering the case of a young surgeon who los[t] a
finger because of the tortious conduct of another. . . . This injury will surely cause
the surgeon compensable general damages, such as physical and emotional pain and
suffering, but it will also undoubtedly cause special damages including loss of
future income. In order to prove the extent of the damages flowing from a clearly
personal injury, the surgeon will likely produce evidence of both his actual pain
and suffering and his loss of income. However, because it is easier to place a
present dollar value upon the loss of future income than upon an intangible such as
emotional pain, the surgeon will quite predictably place greater emphasis on lost
income as a measure of his damages and will perhaps, thereby, receive a greater
recovery. In such a case, the entire damage award or settlement amount received
will be excluded from income. The fact that the tortious conduct causing the sev-
ered digit manifested itself in the loss of future income to the surgeon raises no
troubling questions as to the exclusion of the award.
Id. at 1300.
92. In Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655, 660 (3d Cir. 1990), the Third Circuit
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In extending the scope of § 104(a)(2) to encompass recoveries for lost
income, the courts have implicitly failed to recognize the return of capital
theory in a context where its application is clearly indicated.93 Therefore, it is
again arguable that the return of capital theory does not adequately explain the
underlying rationale of the courts' application of the Internal Revenue Code to
recoveries for personal injuries.
3. Treatment of Punitive Damages for Physical Injury After RRA '89. As
will be discussed at greater length in Part IV of this article,94 Congress
amended I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) as part of RRA '89 to provide that the statutory
exclusion will not be available for punitive damages that are not received on
account of a physical injury. While the meaning of this amendment, and the
intent of Congress in enacting it, are far from clear, a reasonable interpretation
of the amendment is that following RRA '89, the exclusion will be available
for punitive damages that are received on account of a physical injury." This
result remains contrary to the return of capital theory and once again fails to
explain accurately the Internal Revenue Code's intended treatment of personal
injury damage recoveries.
4. Treatment of Recoveries for Damages to Property. The consequences of
applying the return of capital theory to personal injury recoveries must be
compared to its application to recoveries for property damages. Assume, for
example, that Taxpayer Y owns Blackacre, a parcel of unimproved land. As-
sume also that Blackacre is rendered worthless and must be abandoned by
Taxpayer Y due to contamination from toxic waste introduced onto Blackacre
by Taxpayer Y's negligent neighbor. Any recovery by Taxpayer Y against his
neighbor to compensate Taxpayer Y for the loss of Blackacre will be consid-
ered a return of capital with respect to Blackacre. 9 This does not, however,
lead to the result that the entire recovery is necessarily nontaxable. To the
contrary, Taxpayer Y must compare the recovery to his basis in Blackacre,"
concluded that the taxpayer's recovery for lost wages in a successful age discrimination
lawsuit was fully excludable under § 104(a)(2). The court acknowledged:
tilt might be troubling to some that a successful plaintiff in an ADEA suit will
make out better, vis-a-vis federal income tax liability, than if the plaintiff had not
been discriminated against in the first place. Although this concern is understand-
able, we note that . . . the successful ADEA plaintiff is being treated no better (or
worse now) than the typical tort victim who suffers a physical injury. We see no
reason to treat one personal injury victim any differently than another.
Rickel, 900 F.2d at 664; see also Pistillo v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145, 150 (6th Cir.
1990) (finding a back pay award in a successful age discrimination lawsuit to be excludable
and conceding that the taxpayer "will have less federal tax liability than if he had not suf-
fered age discrimination in the first place").
93. Professor Dodge has argued that there may be circumstances where the exclusion of
a recovery for lost income would be logical and correct, depending upon whether certain
factors (such as the amount of the award, the discount rate, or the projected amount of
future earnings) have been applied on an after-tax or before-tax basis. See JOSEPH M.
DODGE, THE LoGic OF TAX 109-14 (1989).
94. See infra text accompanying note 276.
95. See infra text accompanying note 283.
96. See infra text accompanying note 125. See generally Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 144 F.2d 110, 113 (Ist Cir. 1944).
97. For the rules governing the determination of a taxpayer's basis in property, see
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and any difference between these two amounts is either a taxable gain or
loss.98 Thus, if Taxpayer Y's basis in Blackacre was $60,000, and he recov-
ered $100,000 (Blackacre's then-fair market value) to compensate him for the
loss of Blackacre, Taxpayer Y must report a taxable gain of $40,000.9
This result does not conform to the proposed operation of the return of
capital theory in the context of compensatory personal injury recoveries, which
are argued to be fully tax-exempt under that theory. Completely exempting the
personal injury recovery ignores the possibility that the recovery ought to be
tax-exempt only to the extent of the taxpayer's basis in the converted asset.
Yet in the context of personal injuries, this begs the question: what is the
converted asset? Perhaps the best answer that can be given is that the convert-
ed asset is "human capital," an admittedly nebulous concept that may be de-
scribed to include the sum total of the taxpayer's personal rights, health, and
welfare. Is it possible for a taxpayer to prove that she has a "basis" in such
human capital? This seems highly unlikely."° It appears that any recovery by
a tort victim to compensate her for the diminution in value of her personal
well-being should in fact be fully taxed because the victim has no basis in the
asset being converted and compensated."'
generally I.R.C. §§ 1011-1016 (1988). Generally, a taxpayer's basis in a particular asset will
be the taxpayer's cost to acquire the asset. I.R.C. § 1012 (1988).
98. See Telefilm, Inc. v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 688, 695 (1954), nonacq. 1954-2 C.B.
6, rev'd on other grounds, 55-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9,453 (9th Cir. 1955):
Surely, to the extent that damages for the destruction of property, whether
tangible or intangible, do not exceed the cost or other unrecovered basis of
such property, they are merely a return of capital and are not taxable at all.
But to the extent that such damages exceed the unrecovered basis of the prop-
erty the excess represents a profit which constitutes taxable income.
Id. at 695; see also Freeman v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 323, 327 (1959); Cullins v. Com-
missioner, 24 T.C. 322, 327 (1955). See generally ROBERT W. WOOD, TAX ASPECTS OF
SETTLEMENTS AND JUDGMENTS, Tax Mgmt. (BNA) No. 522, at A-3 (1993).
99. This result does not obtain under the Haig-Simons model of taxable income, under
which the concept of "basis" is unknown. See generally SIMONS, supra note 73 and accom-
panying text.
100. See, e.g., DODGE, supra note 93, at 108. Dodge argues:
[A] person has a basis equal to the sum of "human capital" expenditures, which
initially might seem to include such items as outlays for food, education, preventive
health care, vitamins, and the like. Unfortunately, nobody keeps track of these out-
lays, nor would it be feasible to do so.
Id.; see also United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92, 98 (5th Cir. 1979). Garber was a crimi-
nal tax case in which the court relied upon a perceived uncertainty in proving the
defendant's basis in her blood plasma to remand her conviction for tax evasion for failing to
report the substantial income she generated from the sale of the plasma. The dissent argued
that Mrs. Garber had not persuasively shown that she "had anything but a zero basis in her
plasma." Id. at 103 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting); see also Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d
693, 696 n.2 (9th Cir. 1983) ("Since there is no tax basis in a person's health and other
personal interests, money received as compensation for an injury to those interests might be
considered a realized accession to wealth. Nevertheless, Congress in its compassion has re-
tained the exclusion (now codified at I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)."). See generally Dodge, supra note
70, at 152-53. For a light hearted look at this issue, see Note, Tax Consequences of Trans-
fers of Bodily Parts, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 842 (1973).
101. There may be alternate theories of exclusion for personal injury recoveries in this
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Analogizing to the application of the return of capital theory to recoveries
for property damage, the theory would not result in a- tax-exempt personal
injury recovery. Again, the proper tax treatment of personal injury recoveries
under the return of capital theory is at best problematic, and the theory as
applied yields inconclusive results.
C. Summary
The Haig-Simons model of taxable income provides an excellent starting
point for evaluating the tax treatment of personal injury recoveries. Its corol-
lary in federal income tax law, the return of capital theory, has likewise prov-
en to be an attractive rationale for those courts concluding that punitive dam-
ages should not be excluded under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). Indeed, if Congress and
the courts were writing on a clean slate, the return of capital theory would be
extremely persuasive, if not compelling, in resolving the question. The slate,
however, is hardly clean. The return of capital theory has severe limitations
given its uncertain application to other issues in this area." 2 Reliance on this
theory to explain or justify the tax treatment of punitive damage recoveries is
hazardous at best.
IV. OTHER FACTORS INFLUENCING THE CONSTRUCTION AND APPLICATION
OF I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)
A. History of the IRS's Ruling Stance on Punitive Damages
A major factor contributing to the current uncertainty over the taxation of
punitive damages has been the Internal Revenue Service's own inconsistent
context. For example, exclusion may be defended on the argument that most of the expendi-
tures incurred by a taxpayer in creating "human capital," such as food, preventive health
costs, education, and the like, are nondeductible personal expenditures and are not capital
expenditures. See I.R.C. § 262 (1988). Therefore, it is arguably appropriate to mirror this
treatment by allowing a recovery compensating for a loss of human capital to be received
tax-free. See DODGE, supra note 93, at 108; see also Paul B. Stephan III, Federal Income
Taxation and Human Capital, 70 VA. L. REV. 1357, 1391-95 (1984).
The fact that the typical tort victim is being compensated for injuries inflicted in an
involuntary transaction may also provide an explanation for the exclusion of the recovery.
Under I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2)(A) (1988), if a taxpayer's property is converted involuntarily such
as by destruction or condemnation, the taxpayer may nevertheless avoid gain on the conver-
sion by reinvesting the conversion proceeds (e.g., insurance proceeds, condemnation award)
into property which is "similar or related in service or use to the property so converted."
Any realized gain (i.e., the difference between the proceeds and the property's adjusted basis)
will not be recognized and will be deferred by means of adjustments to the basis of the
replacement property. See I.R.C. § 1033(b) (1988). Exemption of a compensatory recovery
for personal injuries may simply reflect that, in the case of human capital, there is simply
no ability to reinvest the proceeds of the recovery in a similar fashion and that in the inter-
est of fairness, the tort victim ought to enjoy exemption. See MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FED-
ERAL INCOME TAXATION 42-43 (7th ed. 1994); DODGE, supra note 93, at 112-13; see also
Cochran, supra note 70, at 46-47 (criticizing this rationale and noting that I.R.C. § 1033
does not provide for exclusion, only deferral, of the realized gain).
102. See Burke & Friel, supra note 70, at 42.
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rulings and litigating positions. Over the years, the Service has struggled to
develop a coherent analytical approach to punitive damages; however, the
results have been confusing. The following rulings illustrate the unpredictable
course charted by the Service in this area.
Revenue Ruling 58-418'°3
In Revenue Ruling 58-418, the taxpayer received both compensatory and
punitive damages in settlement of a libel suit. Relying on Commissioner v.
Glenshaw Glass Co., ° the Service ruled that the punitive damages were tax-
able.
Revenue Ruling 75-4505
The Service subsequently reversed its position in Revenue Ruling 75-45,
ruling punitive damages to be within the scope of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) exclusion.
The taxpayer in this ruling was an estate. The decedent had been killed in an
airplane crash, and in return for a release of all wrongful death claims against
the airplane's owner, the executor accepted a check from the owner's insur-
ance company." The ruling conceded that under the law of the decedent's
state of residence, a series of court decisions had established that payments
made under the wrongful death act were strictly punitive in nature." In
holding these damages to be excludable, the ruling stated,
Section 104 of the Code is a specific statutory exclusion from gross
income within the "except as otherwise provided" clause of section
61(a). Section 104(a)(2) excludes from gross income "the amount of
any damages received (whether by suit or agreement) on account of
personal injuries or sickness" (emphasis added). Therefore, under
section 104(a)(2) any damages, whether compensatory or punitive,
received on account of personal injuries or sickness are excludable
from gross income."
Under this analysis, the treatment of punitive damages mirrors the treat-
ment afforded to compensatory damages: if compensatory damages received
on account of a particular injury are excludable, then any punitive damages
arising out of the same injury would likewise be excludable; and if the com-
pensatory damages are taxable, then any punitive damages arising from the
same injury are also taxable.
Revenue Ruling 84-108"°
In Roemer v. Commissioner,"' the Service argued before the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals that a punitive damages award received by a successful
plaintiff in a libel and defamation action was taxable, despite the Tax Court's
103. 1958-2 C.B. 18.
104. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).




109. 1984-2 C.B. 32.
110. 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
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previous holding that compensatory damages arising out of the same injury
were excludable. This litigating position was inconsistent with the Service's
own Revenue Ruling 75-45. To the Service's chagrin, the Ninth Circuit in
Roemer relied heavily on Revenue Ruling 75-45 in holding punitive damages
excludable, despite the court's strong doubt that the ruling was correct."'
That same year, in Church v. Commissioner,"' the Tax Court also relied on
Revenue Ruling 75-45 in concluding that a punitive damages award in a libel
action was excludable, having held that the compensatory damages portion of
the taxpayer's award was also excludable.
Saddled with a Revenue Ruling undercutting its current litigation position,
the Service reconsidered its liberal application of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) to punitive
damages set forth in that ruling. One year later, in Revenue Ruling 84-108, the
Service revoked Revenue Ruling 75-45.'
In Revenue Ruling 84-108, the Service revisited the facts of Revenue
Ruling 75-45 and assumed that the decedent was domiciled in, alternatively,
Virginia or Alabama. Under the wrongful death act of Virginia, the amount
recoverable was limited to the amount necessary to compensate the survivors
for their loss sustained because of the wrongful death. Punitive damages, how-
ever, were recoverable." 4 In Alabama, the applicable wrongful death act pro-
vided exclusively for the payment of punitive damages based on the degree of
fault of the liable party as opposed to the loss sustained by the survivors."'
Focusing on the fact that payments made under the wrongful death act of
Alabama were strictly punitive in nature, the ruling continued:
In Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co ... the Supreme Court held
that punitive damages received in an antitrust case and punitive dam-
ages received in a fraud case are includable in gross income. In arriv-
ing at this decision, the Court examined the nature of these damages
and concluded that punitive damages are not a substitute for any
amounts lost by the plaintiff or a substitute for any injury to the
plaintiff or plaintiff's property, but are extracted from the wrongdoer
as punishment for unlawful conduct. The Court held that these dam-
ages represent accessions to wealth and are includable in gross in-
come....
An award of punitive damages ... does not compensate a tax-
payer for a loss but add to the taxpayer's wealth. Furthermore, puni-
tive damages are awarded not "on account of personal injury," as
required by section 104(a)(2), but are determined with reference to
the defendant's degree of fault." 6
The ruling concluded that payments made under the Virginia wrongful
11I. See infra text accompanying note 301.
112. 80 T.C. 1104 (1983).
113. See Mary J. Morrison, Getting a Rule Right and Writing a Rule Wrong: The IRS
Demands a Return On All Punitive Damages, 17 CONN. L. REV. 39 (1984).
114. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. at 33.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 33-34.
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death act were excludable under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), but that payments made
under the Alabama act were taxable."7 Revenue Ruling 75-45 was re-
voked. "'
In Revenue Ruling 84-108, the Service articulated two arguments that
subsequently became the bases of its litigating position concerning punitive
damages. First, in its discussion of Glenshaw Glass, the Service concluded that
the return of capital theory is relevant to the interpretation of I.R.C. §
104(a)(2) and requires punitive damages to be included in income. Second, the
phrase "on account of" personal injuries has an independent vitality and repre-
sents a separate test in applying I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). The phrase requires puni-
tive damages to be included in gross income because punitive damages are
received not "on account of' a personal injury, but rather, on account of the
tortfeasor's egregious or malicious conduct.
The Service's inconsistent ruling history has contributed greatly to the
lack of consensus in the federal courts over the taxation of punitive damages.
B. United States v. Burke
A second factor tending to cloud rather than clarify the proper tax treat-
ment of punitive damages is the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Burke."9 The Burke controversy has its roots in the early government rulings
that left some doubt as to how the I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) exclusion was intended
to apply to recoveries for nonphysical and physical injuries. 2 From this
fairly innocuous origin, the physical-vs.-nonphysical question mushroomed into
a full-fledged and well-chronicled 2' controversy that has yet to be resolved
and that has continuing implications for the taxation of punitive damages. To
117. Id. at 34. A federal district court, later addressing the tax treatment of damages
received under the very Alabama wrongful death statute at issue in Revenue Ruling 84-108,
concluded that the Ruling was erroneous and that the phrase "any damages" as used in
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) extended the exclusion to punitive damages as well. Burford v. United
States, 642 F. Supp. 635 (N.D. Ala. 1986).
118. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. at 34.
119. 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
120. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
121. See generally Arthur W. Andrews, The Taxation of Title VII Victims After the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 46 TAX LAW. 755, 766 (1993); Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Taxation of
Awards and Settlements Under Employment Discrimination Statutes, C932 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 795
(1994); Mary L. Heen, An Alternative Approach to the Taxation of Employment Dis-
crimination Awards Under Federal Civil Rights Statutes: Income from Human Capital, Real-
ization, and Nonrecognition, 72 N.C. L. REV. 549 (1994); Richard T. Helleiod & Lucretia S.
W. Mattison, Has the Scope of the Personal Injury Erclusion Been Changed by the Supreme
Court?, 77 J. TAX'N 82 (1992); Margaret Henning, Recent Developments in the Tax Treat-
ment of Personal Injury and Punitive Damage Recoveries, 45 TAX LAw. 783 (1992); David
G. Jaeger, Taxation of Punitive Damage Awards: The Continuing Controversy, 57 TAX
NOTES 109 (1992); Susan W. Matlow, Exclusion of Personal Injury Damages: Have the
Courts Gone Too Far?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 369 (1991); Patricia T. Morgan, Old Torts, New
Torts and Taxes: The Still Uncertain Scope of Section 104(a)(2), 48 LA. L. REV. 875
(1988); Robert W. Wood, Taxing Discrimination Recoveries: Bucking Burke, 56 TAX NOTES
363 (1992).
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gain an appreciation of the controversy that the Supreme Court encountered in
Burke, a review of the leading cases that culminated in Burke is appropriate.
1. Pre-Burke Case Law Developments
Roemer'22 and Threlkeld
23
Prior to the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Roemer, it was well established that
all compensatory damages received because of a physical personal injury were
excludable under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), including those components of the recov-
ery that compensated for such distinctly nonpersonal elements as lost wages
and profits. Recoveries for items such as lost wages have been held non-tax-
able despite the fact that had the victim never been injured and had earned the
wages in the first instance, the wages would have been taxable. 24 Thus, in
the case of physical personal injury, the nature and character of the injury as a
personal injury was all-controlling, and the fact that some of the consequences
flowing from the injury were nonpersonal or business-related was irrelevant.
On the other hand, the Service had never conceded that the same rule
would control in the case of nonphysical injury. Until recently, the Service had
maintained instead that the proper analysis was to analyze the consequences of
the nonphysical injury to determine the tax treatment of the recovery."2 Un-
der this theory, the various components of an award would be taxed by refer-
ence to what the award is intended to replace. Thus, if one consequence of a
nonphysical injury-such as defamation-is lost wages, any subsequent recov-
ery for those lost wages would not be excludable under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2),
notwithstanding that the injury was decidedly personal in nature, because
wages are ordinarily taxable. The validity of this physical-vs.-nonphysical
distinction was the central issue in Roemer.
The taxpayer in Roemer, a casualty insurance salesman, claimed he was
injured by a defamatory credit report prepared by Retail Credit Co. Roemer
sued Retail Credit in 1965, claiming libel and defamation, and following trial
he was awarded $40,000 in compensatory damages and $250,000 in punitive
122. Roemer v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 398 (1982), rev'd, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
123. Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294 (1986), affd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir.
1988).
124. See supra notes 90 and 91.
125. This approach would be consistent with the general rule applicable to damage re-
coveries. Under this general rule, the federal income tax treatment of a damage award de-
pends on the nature of the underlying claims asserted, not the nature of the injury. United
States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963). The inquiry is in lieu of: what were the damages
awarded? See, e.g., Fono v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 680 (1982); Raytheon Prod. Corp. v.
Commissioner, I T.C. 952 (1943), affd, 144 F.2d 110, 113 (1st Cir. 1944). Thus, if ABC
Corporation sues XYZ Corporation and recovers lost profits caused by XYZ's tortious act,
the recovery is taxable just as the profits would have been taxable if received in the first
place. § 104(a)(2) is an exception to this general rule, applicable only to cases of personal
injury that fall within its scope. Despite the fact that nonphysical injuries are acknowledged
to qualify for treatment under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), the Service has nevertheless historically
applied the "in lieu of what were the damages awarded" analysis to determine the tax conse-
quences of nonphysical injury recoveries.
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damages.126 Most of the evidence produced at trial related to Roemer's lost
business, damage to his business relationships, and his general reputation in
the insurance industry.27
After the Service determined that the entire award was includable, Roemer
argued before the Tax Court that the jury awarded him compensatory and
punitive damages based on personal injuries to his personal and professional
reputation, and thus the damages should be excluded from his gross income
under § 104(a)(2). 2' The Service argued that because the injury inflicted on
Roemer was nonphysical, it was appropriate to look not to the nature and
character of the injury suffered, but rather to the consequences of that injury
to determine if the damages received by Roemer were excludable because of
those consequences. 29 Here, the consequences were lost profits and income;
therefore, the Service argued that the damages received by Roemer in compen-
sation for those lost profits were includable in Roemer's gross income.
The Tax Court majority sided with the Service in Roemer, 30 thus vali-
dating the Service's physical-vs.-nonphysical distinction.13' In dissent, Judge
Wilbur noted that where a taxpayer is physically injured, as in an accident, the
entire award is nontaxable under § 104(a)(2), including components such as
lost income. In fact, lost income often represents the best measure of the dam-
ages suffered by the victim and may even constitute the entire award.
32
Judge Wilbur saw no reason to place lost wages and other business injury
recoveries outside the scope of § 104(a)(2) in cases where the injury was
nonphysical, as long as the injury was in fact a "personal" one.
33
126. Roemer, 79 T.C. at 403.
127. Id. at 401-02.
128. Id. at 404.
129. Id.
130. Roemer v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 398 (1982), rev'd, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
131. Id. at 405-406. The next year, prior to the Ninth Circuit's reversal of the Tax Court
in Roemer, the Tax Court again analyzed the tax consequences of a nonphysical personal
injury recovery in Church v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1104 (1983). The taxpayer in Church
had been libeled by the Arizona Republic while serving as Attorney General for the State of
Arizona. After the Republic called Church a "communist" in print, Church's public life was
ruined, causing him embarrassment, humiliation, emotional distress, and other pain and suffer-
ing. After protracted litigation, Church was awarded $250,000 in compensatory damages and
$235,000 in punitive damages. Reiterating its analysis from Roemer, the Tax Court noted that
in defamation actions there is a distinction between damages received for personal reputation
(nontaxable) and damages received for loss of business and professional reputation affecting
income (taxable). In the instant case, however, unlike in Roemer, there was no evidence that
any of Church's recovery was in any way tied to lost income, nor had Church asserted any
claims for lost income. Rather, his compensatory damages related solely to the pain and
suffering of a ruined career. While Church lost his public career, he did not lose his career
as an attorney; he simply was limited to private practice. Thus, there was no evidence of
lost income. Holding his compensatory damages recovery excludable, the court noted that
"[iln our opinion, shattered dreams, ruined careers, and the mental anguish that follow are
just as personal as, for instance, loss of limb." Church, 80 T.C. at 1105-06, 1108-09.
132. Roemer, 79 T.C. at 413-14 (Wilbur, J., dissenting).
133. In an example that was to echo through subsequent cases, Judge Wilbur noted:
A young surgeon who loses a finger will recover damages that for the most part
replace future earnings otherwise taxable, but the loss is not bifurcated into its
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's ruling." The
Ninth Circuit rejected the Tax Court's analytical approach.35 and concluded
that its "analysis of this matter confuses a personal injury with its consequenc-
es and illogically distinguishes physical from nonphysical personal inju-
ries.""'36 The court continued:
The relevant distinction that should be made is between personal and
nonpersonal injuries, not between physical and nonphysical injuries.
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) states that damages received on account of person-
al injuries are excludable; it says nothing about physical injuries.
"[T]he words of statutes-including revenue acts-should be inter-
preted where possible in their ordinary, everyday senses." ... The
ordinary meaning of a personal injury is not limited to a physical
one.
37
The Court of Appeals concluded that, for both physical and nonphysical
injuries, the proper inquiry is into the nature and character of the injury and
not the consequences that flow from that injury. Consistent with Judge
Wilbur's dissent,'38 the Ninth Circuit noted that although lost wages and oth-
er business-related damages often represent the best indicator of the extent of
the injury suffered by the tort victim, those consequences should not define the
injury. 39 Because this rule had long been recognized in the case of physical
damages, the Ninth Circuit did not feel that the nonphysical nature of an inju-
economic and personal components, thereby subjecting the former to taxation. Nei-
ther should damages for defamation of character, since defamation is by definition
personal to the plaintiff. In both cases, section 104 excludes the damages from in-
come-both the economic and personal components-from income.
Id. at 414; see also supra note 91.
134. Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 694 (9th Cir. 1983), nonacq., 1985-2 C.B.
55.
135. The court stated:
When an individual recovers damages for a physical personal injury, the lump-sum
award is not allocated between the personal aspects of the injury and the economic
loss occasioned by the personal injury, nor is the taxpayer precluded from use of §
104(a)(2) when the predominant result of the injury is a loss of income. However,
when the injury is nonphysical, as is defamation, the majority of the tax court
would require the taxpayer to allocate an award between the excludable and the
otherwise taxable components of the damages.
Roemer, 716 F.2d at 697.
136. Id. at 696-97.
137. Id. at 697 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
138. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
139. The court noted:
Although there are different types of defamation actions (libel or slander) depending
on the form of the defamatory statements, all defamatory statements attack an
individual's good name. This injury to the person should not be confused with the
derivative consequences of the defamatory attack, i.e., the loss of reputation in the
community and any resulting loss of income. The nonpersonal consequences of a
personal injury, such as a loss of future income, are often the most persuasive
means of proving the extent of the injury that was suffered. The personal nature of
an injury should not be defined by its effect.
Roemer, 716 F.2d at 699 (footnote omitted).
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ry calls for the application of a different rule. 4 °
The question thus became whether the nature and character of the injury
compensated in a California tort action for defamation was such that damages
received in compensation of that injury were on account of a "personal" injury
for purposes of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). Turning to state law,' 4' the Ninth Circuit
examined the nature of an action for defamation in California'42 and con-
cluded that, under the law of California, "defamation of an individual is a
personal injury."'43  Therefore, Roemer's compensatory damages were
excludable under § 104(a)(2) as were compensatory damages received because
of any personal injury."
In Threlkeld,'45 the Tax Court had the opportunity to reconsider its ana-
lytical approach in Roemer in light of the Ninth Circuit's reversal."4
Threlkeld had sued Williams for malicious prosecution and settled his claims
for $300,000. The settlement allocated the damages to Threlkeld's professional
reputation; his credit reputation; his personal indignity, humiliation, inconve-
nience, and pain and distress of mind; and the settlement of an outstanding
judgment that Threlkeld held against Williams.'47 Threlkeld did not report
any of the settlement. The Service, still clinging to its physical-vs.-nonphysical
injury distinction,'48 asserted that the damages received from injury to pro-
fessional reputation were taxable under the theory that the consequences of the
injury, not the nature of the injury itself, were dispositive of the settlement's
tax treatment. Under this theory, the damages received by Threlkeld for injury
140. See id. at 697.
141. Following the Erie Doctrine, the court concluded that "[s]ince there is no general
federal common law of torts nor controlling definitions in the tax code, we must look to
state law to analyze the nature of the claim litigated." Id.
142. Id. at 697-700.
143. Id. at 700.
144. Id.
145. Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294 (1986), aff'd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir.
1988).
146. In Threlkeld, the Tax Court summarized this approach:
If a taxpayer receives a damage award for a physical injury, which almost by defi-
nition is personal, the entire award is excluded from income even if all or a part
of the recovery is determined with reference to the income lost because of the
injury. Where, however, the damage award is received for a nonphysical injury, we
have previously mounted an inquiry to determine whether the components of the
injuries for which the award is made are personal or professional.
Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1300.
The court compared this approach to that applied to the victim of a physical injury,
such as the surgeon who loses a finger in Judge Wilbur's hypothetical:
The fact that the tortious conduct causing the severed digit manifested itself in the
loss of future income to the surgeon raises no troubling questions as to the exclu-
sion of the award. Where, however, a taxpayer's injuries are nonphysical we have,
in the past, ignored the personal nature of the claim and delved into an inquiry
regarding the nature of the consequences of the injury.
Id. at 1300-01. For the origin of the hypothetical, see Roemer v. Commissioner, 79 T.C.
398, 414 (1982) (Wilbur, J., dissenting).
147. Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1296.
148. The Service had entered a nonacquiescence to the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Roemer. Rev. Rul. 85-143, 1985-2 C.B. 55.
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to business reputation were not on account of a "personal" injury for purposes
of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).
The Tax Court abandoned the analysis it articulated in Roemer and de-
clared it incorrect. "'49 The court stated, "for purposes of section 104(a)(2),
there is no justification for continuing to draw a distinction, in tort actions,
between damages received for injury to personal reputation and damages re-
ceived for injury to professional reputation.' 50 Thus, the Tax Court conclud-
ed that it would no longer focus on the monetary consequences flowing from a
nonphysical injury to determine whether it was a "personal" injury for purpos-
es of § 104(a)(2); instead, it would consider the nature and character of the
injury itself. If that injury was of a personal nature, then damages paid there-
for were to be considered "personal injuries" for purposes of the exclu-
sion. '5 In so holding, the Tax Court articulated a test cited by virtually all
courts subsequently confronted with the question: "Section 104(a)(2) excludes
from income amounts received as damages on account of personal injuries.
Therefore, whether the damages received are paid on account of 'personal
injuries' should be the beginning and the end of the inquiry.'
' 52
This approach became Threlkeld's major contribution to the law develop-
ing around I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). It has also served as the central point of conten-
tion in the punitive damages area. Recent decisions grappling with the ques-
tion of the taxation of punitive damages.have disagreed sharply as to whether
the Threlkeld analysis is still viable after the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Burke. If so, the logical conclusion is that if an underlying
personal injury is "tort or tort-type" in nature, then all damages recovered
from the tortfeasor-including punitive damages-are excludable under I.R.C.
§ 104(a)(2). On the other hand, if the Threlkeld analysis has not survived
Burke, perhaps it is appropriate to further examine the nature and purpose of
the recovery under state law to determine whether it is truly recovered "on
account of" personal injury or "on account of' something else. Part VI of this
149. The court stated:
We do not lightly decline to follow one of our prior decisions; no court bound by
the doctrine of stare decisis does. But where one of our decisions lacks a firm
foundation in the case law and an appellate court issues a well-reasoned reversal of
that decision, the weight of precedent must give way to a better approach. There-
fore, we will no longer distinguish between personal reputation and professional
reputation for the purpose of deciding whether a damage award received in a tort
action is excludable from gross income under section 104(a)(2).
Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1304-05.
150. Id. at 1298.
151. The court stated:
To determine whether the injury complained of is personal, we must look to the
origin and character of the claim and not to the consequences that result from the
injury. No doubt a defamatory statement that injures a person's professional reputa-
tion will result in lost income. In such cases, the amount of income lost is an
accurate measure of the damages sustained because of the injury to reputation.
However, the extent to which income is decreased, even though this may be the
best measure of loss, in no way changes the nature of the claim.
Id. at 1299 (emphasis added).
152. Id. (emphasis added).
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article explores this issue in detail.
How is the beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry analysis from Threlkeld to be
undertaken? How is a "personal injury" to be identified? In Threlkeld, the
central question was whether Threlkeld's malicious prosecution claim was one
for "personal injury" under § 104(a)(2). If so, then the damages received by
Threlkeld were received "on account of personal injuries" and therefore
excludable. In this regard, the court concluded:
The determination of whether damages are received on account of a
personal injury properly depends on the nature of the claim. The
regulations under section 104(a)(2) narrow the scope of damages
received to those amounts received through prosecution of tort or
tort-type rights. Therefore, "the essential element of an exclusion
under section 104(a)(2) is that the income involved must derive from
some sort of tort claim against the payor." As a result, common law
tort law concepts are helpful in deciding whether a taxpayer is being
compensated for a "personal injury."'53
Under the Threlkeld analysis, the critical inquiry is whether the underlying
claim seeks to vindicate "tort or tort-type" rights, which in turn implicates
common law tort concepts. Because there is no federal common law of torts,
recourse to common law tort concepts necessarily requires examination of the
relevant tort law of the state in which the underlying action was brought."
In attempting to establish guidelines for identifying a tort or tort-type claim,
the court noted that "[e]xclusion under section 104 will be appropriate if com-
pensatory damages are received on account of any invasion of the rights that
an individual is granted by virtue of being a person in the sight of the
law."'
155
With this in mind, the Tax Court looked to Tennessee law for guidance as
to the nature and character of Threlkeld's claim.'56 Finding the tort of mali-
cious prosecution to be similar to the tort of defamation (found in Roemer to
be a tort for personal injury under California law), the court concluded based
on their analysis of Tennessee law that "an action for malicious prosecution
would be classified as an action for personal injuries."''  Any damages
Threlkeld received were received as compensation for the invasion of rights
granted to him "by virtue of being a person in the sight of the law."
Threlkeld's settlement was thus held within the scope of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)
and therefore excludable from gross income. The Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
153. Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1305 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
154. In this context, the court stated:
We find that the use of the terms "damages" and "personal injury" by Congress
necessarily implies that the exclusion under section 104(a)(2) depends, to some
degree, upon classifications under State law. This is confirmed by use of the term
"tort or tort type rights" in the regulations under section 104(a)(2).
Id. at 1306 n.6.
155. Id. at 1308 (emphasis added). Note that the cited passage refers to compensatory
damages.
156. Id. at 1307.
157. Id.
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peals' 8 subsequently affirmed." 9
Threlkeld established an analytical approach to I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) that
might be termed a "one-step" approach."w The Tax Court abolished any dis-
tinction between physical injuries and nonphysical injuries in applying the
exclusion. All that mattered was whether the damages were received "on ac-
count of personal injuries." This represented the "beginning and end of the
inquiry."' 6 The Threlkeld inquiry requires an examination of the taxpayer's
underlying claim in light of relevant state tort law to determine if the claim is
a "legal suit or action based upon tort or tort-type" rights as called for under
the Regulations, that is, whether the claim is one arising from the invasion of
rights granted to the taxpayer "by virtue of being a person in the sight of the
law." Put another way, so long as the taxpayer's claim is one that is advanced
in an action based upon tort or tort-type rights, nothing more needs to be said.
In such a case, any damages received from successfully prosecuting the claim
are received "on account of personal injuries" for purposes of the statute.
The principle developed by the Ninth Circuit in Roemer was followed in a
subsequent pro-taxpayer decision, Bent v. Commissioner.'62 The taxpayer in
158. The Sixth Circuit has been called upon in recent years to provide its views on vir-
tually all of the important questions litigated under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2): the physical vs. non-
physical injury controversy (Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988)); the
long battle over the taxation of back pay awards that ultimately led to the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992) (Pistillo v. Commissioner, 912
F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990)); the Burke case itself (Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 1119 (6th
Cir. 1991)); and the taxation of punitive damages (Horton v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 625
(6th Cir. 1994)).
159. Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988). The Court of Appeals
concluded:
We agree with the Ninth and the Third Circuits [in Roemer and in the subse-
quently-decided case of Bent v. Commissioner, 835 F.2d 67 (3rd Cir. 1987)] that
the nonpersonal consequences of a personal injury, such as a loss of future income
are often the most persuasive means of proving the extent of the injury that was
suffered, and that the personal nature of an injury should not be defined by its
effect. Injury to a person's hand or arm is a personal injury. This is so even
though it may affect a person's professional pursuits. All income in compensation
of that injury is excludable under section 104(a)(2). Similarly, the injury to
taxpayer's reputation in this case was a personal injury. This is so even though it
affected his professional pursuits. All income in compensation of that injury is
excludable under section 104(a)(2).
Id. at 84.
160. Concededly, the analysis is not truly a "one step" test. The underlying action, in
addition to being tort or tort-type, must also be personal in nature. There are many torts,
such as trespass, that are not personal in nature, and recoveries for which would not qualify
under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). See Horton v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 93, 112 (Whalen, J., dis-
senting), aff'd, 33 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1994); see also supra text accompanying note 212
(describing this approach as a two-step analysis); Every v. Internal Revenue Serv., 94-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,478 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (recovery of lost income by fishermen in
settlement of claims against Exxon for damages suffered as a result of Exxon Valdez oil
spill is taxable; while action sounded in tort, it was not in respect of a personal injury).
161. See Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294, 1299 (1986), afftd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th
Cir. 1988).
162. 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987).
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Bent, a Delaware teacher, had sued his school district under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
claiming he had been denied re-employment for reasons which abridged his
First Amendment rights.'63 Bent had been fired after making critical remarks
about the school, the staff, and the administration, and he had been denied a
re-employment hearing." The Court of Chancery agreed that Bent had been
denied re-employment "for reasons which, in part, abridged his First Amend-
ment right to express his views as to the public employer and school adminis-
trators for whom he worked-regardless of his obvious lack of tact in so
doing."'65 The state court denied certain of Bent's claims, including rein-
statement, leaving only his First Amendment claim." The Chancery Court
continued the case on the issue of the amount of money damages. Before any
hearing on damages was held, however, the parties settled the case by a pay-
ment by the school district's insurance carrier to Bent of $24,000, computed at
least in part by reference to lost wages. 6'
Bent did not report the $24,000 in his gross income, but the Service as-
serted that the portion of the settlement that constituted compensation for lost
wages should be taxable. The Tax Court sided with Bent, concluding that the
settlement payment was an amount received based upon "tort or tort-type
rights."'68 The government appealed, contending that the settlement "repre-
sented compensation for lost wages which was not excludable from gross
income under section 104(a)(2).""' 9
The Third Circuit affirmed the Tax Court in a brief opinion. 70 Ac-
knowledging that an award of damages for the violation of a constitutional
right may be measured in whole or in part by the amount of lost wages,"'
the court approvingly cited the Ninth Circuit in Roemer for the proposition
that "[tihe personal nature of an injury should not be defined by its ef-
fect."' 2 Accordingly, the settlement was held excludable." 3
163. Bent v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 236, 240 (1986), aff'd, 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 19
164. id. at 237-39.
165. Id. at 240-41.
166. Id. at 241.
167. Id. at 242.
168. Id. at 249.
169. Bent v. Commissioner, 835 F.2d 67, 70 (3d Cir. 1987).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 70.
172. ld. (citing Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 699 (9th Cir. 1983)). The c
stated:
The Commissioner urges that since the settlement admittedly included a sum based
on the taxpayer's lost wages [rather than on pain and suffering], that sum represent-
ed compensation for lost wages which was not excludable from gross income under
section 104(a)(2). We do not agree. For an award of damages for the violation of




173. On petition for rehearing, the Service argued that no personal injury was present in
this case because the injury resulting from the tort was economic. Following this argument,
Bent's suit was merely for lost wages, not personal injury. Bent, 835 F.2d at 70. The court
rejected this position, stating that the denial of a civil right "involves a personal injury just
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2. The Federal Antidiscrimination Cases
In a series of controversial decisions, the principles of Roemer and
Threlkeld were applied with mixed results to particularly nettlesome areas:
back pay and liquidated damage awards, and settlements obtained by employ-
ees alleging violations of federal antidiscrimination statutes such as the Fair
Labor Standards Act,"' the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,"5 and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act"' prior to its amendment in 1991.'" Al-
though the recovery scheme set forth in each statute varies slightly, the basic
underlying remedy is the recovery of back pay: the amount that the victim
should have been paid as compared to what the victim was in fact paid during
the victim's term of employment, or the amount the victim would have earned
absent an improper termination in violation of the applicable statute. In addi-
tion, under the ADEA and the FLSA (but not under pre-amendment Title VII),
the successful claimant may recover liquidated damages in an "additional
equal amount"; that is, an amount equal to the award of back pay."' Under
most statutes of this nature, a claimant may also seek equitable relief, such as
reinstatement and an order prohibiting further discriminatory practices. General
compensatory damages (such as for pain and suffering or mental anguish) and
punitive damages, however, are not available to a plaintiff under these statutes.
The limited recovery scheme reflected in the federal antidiscrimination
statutes immediately raises the question of whether a taxpayer's recovery
under these statutes is really in the nature of personal injury tort recoveries or
more analogous to breach of contract recoveries for earned but unpaid wages.
If the latter, the § 104(a)(2) exclusion would not apply.
as much as a physical assault." Id. at 70-71. The fact that the resulting damages were mea-
sured by reference to lost wages was of no significance.
174. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) [hereinafter FLSA]. Under the FLSA,
a successful claimant may be entitled to "such legal or equitable relief as may be appropri-
ate to effectuate the purposes of [the FLSA], including without limitation employment, rein-
statement, promotion, and the payment of wages lost and an additional equal amount as
liquidated damages." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1988).
175. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) [hereinafter ADEA]. The remedial
scheme of the ADEA is taken directly from the FLSA and, in fact, is simply cross-refer-
enced in the ADEA rather than set out at length therein. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988). Thus,
the FLSA scheme and the ADEA scheme are virtually identical, with one exception: liquidat-
ed damages are "payable only in cases of willful violations of" the ADEA. Id.
176. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988) (amended 1991) [hereinafter pre-amendment
Title VII.
177. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). As indicated in the text, prior to the enactment of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, successful complainants were limited to equitable relief and an award of
back pay. The 1991 Act significantly expanded these remedies to include (i) compensatory
damages, such as for "future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, men-
tal anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses," and (ii) punitive dam-
ages, provided the complainant demonstrates that the respondent "engaged in a discriminatory
practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally
protected rights of an aggrieved individual." § 102, 105 Stat. at 1072-1073 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. V 1993)).
178. See supra notes 174-75.
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In one of the first cases to address this question, Byrne v. Commission-
er,'79 the taxpayer claimed she was the victim of a retaliatory discharge in
violation of the FLSA. Byrne asserted that she was treated discriminatorily and
eventually terminated by her employer, Grammer, Dempsey & Hudson, Inc., a
steel firm, because she had cooperated with an EEOC investigation of wage
disparity at her workplace." Although Byrne initially sought reinstatement,
she eventually accepted $20,000 in a lump sum settlement of her case.''
Byrne did not report the $20,000 in income. The Tax Court, after concluding
that a plaintiff's claims in a retaliatory discharge lawsuit under the FLSA
exhibit equally demonstrable characteristics of both a personal injury tort
claim "'82 and a breach of contract claim," 3 held one-half of the $20,000 to
be includable, and one-half to be excludable." The Tax Court concluded
that the Roemer/Threlkeld principle did not apply in this case because the
claims settled were not solely claims of a tort-like nature.'
The Third Circuit reversed:'
Based upon our ruling in Bent, we reject the Commissioner's argu-
ment in this case that the settlement is taxable because it was intend-
ed, at least in part, to compensate Byrne for lost wages due to her
wrongful firing. The relevant inquiry, as the Tax Court noted, is
whether the settlement was received on account of personal or non-
personal injuries, not whether the damages compensate the taxpayer
for economic losses.
87
The court acknowledged, however, that "[riejecting this argument...
does not settle the issue of whether the settlement Byrne received was on
account of personal or nonpersonal injuries."'8 8 The court proceeded to ana-
lyze Byrne's FLSA claim'89 and her related New Jersey state law wrongful
discharge claim"9 and concluded that "both the FLSA and state law wrong-
179. 90 T.C. 1000 (1988), rev'd, 883 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1989).
180. Bvne, 90 T.C. at 1001-02.
181. Id. at 1004.
182. Byrne analogized the nature of her FLSA claim to similar claims under New Jersey
state law, such as retaliatory or abusive discharge, which she characterized as being in the
nature of a personal injury tort claim. Id. at 1008.
183. After reviewing cases at the state level involving abusive, retaliatory, and unlawful
discharges, which occasionally characterized such claims as sounding in contract, the Tax
Court concluded that "the contract action [analogy] appears to apply equally well to the facts
here." Id. at 1009.
184. Id. at 1011.
185. Id. at 1011 n.10.
186. Byrne v. Commissioner, 883 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1989).
187. Id. at 214. The court added, "[tlo the extent that the Commissioner argues that
because the settlement was intended to compensate Byrne for economic losses it is therefore
compensating her for non-personal injuries, we find this argument to have been explicitly
rejected in Bent, and we reject it again here." Id.
188. Id.
189. The court concluded that such a claim was "more tort-like than contract-like" be-
cause it sought redress for violation of a duty owed by the employer to the employee by
operation of law (the FLSA) and not pursuant to an express or implied employment contract.
Id. at 215.
190. Id. at 215-16. The Court of Appeals, more so than the Tax Court, viewed the set-
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ful discharge claims settled by Christine Byrne qualify for the section
104(a)(2) exclusion"'' because they were more analogous to tort claims than
contract claims. Accordingly, Byrne's recovery was held tax-exempt.
Despite its losses in Bent and Byrne, the Service continued to argue that
statutory recoveries for back wages were analogous to contract recoveries, and
the Tax Court still seemed receptive to the argument. The matter came to a
head in Rickel v. Commissioner.'92 The taxpayer in Rickel received $80,000
from his former employer in 1983 and $25,000 in 1984 pursuant to a settle-
ment of his ADEA lawsuit. 9 Rickel had been general sales manager of
Malsbary Manufacturing Company. Rickel was passed over for a promotion to
president because the company "wanted someone younger" and was subse-
quently terminated after the new president told Rickel he "wanted a younger
person as general sales manager."''" Rickel sued his former employer under
the ADEA, seeking, inter alia, (i) back wages, benefits, and other compensa-
tions with interest, and (ii) a sum equal to back pay as liquidated damages.'95
Rickel's ADEA case was tried before a jury in 1983. While the jury was
deliberating, the parties reached a settlement under which the employer agreed
to pay Rickel $80,000 immediately and $25,000 during each of the next four
years."9 The settlement agreement did not allocate the settlement amount
among Rickel's various claims for relief.'97
Rickel did not report the $80,000 or the $25,000 as gross income on his
1983 and 1984 tax returns. After the Service issued a notice of deficiency
stating that the entire amount of $105,000 was taxable income, Rickel peti-
tioned. The Tax Court first examined the ADEA and concluded that because
the remedial scheme provided for matching the "additional equal amount"
liquidated damages to the back pay award, it would be logical to conclude that
Rickel's settlement should be split 50-50 between back pay and liquidated
damages.'98 The court, therefore, found that one-half, i.e. $40,000 in 1983
and $12,500 in 1984, of the settlement was attributable to each element of
recovery." 9
The Tax Court then held that the one-half attributable to back pay consti-
tuted taxable income, while the other one-half representing liquidated damages
was not taxable. The court likened the back pay award to damages, received in
an action for breach of contract and, as such, held them includable."l The
tlement as also releasing Grammer from claims by Byrne under state law wrongful discharge
doctrines. Id.
191. Id. at 216.
192. 92 T.C. 510 (1989), rev'd, 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990).
193. Id. at 513.
194. Id. at 512.
195. Id. at 512-13; see also supra note 175.
196. Rickel, 92 T.C. at 513. The settlement was contingent upon the jury answering in
the affirmative to four special interrogatories submitted to them; this subsequently occurred.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 522.
199. See id.
200. See id. at 521-22.
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court viewed the "additional equal amount" liquidated damages as merely a
substitute for difficult-to-measure personal injuries resulting from discriminato-
ry employment practices and, accordingly, held them excludable.2"'
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the Tax Court.0 2 The Third Cir-
cuit began by reviewing the lessons of Roemer and Threlkeld. °3 The court
approvingly cited the Tax Court's beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry analysis
from Threlkeld and agreed that in determining whether the injury complained
of is personal, the origin and character of the claim must be considered rather
than the consequences that result from the injury."2" The Third Circuit then
proceeded to chastise the Tax Court for failing to apply its own tests to the
case at hand:
[T]he Tax Court then slipped into the old analysis previously aban-
doned by the full Tax Court in Threlkeld, i.e., "mount[ing] an inquiry
to determine whether the components of the [taxpayer's discrimina-
tion] injuries for which the [settlement was] made are personal or
[economic]." Instead, once it found that age discrimination was analo-
gous to a personal injury and that the taxpayer's ADEA action
amounted to the assertion of a tort type right, the Tax Court should
have ended its analysis and found that all damages flowing therefrom
were excludable under § 104(a)(2). By going further and rummaging
through the taxpayer's prayers for relief in order to determine the
nature of his claim, the Tax Court was simply defining the nature of
the taxpayer's injury by reference to its nonpersonal consequences, an
approach ... the full Tax Court rejected in Threlkeld .... [T]he
nonpersonal, economic effects of the employer's act of discrimina-
tion, e.g., loss of wages, does not transform a personal tort type claim
into one for nonpersonal injuries.201
Thus, under the Threlkeld analysis, the only question the Tax Court
should have considered was whether an action under the ADEA was "tort or
tort-type." If so, all damages recovered by Rickel should have been considered
as received on account of a personal injury. Turning to this question, the Court
of Appeals concluded that an ADEA action is in fact more akin to a personal
injury tort action, and not to a breach of contract action:
[F]ocusing on the nature of the claim, we are convinced that the
taxpayer's discrimination suit under the ADEA was analogous to the
assertion of a tort type right to redress a personal injury. By discrimi-
nating against the taxpayer on the basis of his age, Malsbary invaded
the rights that the taxpayer "is granted by virtue of being a person in
the sight of the law." The taxpayer merely sought the remedies af-
forded by the statute as compensation for the personal injury he suf-
fered as a result of his employer's act of discrimination; the requested
201. Id. at 522.
202. Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990).
203. Id. at 659.
204. Id. (quoting Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1299); see also supra note 151.
205. Rickel, 900 F.2d at 661-62 (citations omitted).
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remedies were not separate claims in themselves to redress the
employer's breach of a contract. The nonpersonal consequences of the
discrimination, e.g. the loss of wages, does not transform discrimina-
tion into a nonpersonal injury.2"
As in Bent and Byrne, the Third Circuit sided with the taxpayer in Rickel
and held the taxpayer's ADEA recovery fully excludable under §
104(a)(2).
2 7
The Service continued to litigate cases involving recoveries under statutes
such as the ADEA and the FLSA, arguing that such statutes evince a recovery
scheme that is predicated on theories of breach of contract and not tort law.
Generally speaking, the courts were unimpressed with this view and frequently
held that the entire amount of such recoveries fell within the scope of I.R.C. §
104(a)(2).2" For example, in Pistillo v. Commissioner,2" the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals adopted the reasoning of the Third Circuit in Rickel and held
that the taxpayer's recovery in an ADEA lawsuit was fully excludable."'
Subsequently, in Downey v. Commissioner,2" the Tax Court itself fell
206. Id. at 663 (citations and footnotes omitted).
207. When Rickel came before the Third Circuit in 1990, the Service made the same
previously rejected arguments. The Third Circuit reacted as follows:
[Tbo the extent that the Commissioner, in spending an inordinately large part of his
brief attempting to establish that at least half of the settlement comprised payment
for back pay, is arguing that "because the settlement was intended to compensate
[the taxpayer] for economic losses it is therefore compensating [him] for
nonpersonal injuries, we find this argument to have been rejected in Bent [and
Byrne], and we reject it again here" for the third time.
Id. at 662 n.9 (quoting Byme v. Commissioner, 883 F.2d 211, 214 (3d cir. 1989)) (emphasis
added).
208. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, see Wulf v. City of Wichita, 883
F.2d 842, 873 (10th Cir. 1989) (in a non-tax case, holding an award of damages specifically
allocated to back pay as a result of a wrongful discharge in violation of First Amendment
rights nontaxable under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)); Redfield v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 940 F.2d
542, 549 (9th Cir. 1990) (also in a non-tax case, holding awards under ADEA and the Cali-
fornia Fair Employment and Housing Act excludable).
209. 912 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990).
210. Pistillo had been awarded $55,000 in back pay by a jury. and while the case was
on appeal, the parties settled for approximately that amount. Therefore, Pistillo's entire recov-
ery was merely for back pay and no part of the settlement was attributable to "additional
equal amount" liquidated damages. The Tax Court accepted the view of the Service that this
recovery was more similar to a breach of contract recovery and therefore fully includable. At
that time, the Tax Court's decision in Rickel I had not yet been reversed by the Third Cir-
cuit. On appeal of Pistillo, the Sixth Circuit reversed. After approvingly citing the Threlkeld
beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry analysis, the Court of Appeals stated:
Reviewing the nature of Pistillo's claim, we conclude that his age discrimination
lawsuit is analogous to the assertion of a tort-type right to redress personal injuries.
Cleveland Tool discriminated against Pistillo on the basis of his age and invaded
the rights Pistillo "is granted by virtue of being'a person in the sight of the
law.". . . Pistillo's loss of wages-a substantial non-personal consequence of his
employer's age discrimination-did not transform the discrimination into a non-per-
sonal injury.
Pistillo, 912 F.2d at 149-150 (quoting Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1308) (citations omitted).
211. 97 T.C. 150 (1991). For a discussion of the subsequent history of Downey, see
19951
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
into line and held the taxpayer's entire ADEA recovery to be excludable.
Downey had received $120,000, one-half of which was specifically allocated
to back pay, and one-half of which was allocated to "additional equal amount"
liquidated damages. In a lengthy opinion, the Tax Court reviewed the history
of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), the relevant Regulations, and past cases. The court then
noted:
[t]he inquiry under section 104(a)(2) is whether the nature of the
claim giving rise to the payment is tort or tort-like and whether the
nature of the injury is personal. If the above two questions are an-
swered in the affirmative, then our inquiry should end, and the settle-
ment amount received on account of the personal injury is excludable
from gross income under section 104(a)(2). 2
Applying the foregoing principles, the court decided that the task was to
focus on the nature of the claim on which Downey's ADEA suit was founded.
[T]he consequences of a personal injury, or the actual damages suf-
fered, do not affect our inquiry under section 104(a)(2). Whether the
damages paid to the tort victim reflect a substitute for amounts or
items otherwise taxable or a substitute for amounts or items to be
enjoyed without a tax consequence is irrelevant....
We seek to determine whether petitioner's claim under the
ADEA sounded in tort and whether the nature of the injury arising
from age discrimination is personal for purposes of section 104(a)(2).
If we answer those questions in the affirmative, then our inquiry has
ended, and the payment petitioner received in settlement of the age
discrimination claim is excludable under section 104(a)(2). We need
not consider the nature of the consequences of the personal injury
(such as whether the victim suffered pain and suffering or was de-
prived of all or a portion of his livelihood)."3
Following the lead of the various appellate court decisions finding the
ADEA recovery scheme based on concepts of personal injury tort law and not
breach of contract, the Tax Court explicitly overruled and abandoned its for-
mer position in Rickel and Pistillo21 4 over the dissent of seven judges."5
The Service, however, did not fight completely in vain. In Thompson v.
Commissioner,"6 the Fourth Circuit agreed with the government and the Tax
Court." 7 The Fourth Circuit held that amounts recovered as back pay in a
infra note 260 and accompanying text.
212. Downey, 97 T.C. at 161 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
213. Id. at 163-64 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
214. Id. at 168-70.
215. The majority opinion was joined by ten other Tax Court judges. In a dissent joined
by six other judges, Judge Cohen 'argued that the beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry analysis
was misguided and concluded that the "dual nature" approach followed by the Tax Court in
Rickel was correct. Downey, 97 T.C. at 174-80.
216. 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir.1989).
217. Thompson had instituted a class action lawsuit against her employer, the United
States Government Printing Office, asserting gender discrimination claims under the Equal
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gender discrimination suit under the Equal Pay Act2 " and pre-amendment
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act" 9 were taxable, although the portion of the
taxpayer's recovery representing "additional equal amount" liquidated damages
was not.
After analyzing the statutory scheme [of the Equal Pay Act and Title
VII] we conclude that Thompson received the liquidated damages
through prosecution of a tort-type claim for personal injuries. We
conclude, however, that the claim for back pay was essentially a
contractual claim for accrued wages. Thus, the Tax Court correctly
held the liquidated damages award excludable under section
104(a)(2), and the award of back pay includable in gross income.22
The Fourth Circuit was convinced, based on its analysis of the Equal Pay
Act and Title VII, that recoveries for back pay under those statutes were
essentially contractual in nature and therefore taxable.22 Recoveries for liqui-
dated damages under the Equal Pay Act, however, were received through a
"tort or tort-type" action for personal injuries and therefore excludable.222
As in Thompson, the Service often enjoyed success in taxing back pay
recoveries under pre-amendment Title VII. As previously noted, the sole mon-
etary remedy available in a pre-amendment Title VII action (in addition to
equitable relief) is a recovery of back pay. 23 This fact strengthened the
Pay Act and Title VII. Thompson, 89 T.C. 632, 633 (1987). In 1982, Thompson received
approximately $66,000 in back pay under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII and approximate-
ly $66,000 in liquidated damages under the Equal Pay Act. Id. at 637. The Tax Court held
that the back pay award, but not the liquidated damages award, was includable in her in-
come, consistent with its decisions in Byrne and Rickel. Id.
218. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988).
219. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
220. Thompson, 866 F.2d at 712 (emphasis added).
221. The court stated:
Thompson performed essentially the same work as her male co-workers for which
she should have received equal pay. The back pay award was simply recovery for
earned, but unpaid, wages which distinguishes her award of back pay from awards
for lost wages or lost income in traditional personal injury/tort actions. She received
compensation for services rendered whereas a tort plaintiff receives compensation
for the inability to earn an income due to the tortious action of a defendant.
Further, the purpose of the Equal Pay Act is to ensure equal pay for equal
work regardless of the gender of the employee. The amount of the award is calcu-
lated based on the wage differential between similarly situated male and female
employees without regard to tax consequences. If the back pay award were exclud-
ed from gross income, Thompson would be placed at an advantage over her male
co-workers, who presumably reported their total earned wages as gross income.
Id. (citations omitted).
222. The court concluded:
In contrast to the award of back pay, Thompson's liquidated damages award was
not earned income. Rather, it served both as a deterrent to ensure compliance with
the Act, and as "compensation for the retention of a workman's pay which might
result in damages too obscure and difficult of proof for estimate other than by
liquidated damages." As such, the liquidated damages award constituted compensa-
tion received through a tort or tort-type action for personal injuries.
Id. (quoting Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 710 (1945)),
223. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
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Service's arguments that the remedial scheme of the statute was more analo-
gous to breach of contract recovery rather than tort.
224
The taxpayer in Sparrow v. Commissioner25 was a computer specialist
for the Navy. He resigned after receiving a notice of removal, and subsequent-
ly filed a Title VII complaint with the Navy alleging racial discrimination.226
After the Navy rejected the complaint, the case was reviewed by the EEOC.
The EEOC found for Sparrow and ordered his reinstatement. Sparrow opted to
settle with the Navy and received $69,284 in back pay.
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit adopted a two-part test in ana-
lyzing I.R.C. § 104(a)(2): the amount received (1) must be for damages and
(2) must result from a personal injury.2  Under this unique approach, which
has never been adopted by any other federal court, the Court of Appeals con-
cluded that the first test was not satisfied. The amount received by Sparrow
was not received as "damages" but rather as equitable relief. The court noted
that, in enacting Title VII, Congress did not make the legal remedies of com-
pensatory and punitive damages available. Instead, Congress limited the reme-
dy to equitable relief.229 The court concluded that an award of back pay un-
der Title VII did not constitute a remedy of damages. Therefore, the award
was not excludable income under section 104(a)(2).23
In so holding, the Court of Appeals specifically rejected the Threlkeld
beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry analysis, noting that it "leapfrogged over the
damages requirement directly to the personal injury inquiry, at the same time
fusing the distinction between damages and back pay universally recognized in
Title VII cases. 23'
While the two-part test proposed in Sparrow has not won adherence out-
side the D.C. Circuit, the opinion seems to be the first to foreshadow the
approach ultimately adopted by the Supreme Court in United States v. Burke.
3. United States v. Burke
23 2
In Burke, the taxpayers had recovered back pay from their employer (the
Tennessee Valley Authority) in settlement of a Title VII sex discrimination
action brought in 1984.233 The TVA paid a lump sum of $5 million to be
224. In Crossin v. United States, 789 F. Supp. 906 (N.D. 111. 1991), the taxpayer had
received $214,913.66 in 1989 for participating in the settlement of a class action Title VII
gender discrimination lawsuit against the FBI. The amount represented wages Crossin would
have earned from 1977 through 1988 had the FBI hired her. Id. at 907. In a somewhat
indecipherable opinion, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois agreed with the
government that the entire back pay settlement award was taxable. The basis of the court's
holding is unclear.
225. 949 F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
226. Id. at 434-35.
227. Id. at 435.
228. Id. at 436.
229. Id. at 437.
230. Id. at 438.
231. Id. at 439.
232. 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
233. Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 1119, 1120 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct.
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distributed among the plaintiffs under a formula devised by the employees'
union. The formula considered the length of service in the affected rates of
pay and salary schedule."M Burke raised the question of whether those pay-
ments were excludable under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).
The District Court ruled that, because the taxpayers sought and obtained
only back wages due as a result of TVA's discriminatory underpayments rath-
er than compensatory or other damages, the settlement proceeds did not result
from a "tort or tort-type" action and could not be excluded from gross income
as damages received on account of personal injuries.23
The Sixth Circuit reversed on appeal.236 Viewing the issue "as a quite
narrow one, 237 the Sixth Circuit approvingly restated the Threlkeld begin-
ning-and-end-of-the-inquiry test and then noted:
In other words, determining whether the § 104(a)(2) exclusion applies
requires an examination of the nature of the injury to determine
whether the injury and claim are personal and tort-like in nature, and
not whether the consequences of the injury resulted in an award of
compensatory damages or damages for back pay. Thus, our inquiry is
limited to whether injuries resulting from sex discrimination in viola-
tion of Title VII are "personal injuries" for the purposes of §
104(a)(2).23
The court answered this latter question in the affirmative. 239 The govern-
ment had argued, however, that a Title VII lawsuit is distinguishable from
other types of actions (such as those brought under the ADEA) because in a
Title VII action the only monetary remedy available is an award of back pay.
Thus, the taxpayer was recovering only for economic injury, not personal
injury.2 " The Sixth Circuit disagreed, concluding that the government's ar-
gument improperly focused "on the consequences of a Title VII violation (the
payment of back pay for lost wages) rather than the personal nature of the
1867 (1992).
234. Id.
235. Burke v. United States, 90-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) l 50,213 (E.D. Tenn. 1990),
rev'd, 929 F.2d 1119 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
236. Burke, 929 F.2d 1119 (6th Cir. 1991).
237. Id. at 1121.
238. Id. at 1121 (citations omitted). The court concluded:
In sum, Threlkeld and its progeny require that for the purposes of § 104(a)(2), this
court determine whether the injury is personal and the claim resulting in the dam-
ages is tort-like in nature. If the answer is in the affirmative, then that is "the
beginning and end of the inquiry. .... At no point do we inquire into the na-
ture of the damages involved. Rather the narrow scope of our gaze is properly
limited to the "origin and character of the claim, . . . and not to the consequences
that result from the injury."
Id. at 1123 (quoting Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1299) (citations omitted).
239. The court noted, "Courts have long held that injuries resulting from invidious dis-
crimination, be it on the basis of race, sex, national origin or some other unlawful category,
are injuries to the individual rights and dignity of the person." Burke, 929 F.2d at 1121.
240. Id. at 1122.
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injury (invidious discrimination)."24'
Finding no convincing reason to distinguish an award under the ADEA, as
was held nontaxable in Pistillo, from an award under Title VII, the Sixth
Circuit found the settlement awards in Burke to be nontaxable.242
Recognizing a conflict among Sparrow, Thompson, and Burke, the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari, 43 and reversed in a 7-2 decision. In holding
a pre-amendment Title VII back pay recovery to be taxable, the Supreme
Court fashioned an entirely new "scope of the remedies" test for identifying
"tort or tort-type" actions.244
After reviewing the Sixth Circuit's test, 245 Justice Blackmun, writing for
the majority, agreed with the test in part: "We thus agree with the Court of
Appeals' analysis insofar as it focused, for purposes of § 104(a)(2), on the
nature of the claim underlying respondents' damages award. Respondents, for
their part, agree that this is the appropriate inquiry, as does the dissent. 246
In an effort to articulate the standards by which it can be determined
whether an action brought under federal antidiscrimination statutes can be
characterized as one attempting to vindicate "tort or tort-type" rights, the Su-
preme Court fashioned a new "scope of the remedies" analysis. The Supreme
Court's analysis emphasized whether the statute in question incorporates suffi-
cient hallmarks of traditional concepts of tort liability and recovery:
A "tort" has been defined broadly as a "civil wrong, other than
breach of contract, for which the court will provide a remedy in the
form of an action for damages." Remedial principles thus figure
prominently in the definition and conceptualization of torts. Indeed,
one of the hallmarks of traditional tort liability is the availability of a
broad range of damages to compensate the plaintiff "fairly for inju-
ries caused by the violation of his legal rights." Although these dam-
ages often are described in compensatory terms, in many cases they
are larger than the amount necessary to reimburse actual monetary
loss sustained or even anticipated by the plaintiff, and thus redress
intangible elements of injury that are "deemed important, even though
241. Id. (emphasis added).
242. The court was not convinced of
any principled way to distinguish the injuries arising from a claim for invidious age
discrimination, and the claim for invidious sex discrimination . . . except that these
tort claims were brought under different federal statutes. In addition, the government
was unable to demonstrate why injuries resulting from sex discrimination were not
"personal" while other forms of nonphysical tort injuies were "personal" for the
purposes of § 104(a)(2) exclusion.
Id. at 1123.
243. United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 47 (1992).
244. United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
245. Significantly, the Supreme Court cited with seeming approval the Threlkeld test:
"The Court of Appeals concluded that exclusion under § 104(a)(2) turns on whether the inju-
ry and the claim are 'personal tort-like in nature.' 'If the answer is affirmative,' the court
held, 'then that is the beginning and end of the inquiry."
Id. at 1869 (citations omitted).
246. Id. at 1872 (citations omitted).
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not pecuniary in [their] immediate consequence[s]."
For example, the victim of a physical injury may be permitted,
under the relevant state law, to recover damages not only for lost
wages, medical expenses, and diminished future earning capacity on
account of the injury, but also for emotional distress and pain and
suffering. Similarly, the victim of a "dignitary" or non-physical tort
such as defamation may recover not only for any actual pecuniary
loss (e.g., loss of business or customers), but for "impairment of
reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and
mental anguish and suffering." Furthermore, punitive or exemplary
damages are generally available in those instances where the
defendant's misconduct was intentional or reckless . 247
In order to come within the § 104(a)(2) income exclusion, re-
spondents therefore must show that Title VII, the legal basis for their
recovery of backpay, redresses a tort-like personal injury in accord
with the foregoing principles.4 8
According to Justice Blackmun, if a federal antidiscrimination statute
reflects sufficient indicia of traditional tort concepts of recovery, it will be
viewed as redressing a tort-like personal injury under § 104(a)(2). The main
difference between this analysis and that employed by the Sixth Circuit, then,
is in the manner in which an action involving "tort or tort-type" rights is to be
identified. Under the Sixth Circuit's view and under the view of most of the
courts that had taken up the matter, this determination involved an inquiry into
whether the underlying injury was to the "individual rights and dignity of the
person"; 249 that is, whether there had been an "invasion of the rights that an
individual is granted by virtue of being a person in the sight of the law.' 25
Justice Blackmun did not agree, however, that this was the appropriate
test."' The Supreme Court's test, which focused on the scope of the rem-
edies afforded under the particular antidiscrimination statute, led to a much
different result when applied to Title VII cases:
Indeed, in contrast to the tort remedies for physical and nonphysical
injuries discussed above, Title VII does not allow awards for compen-
satory or punitive damages; instead, it limits available remedies to
247. Id. at 1870-72 (emphasis added) (citations and footnote omitted). Justice Blackmun
also pointed to the fact that no jury trial is available in a Title VIi action as further indica-
tion that such an action does not bear the hallmarks of a traditional tort action. Id. at 1872.
248. Id. at 1872.
249. See, e.g., Burke, 929 F.2d at 1121.
250. Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1308.
251. The Court noted:
It is beyond question that discrimination in employment on the basis of sex, race,
or any of the other classifications protected by Title VII is, as respondents argue
and this Court consistently has held, an invidious practice that causes grave harm
to its victims. The fact that employment discrimination causes harm to individuals
does not automatically imply, however, that there exists a tort-like "personal injury"
for purposes of federal income tax law.
Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1872-73 (citations omitted).
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backpay, injunctions, and other equitable relief .... An employee
wrongfully discharged on the basis of sex thus may recover only an
amount equal to the wages the employee would have earned from the
date of discharge to the date of reinstatement, along with lost fringe
benefits such as vacation pay and pension benefits; similarly, an
employee wrongfully denied a promotion on the basis of sex, or, as
in this case, wrongfully discriminated against in salary on the basis of
sex, may recover only the differential between the appropriate pay
and actual pay for services performed, as well as lost benefits.
' * * Nothing in this remedial scheme purports to recompense a
Title VII plaintiff for any of the other traditional harms associated
with the personal injury, such as pain and suffering, emotional dig-
tress, harm to reputation, or other consequential damages.252
While recognizing that other federal antidiscrimination statutes may be
sufficiently "tort-like" under this standard,253 this was not the case in a Title
VII action:2" "Thus, we cannot say that a statute such as Title VII, whose
sole remedial focus is the award of backwages, redresses a tort-like personal
injury within the meaning of § 104(a)(2) and the applicable regulations."'255
Accordingly, the majority held that the backpay awards were taxable.5 6
4. Evaluation of Burke's Law
As a practical matter, the specific holding of Burke will have a diminish-
ing impact as time passes and pre-1991 Title VII controversies fall away."5 7
Of more importance will be the utility and practicality of the approach articu-
lated by the Supreme Court for determining whether recoveries under other
federal antidiscrimination statutes are excludable.5 8 It remains to be seen
252. Id. at 1873 (citations omitted).
253. The court stated:
No doubt discrimination could constitute a "personal injury" for purposes of
§ 104(a)(2) if the relevant cause of action evidenced a tort-like conception of injury
and remedy. Indeed, the circumscribed remedies available Title VII stand in marked
contrast not only to those available under traditional tort law, but under other feder-
al antidiscrimination statutes, as well.
Id. at 1873 (citations and footnotes omitted).
254. The Court noted:
Notwithstanding a common-law tradition of broad tort damages and the existence of
other federal antidiscrimination statutes offering similarly broad remedies, Congress
declined to recompense Title VII plaintiffs for anything beyond the wages properly
due them - wages that, if paid in the ordinary course, would have been fully tax-
able.
Id. at 1874 (citation omitted).
255. Id. (footnote omitted).
256. In a concurring opinion that departed wholly from established law, Justice Scalia
agreed that the back pay awards should be taxable, but on the surprising theory that only
damages received for physical injuries should be eligible for exemption under § 104(a)(2).
Id. at 1875. This long-discredited notion had not even been argued by the government.
257. In dissent, Justice O'Connor noted that "[bly resting on the remedies available un-
der Title VII and distinguishing the recently amended version of that law, the Court does
make today's decision a narrow one." Id. at 1881 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
258. As previously noted, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 sigrfificantly expanded the reme-
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how the lower federal courts will apply the new "scope of the remedies" anal-
ysis laid down by the Supreme Court, and whether the new test will lead to
heightened uniformity in judicial decisions in this area.
However, if experience in the first two years following the Supreme
Court's decision in Burke is any indication, the courts appear confused. For
example, several courts have attempted to apply the "scope of the remedies"
analysis to back pay and liquidated damage recoveries under the ADEA, with
wildly divergent results. After the Supreme Court's ruling in Burke, the Tax
Court reexamined its decision in Downey v. Commissioner259  at the
government's request. The Tax Court affirmed that decision, holding that the
"scope of the remedies" test is satisfied by the ADEA.2" The Seventh Cir-
cuit reversed, however, and held that the ADEA does not provide remedies
that are the hallmark of tort liability because liquidated damages-the only
remedy available in an ADEA action that differentiates them from Title VII
actions-do not compensate the victim for the intangible elements of a person-
al injury.26" ' Thus, ADEA recoveries "lack an essential element of a tort-type
claim" 262 and do "not even clear the low hurdle" 263 of being "tort-type" un-
der the Regulations. 26' The Seventh Circuit therefore viewed ADEA recov-
eries as taxable.
The Seventh Circuit is in conflict with the Ninth Circuit over the treat-
ment of ADEA recoveries. In Schmitz v. Commissioner,265 the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the ADEA does in fact "establish[] a tort-like cause of action
within the meaning of Burke"2' and held the taxpayer's back pay and liqui-
dies available to a successful Title VII plaintiff. See supra note 177. As to post-1991 Title
VII recoveries, the Service has concluded that recoveries for disparate treatment discrimina-
tion (the remedies for which include compensatory and punitive damages) are excludable (but
specifically declining to rule as to whether a punitive damage recovery would be excludable),
while back pay recoveries for disparate impact discrimination (the remedies for which do not
include compensatory or punitive damages, and are more akin to those available under the
ADEA) are not excludable. Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 61.
259. 97 T.C. 150 (1991), affd on reh'g, 100 T.C. 634 (1993), rev'd, 33 F.3d 836 (7th
Cir. 1994).
260. Downey v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 634 (1993).
261. Downey v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 836, 840 (7th Cir. 1994).
262. Downey, 33 F.3d at 840. The Tax Court continues to follow its decision in
Downey. See, e.g., Bums v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 3116 (1994); Cassino v. Com-
missioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2193 (1994); Fite v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1588
(1993).
263. Downey, 33 F.3d at 838.
264. The Seventh Circuit gave no indication as to whether it endorsed the one-step
ThrelkeldlHorion test or the two-step HawkinslMiller test, a controversy that is discussed in
the text below. Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit stated in dicta its approval of the position
taken by Justice Scalia in his concurrence in Burke, see supra note 256, that the plain lan-
guage of I.R.C. § 104 excludes awards only for physical injury, Thus, even if the Seventh
Circuit had concluded that ADEA claims are tort-type, the court would apparently have ruled
Downey's award to be taxable. Downey, 33 F.3d at 838.
265. 34 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1994). Both Schmitz and Downey were argued on April 11,
1994, and decided on August 30, 1994.
266. Id. at 794. The government argued in Schmitz that liquidated damages under the
ADEA represent only punitive damages, and therefore do not compensate the victim for
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dated damage recoveries to be excludable. The other federal courts that have
attempted to apply the "scope of the remedies" test to ADEA recoveries re-
flect hopeless confusion.267
The Supreme Court will soon step in to resolve the application of the
"scope of the remedies" test to the ADEA. On August 31, 1993, in three relat-
ed but unreported decisions, the Tax Court held recoveries under the ADEA to
be excludable. One of these cases, Schleier v. Commissioner,"' was subse-
quently appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed without opinion."6 The
other two cases have been appealed to the Tenth27 and Eleventh"" Cir-
injuries such as emotional distress or pain and suffering. See id. at 793. The government's
position was that, because liquidated damages serve no compensatory purpose and because
the presence of compensatory damages is vital to a scheme of tort recovery, the scope of
the remedies under the ADEA do not include a tort-like conception of remedy. The Schmitz
majority disagreed, concluding that ADEA liquidated damages do in fact serve a compensato-
ry purpose, at least in part, and this factor, taken together with the fact that the ADEA
allows for jury trials, serves to distinguish the ADEA from pre-amendment Title VII as
evaluated in the Burke decisions. Id. Whether or not liquidated damages under the ADEA
are punitive, compensatory, or both, is a matter of controversy in the federal courts. See
infra notes 267 and 509.
267. See, e.g., Rice v. United States, 834 F. Supp. 1241 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (ruling that
back pay and liquidated damages are not taxable). The court noted that the ADEA, in con-
trast with pre-amendment Title VII, provides for a jury trial and liquidated damages. Whether
ADEA liquidated damages are viewed as serving a compensatory purpose or a punitive pur-
pose is irrelevant. In either case, such damages are a "tort-type remedy which distinguishes
the ADEA from pre-amendment Title VII." Id. at 1245. By concluding that the nature of liq-
uidated damages is irrelevant, the court seemed to adopt a Threlkeld beginning-and-end-of-
the-inquiry analysis that is inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit's later decision in Schmitz.
Both Downey (award taxable) and Rice (award not taxable) involved United Airlines pilots
who were plaintiffs in the same ADEA class action lawsuit.
The recovery of back pay was held taxable in Maleszewski v. United States, 827 F.
Supp. 1553 (N.D. Fla. 1993). The only difference in remedies under pre-amendment Title
VII and the ADEA is the availability of liquidated damages in cases involving willful vio-
lations. Id. at 1556. The purpose of liquidated damages is wholly punitive and noncompensa-
tory and this single difference "does not convert every ADEA award into 'personal injury'
damages for tax purposes." Id. at 1556-57. Maleszewski was criticized, and both back pay
and liquidated damages were held non-taxable in Bennett v. United States, 30 Cl. Ct. 396
(1994). As in Rice, it is irrelevant whether liquidated damages are characterized as compen-
satory or punitive in nature. Id. at 400; see also Shaw v. United States, 853 F. Supp. 1378
(M.D. Ala. 1994) (adopting the reasoning of Maleszewski and holding back pay and liquidat-
ed damage recoveries taxable); Drase v. United States, 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,463
(N.D. II1. 1994) (following Maleszewski and Shaw and holding the recovery taxable and
viewing liquidated damages as wholly punitive); cf Wood, supra note 121, at 365 ("On bal-
ance ... it would appear that ADEA recoveries stand an excellent chance of continuing to
be excludable .... ").
268. No. 22909-90 (T.C. 1990), cited in Bums v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M.(CCH) 3116,
3118 (1994).
269. 26 F.3d 1119 (5th Cir. 1994) (table), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 507 (1994). The
Fifth Circuit considers awards under the ADEA not taxable. See Purcell v. Sequin State
Bank & Trust Co., 999 F.2d 950, 960-61 (5th Cir. 1993) (a non-tax case).
270. Gates v. Commissioner, No. 17889-90 (T.C. 1990), on appeal to the Tenth Circuit
(Nov. 24, 1993), cited in Bums v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 3116, 3118 (1994).
271. Estate of Hillelson v. Commissioner, No. 11464-90 (T.C. 1990), on appeal to the
Eleventh Circuit (Nov. 24, 1993), cited in Bums v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 3116,
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cuits. In light of the conflict between the Fifth and Ninth Circuits on the one
hand, and the Seventh Circuit on the other hand, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Schleier272 on November 14, 1994, to resolve the application of
Burke to ADEA recoveries. In resolving Schleier, the Supreme Court may de-
cide, either directly or indirectly, the issue of whether punitive damages are
excludable under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).273
Importantly, the Supreme Court's test in Burke exacerbates the confusion
surrounding the taxation of punitive damages. It is unclear whether the Su-
preme Court validated the Threlkeld beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry analysis,
which had been applied by the Sixth Circuit. The Supreme Court cited that
analysis, then subsequently noted that it "agree[d] with the Court of Appeals'
analysis insofar as it focused, for purposes of § 104(a)(2), on the nature of the
claim underlying respondents' damages award. 274 Was this enigmatic state-
ment intended to place a stamp of approval on the Threlkeld analysis? Appar-
ently, the Supreme Court did not have a problem with the notion that, so long
as the injury and the claim are "personal and tort-like in nature," that is the
"beginning and end of the inquiry." The Court seemed only to object to the
manner in which the inquiry itself was to be undertaken and substituted its
"scope of the remedies" analysis for the tests that had been applied by the
lower courts in identifying a tort or tort-type action.
If the Threlkeld analysis survived the Supreme Court's scope-of-the-reme-
dies test, it is arguable that as long as the underlying claim is tort or tort-type,
that is the beginning and end of the inquiry and all damages-including puni-
tive damages-are excludable from income.27 The Supreme Court's analysis
in Burke has crucial significance to the question of the federal income tax
treatment of punitive damages.
On the other hand, it is also easy for a court to distinguish the Supreme
Court's decision in Burke from any case involving punitive damages. Burke
simply did not involve punitive damages and did not address that issue. Re-
gardless of whether Burke is factually distinguishable, it can be argued that the
Supreme Court did not explicitly approve the Threlkeld approach. Therefore,
there is nothing in the Burke decision to preclude the conclusion that if an
injury is found to be tort or tort-type under the scope-of-the-remedies test,
there is also a second inquiry to be considered: whether the resulting recovery
is received "on account of' that injury. If a second test indeed exists and
requires the recovery to be received "on account of" a personal injury, it can
be argued that punitive damages are not excludable under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)
on the theory that punitive damages are not received on account of personal
injury at all, but because of the tortfeasor's malicious or wanton misconduct.
3118 (1994).
272. 115 S. Ct. 507 (1994).
273. See infra note 505 and accompanying text.
274. See United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1872 (1992).
275. Note, however, that both the Tax Court and the Sixth Circuit in Threlkeld seemed
to be addressing the tax treatment of compensatory damages only. See supra notes 155 and
159.
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Whether the Threlkeld beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry approach has
survived Burke is a key question affecting the taxation of punitive damages.
Courts attempting to apply the Supreme Court's test in Burke to the tax treat-
ment of punitive damages have come to inconsistent conclusions.
C. The Riddle of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989 and its Amendment
of I.R.C. § 104(a)
In the midst of the battle being played out in the courts, described in the
previous section, Congress moved to bring some certainty to the area. In 1989,
as part of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989, I.R.C. § 104(a) was
amended to provide that the § 104(a)(2) exclusion "shall not apply to any
punitive damages in connection with a case not involving physical injury or
physical sickness. ' 276 This curious language, phrased as a double negative,
has succeeded only in confounding those judges who have since attempted to
divine congressional intent in adopting the amendment. Serious doubt and
confusion continues to exist over the legislative purpose behind the amend-
ment, and its impact on the proper tax treatment of punitive damages is ex-
tremely problematic.
That the amendment was adopted to address the emerging judicial trend
extending § 104(a)(2) to recoveries for nonphysical injury seems clear. The
House Conference Report277 accompanying the Revenue Reconciliation Act
of 1993 (RRA '93) acknowledges those judicial developments by stating that
"[i]n some cases, courts have held that [the I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)] exclusion is
available even though there is no physical injury, for example, in cases involv-
ing employment discrimination." 278 Concerned about this emerging trend,7 9
the House version of the bill had provided that "the exclusion for damages
276. See supra note 10 (emphasis added).
277. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 386, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 622-23 (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3018, 3225-26.
278. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 386, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 622, reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3225. The House Ways and Means Committee Report was even more spe-
cific, stating:
Courts have interpreted [the I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)] exclusion broadly in some cases to
cover awards for personal injury that do not relate to a physical injury or sickness.
For example, some courts have held that the exclusion applies to damages in cases
involving employment discrimination and injury to reputation where there is no
physical injury or sickness.
Amounts received as damages for personal injury or sickness receive favorable tax
treatment in that they are excludable from gross income. The committee believes
that such treatment is inappropriate where no physical injury or sickness is in-
volved.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1354-55 (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2824-25.
279. By 1989, compensatory damage recoveries for nonphysical injuries had been held
excludable in Byme v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 1000 (1988), rev'd, 883 F.2d 211 (3d Cir.
1989); Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294 (1986), aff'd. 848 F.2d 87 (6th Cir. 1988);
Bent v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 236 (1986). aff'd, 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987); Roemer v.
Commissioner, 79 T.C. 398 (1982), rev'd, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
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received for personal injury is limited to cases involving physical injury or
sickness. '280 This provision would have withdrawn the exclusion for all dam-
ages recoveries (both compensatory and punitive) for nonphysical injuries and
thus would have stemmed the tide of recent decisions. The Senate version of
the bill had no corollary provision. In conference, the bill was amended to
read as finally adopted; however, the legislative history gives no hint as to
congressional intent. The final version of the bill therefore limited the reach of
the provision to punitive damages and adopted the double negative phrasing.
Congressional intent behind the amendment as adopted is extremely diffi-
cult to discern. The question of congressional intent has two important aspects.
First, what did Congress think existing law was prior to the amendment? This
question has particular relevance to the recent case law developments concern-
ing punitive damages that are the focus of this article, as those cases all arose
under federal tax law as it existed prior to 1989. Therefore, if one determines
that a particular interpretation of congressional intent is more attractive than
another, one must also consider whether that interpretation is consistent with
the conclusions already reached by the Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, and Federal Cir-
cuits in Miller, Horton, Hawkins, and Reese, respectively.
2
11
A second aspect of this legislative history addresses how Congress intend-
ed to change existing law. That is, what did Congress intend the effect of the
amendment to be on post-RRA '89 damage recoveries? Clearly, after the
amendment, punitive damages for nonphysical injuries are taxable. Conversely,
by implication it would seem relatively clear that punitive damages for physi-
cal injuries are to be excluded subsequent to RRA '89. This interpretation has
received support from the commentators.2 2 Significantly, the Supreme Court
has apparently endorsed this view of post-RRA '89 law, stating in Burke that
"Congress amended § 104(a) to allow the exclusion of punitive damages only
in cases involving 'physical injury or physical sickness.
283
With these questions in mind, several possibilities may explain congres-
sional intent behind the 1989 amendment.
280. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 386, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 622, reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3225 (emphasis added).
281. See supra notes I and 2.
282. See, e.g., Mark W. Cochran, 1989 Tax Act Compounds Confusion Over Tax Status
of Personal Injury Damages, 49 TAx NOTES 1565, 1567 (1990); Jaeger, supra note 121, at
111-112; Andrews, supra note 121, at 766.
283. United States v. Burke, 112 S.Ct 1867, 1872 n.6 (1992) (emphasis added). This is
essentially the same conclusion reached by Professor Chirelstein, who states:
The result, as it seems, is that physical injury and nonphysical injury are now to
be treated alike under § 104 except with respect to punitive damages, which are
excluded by § 104(a)(2) if awarded in connection with physical injury but remain
taxable under § 61 if awarded in connection with nonphysical injury.
CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 101, at 42; see also Matlow, supra note 121, at 390 ("[B]y impli-
cation punitive damages in physical injury actions will continue to qualify for exclusion
under section 104(a)(2)."). The District Court for the District of Colorado has reached the
same conclusion. In Brabson v. United States, 859 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Colo. 1994), the court
stated that after RRA '89 "[plunitive damage awards are excludable only if the underlying
injury is physical." Id. at 1362 n.2 (emphasis added).
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Interpretation #1. Congress believed that punitive damages awarded
for both physical and nonphysical injuries were tax-exempt prior to 1989.
Congress intended to change existing law by providing that punitive damages
for nonphysical injuries are now taxable, but that punitive damages for physi-
cal injuries will remain tax-exempt.
2 8
4
This reading of the 1989 amendment implies that Congress intended to
narrow the scope of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) in RRA '89.25 This is a plausible ex-
planation of congressional intent, and is the most immediately obvious result
suggested by the wording of the amendment itself. It is also consistent with
the legislative history, which shows that Congress initially sought to remove
even compensatory damages for nonphysical injuries from the reach of I.R.C.
§ 104(a)(2). Limiting the change to just punitive damages can be seen as a
slight retreat from this initial position, and merely a function of legislative
compromise. By expressing a concern over the exclusion of recoveries for
nonphysical injuries only, and by leaving the law unchanged regarding damag-
es for physical injuries, Congress implicitly placed its stamp of approval on
existing law.286
This interpretation of congressional intent, however, fails to explain satis-
factorily the particular double negative phrasing employed. Why did Congress
not simply state in positive terms that "the exclusion for punitive damages
received for personal injury shall only apply in cases involving physicalinjury
or sickness"? This would have made clear both the direct statement (that puni-
tive damages recoveries for physical injury are tax-exempt) and the implied re-
sult (that punitive damages for nonphysical injury are taxable). Congress's
intentional use of the double negative phrasing perhaps suggests the result that
284. See, e.g., Horton v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 625, 631 n. 12 (6th Cir. 1994) (dis-
cussed infra); Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 1994) (Trott, J.,
dissenting) (discussed infra).
285. As relevant to compensatory damages, the Supreme Court has interpreted the legis-
lative history to indicate that subsequent to RRA '89, "Congress assumed that [damages
other than punitive damages, such as compensatory damages] would be excluded in cases of
both physical and nonphysical injury." Id. The Supreme Court thus reads the 1989 amend-
ment to § 104(a)(2) as finally resolving, if further resolution was necessary, and rejecting the
Service's physical- vs.-nonphysical distinction, at least insofar as compensatory damages are
concerned. The Court did not, however, view this as relevant to the larger threshold question
in Burke: whether Burke's back pay award was on account of a tort or tort-type injury, and
therefore whether I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) was even applicable to the recovery.
286. As to the relevance of the amendment to pre-RRA '89 law, see Rickel v. Commis-
sioner, 900 F.2d 655, 664 (3rd Cir. 1990), concluding that the amendment placed a Congres-
sional stamp of approval on the case law trend that had excluded compensatory damage
awards for nonphysical injuries:
In its final conference bill, Congress chose to implicitly endorse the courts' expan-
sive interpretation of § 104(a)(2) to encompass nonphysical injuries and merely cir-
cumscribe the scope of the exemption as to only one type of remedy, i.e., punitive
damages, and not other types of remedies typically available in employment dis-
crimination cases, such as back pay.
Id. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the original House Ways and Means Con-
ference Report specifically disapproved that expansive interpretation. See supra note 278. The
House Conference Committee Report, however, dropped the disapproving language.
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could have been more directly stated was not intended, and that Congress did
not intend to make a definitive statement on the tax treatment of punitive
damages for physical injuries.2"7
Interpretation #2. Congress believed that punitive damages awarded
for both physical and nonphysical injuries were taxable prior to 1989. Con-
gress intended to change existing law by providing that punitive damages for
nonphysical injuries only will continue to be taxable. Therefore, by implica-
tion, damages for physical injuries are now tax-exempt.2"'
If this view of legislative history accurately represents Congress's assump-
tions in enacting the amendment, it means the effect of RRA '89 was to ex-
pand the scope of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). This view is hardly consistent with the
legislative history, which clearly evinces an intent to narrow that scope.
Moreover, if Congress intended to expand the scope of § 104(a)(2), it would
have made much more sense for the amendment to state simply and affirma-
tively that the exemption extends only to punitive damages received for physi-
cal injuries and not for nonphysical injuries. There is no good reason why
Congress would use a double negative if it intended to expand the statute.
The implication of this interpretation is that, if the Fourth, Ninth, and
Federal Circuits are correct in their apparent belief that all punitive damage
recoveries prior to RRA '89 are taxable,289 and if it is true (as the Supreme
Court has indicated) that after RRA '89 only punitive damage recoveries for
nonphysical injuries are taxable, then these Courts of Appeal have interpreted
the RRA '89 amendment as expanding the scope of § 104(a)(2). Again, this is
completely inconsistent with the tenor of the legislative history accompanying
the amendment.
It perhaps can be argued that, by using the double negative phrasing,
Congress did in fact imply that punitive damages for physical injuries are now
exempt where they were not before, but that this implication was totally inad-
vertent and essentially represents a drafting error. However, this seems a very
strained and unwarranted reading of Congressional intent.
Interpretation #3. Congress believed that punitive damages awarded
for both physical and nonphysical injuries were taxable prior to 1989. After
the amendment to I.R.C. § 104, punitive damages, whether for physical or
nonphysical injuries, are still taxable; that is, Congress did not intend to
change existing law."g
287. See Dodge, supra note 70, at 143 ("The 1989 amendment seems to be based on
the erroneous, or at least doubtful, assumption that punitive damages generally fall within the
section 104 exclusion.").
288. See, e.g., Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1087 (Trott, J., dissenting).
289. The analysis and rationale of the Fourth, Ninth, and Federal Circuits' opinions in
Miller, Hawkins, and Reese, respectively, simply do not permit a distinction to be made be-
tween physical and nonphysical injuries. The implication of these decisions is that pre-RRA
'89 punitive damage recoveries for both types of injury are taxable. If this is the case, then
either Interpretation #2 is true-but that interpretation seems wholly unwarranted-or Interpre-
tation #3 is true.
290. See, e.g., Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1086-87 (Trott, J., dissenting).
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This interpretation of congressional intent, which is most favorable to the
Service, is the most strained of the several here discussed. Under this view,
both categories of punitive damages are taxable both before and after the
amendment. It is difficult to believe that this view accurately reflects congres-
sional intent. If the law prior to RRA '89 was complete exclusion, and after
the amendment the law continues to be full exclusion, then the amendment is
completely superfluous and carries no import whatsoever-it does not even
restate or codify existing law in a coherent fashion. Legitimate interpretation
of congressional intent cannot lead to the conclusion that Congress intended to
enact a meaningless statute.
One must consider this interpretation carefully because, if the implication
of the Fourth, Ninth, and Federal Circuit opinions is that all punitive damages,
whether for physical or nonphysical injury, are taxable both before and after
the amendment, the net effect is that the courts have simply written the
amendment out of the statute and have rendered it a complete nullity. This
seems an unprincipled application of legislative history to interpret an
amended statute.
Interpretation #4. Congress believed that punitive damages awarded
for physical injuries were exempt prior to 1989, but punitive damages for
nonphysical injuries were taxable. Congress intended to codify this position by
specifically incorporating it into I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), and this remains the rule
following RRA '89.29
Interpretation #4 implies that Congress was simply clarifying, restating,
and codifying existing law, or at least Congress's understanding of existing
law. While this is not an unreasonable reading of the legislative history, it is
not entirely consistent with the tone of the legislative history, which suggests
that Congress intended to narrow the scope of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) and not
merely restate existing law.
This interpretation has particular merit considering that by 1989, two
courts 292 had held punitive damage recoveries for nonphysical injuries
excludable. It is entirely plausible to assume that Congress was aware of these
holdings and considered them inconsistent with its understanding of the law.
RRA '89 can therefore be viewed as nothing more than a legslative reversal of
those two cases. 293 Of course, these cases were later determined to be -incor-
rectly decided,2" and in that sense the amendment ultimately would be su-
291. See, e.g., Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1082.
292. Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983); Miller v. Commissioner,
93 T.C. 330 (1989), rev'd, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990). The Tax Court decision in Miller
was entered on September 13, 1989. The House Report is dated September 20, 1989, and
the House Conference Committee Report is dated November 21, 1989, the same date that
RRA '89 was passed by both houses of Congress.
293. The main problem with this analysis is that "[t]he legislative history clearly shows
that Congress was rejecting the judicial decisions holding that section 104 covered damages
received from nonphysical injuries rather than decisions that had found punitive damages to
fall within the scope of the section 104 exclusion." Jaeger, supra note 121, at 111-12.
294. Subsequent to RRA '89, the Ninth Circuit disavowed its analysis of punitive dam-
ages from Roemer in Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 1994), and Miller
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perfluous. However, that fact does not undermine this explanation of congres-
sional intent. While it is true that this renders the 1989 amendment meaning-
less, this was certainly not known at the time, and only subsequent events
created that result.
This interpretation also accurately explains the results in Miller, Hawkins;
and Reese (all of which held punitive damages for nonphysical injuries tax-
able) and in Horton (which held punitive damages for a physical injury29
taxable). However, as noted, the rationale of Miller, Hawkins, and Reese does
not seem limited to nonphysical injury, and it seems clear that the Fourth,
Ninth, and Federal Circuits would also hold punitive damages for nonphysical
injuries includable if faced with that issue, a result inconsistent with Interpreta-
tion # 4.
Interpretation # 5. Congress did not have a clear idea how punitive dam-
ages for physical injuries were taxed under existing law, and perhaps it did
not care one way or the other. However, Congress was concerned about the
emerging trend of courts finding that damage awards, both compensatory and
punitive, for nonphysical injuries fell within the scope of I.R. C. § 104(a)(2).
Congress intended to express its disapproval of this trend and legislatively
reverse those cases. Due to a compromise between the House and Senate, this
reversal was effected only for punitive damages and not for compensatory
damages. Therefore, after the amendment, compensatory damages for non-
physical injuries are still tax-exempt, but punitive damages for nonphysical
injuries are now taxable. The proper tax treatment of punitive damages for
physical injuries was simply not addressed by the amendment and was not in-
tended to be.296
Under this interpretation, the taxation of punitive dmages remains an open
question, except for post-RRA '89 punitive damages for nonphysical injuries,
which are now explicitly taxable. Whether punitive damages for physical inju-
ries both before and after the amendment are taxable, and whether pre-RRA
'89 damages for nonphysical injuries are taxable, are left to the courts.297
In one sense, this interpretation of congressional intent can be viewed as a
variation of Interpretation #4. Under this view, Congress was only concerned
with legislatively overruling those cases that had held punitive damages for
nonphysical injuries excludable. Moreover, Congress did address or consider
the tax treatment of punitive damages for physical injuries, and it had formed
no view as to whether these were taxable or excludable, preferring to let the
law develop. It is therefore quite acceptable for the courts to have ultimately
concluded that punitive damages for both physical and nonphysical injuries,
was reversed by the Fourth Circuit in Miller v. Commissioner, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
One therefore begins to suspect that, in one sense, Congress jumped the gun by amending
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) in 1989. Had the matter been left to the courts, they would have ulti-
mately come to the correct conclusion-at least in the view of Congress-without the need
for statutory tinkering and its resulting controversial effect.
295. See infra note 428.
296. See, e.g., Hawkins. 30 F.3d at 1082 n.7.
297. See Dodge, supra note 70, at 143 & n.4.
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recovered prior to RRA '89, are taxable. It is also not inconsistent with the
legislative history to conclude that, after RRA '89, punitive damages for non-
physical injuries are taxable but punitive damages for physical injuries are not,
viewing post-RRA '89 law as consistent with the Supreme Court's apparent
view. While this turn of events does expand the scope of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2),
this is neither consistent nor inconsistent with the legislative history as so
interpreted. It is merely a neutral consequence, neither compelled nor preclud-
ed by the amendment.
In reviewing these alternative explanations of congressional intent, Inter-
pretations #2 and #3-and therefore, any treatment of punitive damages under
such interpretations - are the least defensible, for the reasons stated above.
Among the remaining three alternatives, Interpretation #1 seems the most
reasonable and requires the least rationalization. This interpretation would lead
one to the conclusion that punitive damages received prior to RRA '89 should
be within the scope of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) and therefore nontaxable. Such a
conclusion is inconsistent with the view taken by the Fourth, Ninth, and Fed-
eral Circuits and, as will be explored in Part VI below, will present those
courts the formidable task of explaining away this interpretation of congressio-
nal intent.
V. RECENT CASE LAW DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING PUNITIVE DAMAGES
TAXATION
The following discussion examines the major cases addressing the taxation
of punitive damages. These cases reflect severe disagreements among the
courts as to the application of punitive damages under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).
Three of the cases discussed, Reese, Hawkins, and most recently Horton,
proceeded through the courts on virtually parallel tracks and were decided
within a few months of each other in 1994. Developments in this area have
thus been rapid as well as controversial.
A. Roemer v. Commissioner29
The facts of Roemer have been discussed previously.29 In addition to
his compensatory damages of $40,000, Roemer had also recovered punitive
damages of $250,000 in his libel and defamation suit against Retail Credit.'
The Service sought to tax this component of the recovery, claiming that the
damages were not paid on account of personal injury and therefore were not
excludable under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).
At the time of the Tax Court's decision in Roemer,*Revenue Ruling 75-
45301 was still in effect, holding a punitive damage award eligible for exclu-
298. 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
299. See supra text accompanying and following note 126.
300. Roemer, 79 T.C. at 403.
301. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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sion under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). In arguing Roemer's punitive damages taxable,
the Service therefore advanced a litigation position inconsistent with its pub-
lished ruling. The Tax Court's majority opinion, which had already concluded
that Roemer's underlying compensatory damage recovery was taxable, held:
It therefore follows that the punitive damages were [also] not award-
ed "on account of personal injuries" to the petitioner. This is incon-
sistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner v.
Glenshaw Glass Co. and the Commissioner's ruling positions in Rev.
Rul. 75-45. Accordingly, we hold that the punitive damages are
includable in petitioner's gross income."
This conclusion was consistent with the theory of Revenue Ruling 75-45:
if the underlying compensatory award is not taxable, neither are any punitive
damages received in the same action. Conversely, if the underlying compensa-
tory damage component is taxable, so is the punitive damage component.'
The majority did not, however, give a ringing endorsement to the
Commissioner's interpretation of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) as reflected in Revenue
Ruling 75-45:
Since [the Commissioner's] interpretation arguably comes within the
language of section 104(a)(2), the Commissioner, in his administra-
tive discretion, has chosen to allow punitive damages to be excluded
from gross income in the same manner as compensatory damages
provided they arise out of a personal injury.3"
In dissent, Judge Wilbur would have bifurcated the compensatory damage
award from the punitive damage award. As we have seen, Judge Wilbur force-
fully argued that Roemer's compensatory damages should have been excluded,
using his "fingerless surgeon" example. 5 He then stated:
However, the law is clear that punitive or exemplary damages must
be included in gross income, and I would so hold. Commissioner v.
Glenshaw Glass Co. ... Punitive damages are certainly not intended
to compensate petitioner for a loss within the purview of section 104.
I realize respondent has a revenue ruling that suggests a contrary
result. Rev. Rul. 75-45. Under appropriate circumstances, respondent
may be precluded from taking one position in a ruling with respect to
taxpayers in general, and a different position in regard to a taxpayer
before the Court. Nevertheless, the facts in Rev. Rul. 75-45 are suffi-
ciently different from those herein to permit the surprising but general
language of the ruling to be disregarded for now.'
On appeal in Roemer, the Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court and held
302. Roemer, 79 T.C. at 408 (citations ommitted).
303. Revenue Ruling 75-45 was therefore a largely "pro-taxpayer" ruling: it was incon-
sistent with the return of capital theory, to the taxpayer's benefit. On this basis, the Tax
Court majority was willing to follow its approach.
304. Roemer, 79 T.C. at 408 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
305. See id. at 414 (Wilbur, J., dissenting).
306. Id. at 414-15 (citations omitted).
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Roemer's entire award excludable. In doing so, the Court of Appeals held that
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) excluded punitive damages, as long as the underlying injury
was personal in nature. The court noted:
Normally, an amount awarded for punitive damages is includable in
gross income as ordinary income. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass
Co. Nevertheless, the Commissioner liberally interprets § 104(a)(2) to
exclude punitive damages as well as all compensatory damages where
there has been a personal injury. Rev. Rul. 75-45. Therefore, accord-
ing to the Commissioner's own interpretation, the punitive damages
received by Roemer on account of his § 104(a)(2) personal injury
(the defamation( are excludable from gross income. 7
The Ninth Circuit therefore held the Service to its own published ruling
position on punitive damages, and found Roemer's recovery excludable.'
Therefore, whatever the wisdom or correctness of Revenue Ruling 75-45, it
contributed directly to the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that had little to do with
whether punitive damages should be excludable as a matter of statutory con-
struction. Just as the Service was faced with the hurdle of Revenue Ruling in
arguing that punitive damages are taxable, so too would courts later be faced
with the Ninth Circuit's decision in Roemer arriving at the opposite conclu-
sion.
B. Commissioner v. Miller'09
Bonnie Miller had brought defamation actions against her former employ-
ers, alleging they had accused her of embezzlement and other kinds of mis-
conduct to conceal their own participation in schemes involving bribery of
government officials." ° Miller's first suit went to trial and a jury awarded
her $500,000 in compensatory damages and $450,000 in punitive damages.
She and the defendants then settled both actions for $900,000."' After pay-
ment of legal fees and costs from the settlement amount totaling $375,000,
Miller received $525,000 in net settlement proceeds."' The Service took the
view that the entire $525,000 was taxable, 313 and Miller petitioned the Tax
307. Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 700 (9th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
308. Id.; see also Church v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1104, 1110 (1983) (finding Church's
compensatory damages, received in a libel action, excludable). In Church, the Service did not
bother to
argue that the punitive damages should be included in income regardless of the
nature of the underlying compensatory damages. [Riespondent, in his adminstrative
discretion, has chosen to allow punitive damages to be excluded from gross income
in the same manner as the underlying compensatory damages, provided they arose
out of a personal injury.
Church, 80 T.C. at 1110 n.7 (citation omitted). The Service therefore conceded that Church's
punitive damages award was excludable. Id.
309. 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
310. Miller, 93 T.C. 330, 331 (1989).
311. Id. at 333-34.
312. Id.
313. In Miller, as in previous cases, the Service argued that a distinction existed between
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Court.
In Miller,"' the Tax Court had no difficulty concluding that I.R.C. §
104(a)(2) excludes from gross income both compensatory and punitive damag-
es received on account of personal injuries, essentially adopting the conclusion
of Revenue Ruling 75-45:
Section 104(a)(2) excludes from gross income "any damages re-
ceived ... on account of personal injuries." . . . Congress, aware of
[the existence of punitive damages], could have excluded only "com-
pensatory damages" or provided that only damages received "as com-
pensation for" personal injuries be excluded ... It did neither, and
the plain meaning of the broad statutory language simply does not
permit a distinction between punitive and compensatory damages ...
Thus, we read "any damages" to mean "all" damages, including
punitive damages.31
By this time, of course, the Service had reversed its ruling position by
issuing Revenue Ruling 84-108,' 6 revoking Revenue Ruling 75-45. Address-
ing the history of the Service's ruling position on punitive damages, the court
rejected the rationale and holding of Revenue Ruling 84-108, noting:
At one time, the Commissioner also viewed the statute as free of
ambiguity. Revenue Ruling 75-45 ....
. . . In Revenue Ruling 84-108 the Commissioner reversed his
position and stated that section 104(a)(2) does not exclude punitive
damages from gross income. The Commissioner relied primarily .on
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co. [H]owever, Glenshaw Glass
does not support respondent's position. Glenshaw Glass involved
two-thirds of treble damages recoveries for violations of Federal anti-
trust laws and a punitive damages recovery for fraud. The taxpayers
had not received any recoveries on account of personal inuries, and
thus the predecessor of section 104(a)(2) was not in issue."'
Revenue Ruling 84-108 had concluded that punitive damages are not
awarded "on account of' personal injury, because they are "determined with
reference to the defendant's degree of fault."3 ' The Tax Court viewed the
Commissioner's construction of the phrase "on account of' as "strained and
unnatural." 3 9 According to the Tax Court, the plain meaning of the
the treatments of physical and nonphysical injuries under § 104(a)(2). This argument had
been rejected in Roemer and by the Tax Court in Threlkeld. In Miller, the Tax Court fol-
lowed Threlkeld, holding that the compensatory damage element of Miller's recovery was
excludable under § 104(a)(2), even if the injury was nonphysical and was to the taxpayer's
"professional" rather than "personal" reputation. Id. at 335-37.
314. Miller v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 330 (1989), rev'd, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
315. Id. at 338 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
316. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
317. Miller, 93 T.C. at 339 (citations omitted).
318. See supra note 116.
319. Miller, 93 T.C. at 339.
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statute 32 0 required a conclusion that the receipt of punitive damages is "on
account of' the infliction of the tort due to a relationship suggesting causation:
Webster's defines the phrase "on account of" as: "For the sake of,"
"by reason of," or "because of." These phrases suggest causation.
Punitive damages result from both personal injury and a defendant's
culpability. Without the "invasion of. . . rights" referred to in
Threlkeld, punitive damages are unavailable, and most jurisdictions
require some amount of actual damages before punitive damages may
be awarded. Thus, punitive damages are received "on account of'
personal injury, although personal injury alone may not justify an
award of punitive damages.32
The type of causation described here by the Tax Court can best be de-
scribed as "but for" causation. The Tax Court's view of causation boiled down
to this: punitive damages are received "on account of' personal injury because
the two are linked by a cause-and-effect relationship--but for the personal
injury, there would simply be no punitive damages. In a concurring opinion,
Judge Ruwe reinforced the "but for" causation argument of the majority:
[Plunitive damages can only be awarded if there is a valid underlying
cause of action. In this case, the underlying cause of action is clearly
one for personal injury. The existence of a personal injury is the sine
qua non for an award of any kind of damages, be they compensatory
or punitive. While the primary purpose of punitive damages may well
be to deter egregious conduct on the part of tortfeasor, egregious con-
duct standing alone will not entitle a claimant to punitive damages.
Without an injury, there is simply no basis for awarding punitive
damages, regardless of how much interest society might have in pre-
venting a reoccurrence of egregious conduct. 2
Judge Ruwe was unimpressed with the Service's argument that punitive
damages are accessions to wealth and should therefore be taxed, noting that
under this theory recoveries for lost wages should also be taxed but are
not. 3 As previously discussed, 4 when placed in the context of the return
320. Under the "plain meaning" rule of statutory construction, the plain meaning of a
statute is not to be disregarded except to prevent an abusrd result or one that is contrary to
legislative intent. See, e.g., United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534,
543 (1940); Ables v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 1019, 1028 (1988); see also Miller, 93 T.C. at
340-41. But see Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476, 479 (1943) ("But words are
inexact tools at best, and for that reason there is wisely no rule of law forbidding resort to
explanatory legislative history no matter how clear the words may appear on 'superficial
examination'."); United States v. The Heirs of Boisdore', 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122 (1849)
("In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or members of a
sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.").
321. Miller, 93 T.C. at 339-40 (citations omitted).
322. Id. at 342 (citations omitted).
323. Judge Ruwe noted:
The very purpose of section 104(a)(2) is to exclude from income amounts which
would otherwise have been taxed. The fact that punitive damages represent an
accession to wealth and therefore would normally be included in gross income is
no reason to preclude the application of section 104(a)(2). Indeed, even certain
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of capital theory, this is a telling observation. The Tax Court majority thus
concluded that I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) applied to both compensatory and punitive
damages equally, without regard as to whether punitive damages served a
compensatory purpose. The majority therefore found it unnecessary to analyze
Maryland law to determine the nature of punitive damages in that state.
Judge Whalen dissented, criticizing the majority's expansive reading of
the phrase "any damages," suggesting that an additional inquiry was required:
whether the punitive damages were actually received "on account of" personal
injuries at all. 25 Judge Whalen argued that under this reading of the statute,
one is requierd to examine underlying state law to determine "on account of"
what the punitive damages in question are awarded. Reviewing Maryland
law,326 Judge Whalen determined that Maryland followed the majority view
characterizing punitive damages as a form of civil punishment. 27 The dissent
concluded that in Maryland punitive damages are not recovered "on account
of" a personal injury at all but are instead awarded on account of the
wrongdoer's outrageous conduct as'a form of private fine levied by the ju-
ry.? The dissent would have given effect to the phrase "on account of" as
compensatory damages would seem to be includable in taxable income as an ac-
cession to wealth were it not for the existence of section 104(a)(2). For example,
compensatory damages for personal injury are frequently measured by the injured
party's lost future earnings. Such future earnings would have been accessions to
wealth and would clearly have been taxable. Even respondent agrees that compen-
satory damages, that are determined by reference to lost future income, are
excludable under section 104(a)(2).
Id. at 342-43 (citation omitted).
324. See supra text accompanying note 90.
325. Judge Whalen stated:
I do not believe [the majority'sl approach is justified by the fact that section
104(a)(2) uses the words "any damages" and does not expressly distinguish between
compensatory and punitive damages. Rather, it seems to me that the majority's
analysis on that point begs the question of whether the payment, by whatever name
it is described, qualifies under section 104(a)(2) as an amount "paid on account of
personal injuries."
Id. at 348 (Whalen, J., dissenting) (citations ommitted).
326. See, e.g., Nast v. Lockett, 539 A.2d 1113, It16 (Md. 1988) (stating that punitive or
exemplary damages are damages on an increased scale, awarded not as the measure of actual
loss suffered but "as punishment for outrageous conduct and to deter future transgressions.")
(citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 352 (5th ed. 1979)). See also Exxon Corp. v. Yarema,
516 A.2d 990, 997 (Md. 1986):
Punitive damages are inherently different from compensatory damages and the rea-
sons for the award of each differ sharply .. . [T]he award of punitive damages
does not attempt to compensate the plaintiff for harm suffered by him but rather is
exemplary in nature and is over and above any award of compensatory damages.
The fundamental purpose of a punitive damages award is to punish the wrongdoer
for misconduct and to deter future egregious conduct by others.
327. Miller, 93 T.C. at 346 (Whalen, J., dissenting).
328. Id. at 344-46. Judge Whalen noted that:
the amount paid to satisfy petitioner's claims for punitive damages was paid "on
account of" the tort-feasor's culpable conduct, not petitioner's personal injuries.
Accordingly, it should be included in petitioner's income under section 61(a) as an
accession to her wealth, rather than excluded as compensation which makes her
personal injuries whole.
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used in the statute, holding that punitive damages awarded in Maryland are not
received "on account of" a personal injury nor intended to compensate the
victim for such an injury, but instead are received "on account of" the
tortfeasor's conduct and intended to punish the wrongdoer. Such damages,
therefore, would not fall within the statutory exclusion.
The Fourth Circuit, which had previously failed to adopt the Threlkeld
beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry analysis in holding for the government in
Thompson,329 reversed." The court immediately took issue with the Tax
Court's conclusion that the "plain meaning" rule clearly required application
of a "but for" test of causation:
We do not quarrel with the [tax] court's observation that "on account
of' suggests "causation." However, in our view, that observation
blithely smooths over the distinction between "but-for" causation and
"sufficient" causation.... [U]nder a sufficient causation approach,
the fact that personal injury is a prerequisite to punitive damages does
not lead to the conclusion that the punitive damages were "on account
of' the plaintiff's injuries because, even if the other elements of the
tort are present, personal injury alone does not sustain a punitive
damage award. The fact that a plaintiff seeking punitive damages has
to show egregious conduct by the defendant indicates that the
plaintiff's injury was not a sufficient cause of the punitive damag-
es.
3 3 1
The Court of Appeals concluded that I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) was inherently
ambiguous.33 - The court therefore resorted to. "extrinsic aids to interpreta-
tion.' 33' The court relied upon two factors in construing the statute. First, the
court noted the "well-recognized, even venerable, principle that exclusions to
income are to be construed narrowly."3" This mitigated against extending
the § 104(a)(2) exemption to punitive damages.
Second, the court invoked the return of capital theory, discussed in Part
III, supra, concluded that this theory persuasively provided a rationale for
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) and therefore assisted in construing the scope of the exclu-
sion."' The court found it worth noting that I.R.C. § 104 is entitled "Com-
Id. at 344.
329. Thompson v. Commissioner, 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989).
330. Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
331. Id. at 589-90.
332. Id. at 590.
333. Id.
334. Id.; see Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949).
335. Miller, 914 F.2d at 590. The court stated:
In discussing the section, the Ninth Circuit has observed that "Idlamages paid for personal
injuries are excluded from gross income because they make the taxpayer whole from a previ-
ous loss of personal rights- because, in effect, they restore a loss to capital." In so com-
menting, the Ninth Circuit aptly relied upon the Supreme Court's comment, in another con-
text, that "[plunitive damages, on the other hand, cannot be considered a restoration of capi-
tal for taxation purposes."
Id. (citing Starrels v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 574, 576 (9th Cir. 1962) and Commissioner v.
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pensation for injuries or sickness."" 6 The court concluded that "[tihe Tax
Court's interpretation of § 104(a)(2) extends the section to situations in which
a plaintiff's damages do not serve to make a plaintiff whole and thus runs
afoul of the section's purpose."33' The analysis of the Fourth Circuit thus
dovetailed with that of Judge Whalen's dissent in the tax court and required
the Fourth Circuit to consider the nature of punitive damages in Maryland to
determine whether or not Bonnie Miller's punitive damages served a compen-
satory purpose. Consistent with Judge Whalen, the court of appeals concluded
that, under Maryland law, punitive damages punish the wrongdoer and do not
compensate the victim."' As a result, Miller's punitive damage award could
not be excluded from her taxable income.
The court then addressed the Service's inconsistent ruling position, which
once held punitive damages to be excludable:
It is of little moment that the Commissioner at one time construed §
104(a)(2) to exclude from income punitive damages and that the
Ninth Circuit [in Roemer] held (relying on Rev. Rul. 75-45) the then
Commissioner's "liberal" interpretation to control. The Ninth Circuit
was merely presenting proof that when in Rome one should do as the
Romans do. However, in the first place, the Commissioner's subse-
quent shift in position calls for Roemer, as a Roman, to shift al-
so.... [T]he making of an error does not recommend, let alone,
necessitate, its repetition. The Commissioner does not, in circum-
stances such as those in the present case, adhere to a dubious con-
struction such as was applicable in Roemer. Rev. Rul. 84-108."'
Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 432 (1955)).
336. Miller, 914 F.2d at 590.
337. Id.
338. I. at 589. The court stated:
To determine whether Miller's settlement award may be excluded pursuant to §
104(a)(2), "the nature of the cause of action and the injury to be remedied must be
identified." That inquiry requires consideration of the Maryland law that created
Miller's entitlement to relief.
Under Maryland law, a defamation action such as Miller's is an action for
personal injuries. However, it must also be recognized that, under Maryland law,
"[plunitive damages are inherently different from compensatory damages and the
reasons for the award of each differ sharply." A punitive damages award "does not
attempt to compensate the plaintiff for harm suffered by him, but rather is exempla-
ry in nature and is over and above any award of compensatory damages." In the
context of a defamation action, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals has com-
mented that "[eixemplary or punitive damages, as the name connotes, are rather a
punishment for and deterrent to wrongdoing than a means of recompensing the
victim. To the victim they are a windfall not necessarily related to the injury he
has suffered."
Id. (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
339. Id. at 591 (citations omitted). Miller had argued that it was "unfair to apply the
Commissioner's 'new' rule to her case because she detrimentally relied upon the Com-
missioner's 'old' rule when she negotiated her settlement." Id. The court noted:
While Miller's argument evokes some sympathy, "the Supreme Court has upheld
the retroactive application of revenue rulings on the grounds that the I.R.S. should
not be estopped from correcting a 'mistake of law,' even though a taxpayer may
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The court concluded that Miller's settlement representing punitive damag-
es fell outside the scope of § 104(a)(2) and was therefore includable in in-
come. Such damages were a "'windfall,'..., being 'over and above any award
of compensatory damages'... .340
The Tax Court in Miller took a position analytically indistinguishable
from its Threlkeld beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry test, essentially holding
that if the underlying injury is personal and if the claim seeks to vindicate tort
or tort-type rights, then all damages arising out of the action, including puni-
tive damages, are excludable under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). The Fourth Circuit's
opinion can be taken as a direct rejection of the beginning-and-end-of-the-
inquiry analysis and requiring that a further question be asked: whether the
recovery is truly "on account of" that personal injury. In the case of punitive
damages, this was held not to be the case.
C. Reese v. United States3"
In Reese, both the Court of Federal Claims and the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit adopted reasoning similar to the Fourth Circuit's analysis
in Miller, holding a punitive damage award to be taxable.
The taxpayer in Reese filed suit under the District of Columbia Human
Rights Act342 against her former employer asserting gender discrimination,
sexual harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of
contract. 3 Following a jury trial, she was awarded $100,000 in punitive
damages as part of a larger award. At the time of her award, the law was
unsettled as to whether punitive damages were in fact available under the
DCHRA.' When the Service included the punitive damages award in her
taxable income, Reese paid the tax and sued for a refund in the Court of Fed-
eral Claims. Noting the inconsistent historical treatment of punitive damages
by the Service in its rulings 5 and the current split developing in the
courts,3 6 the Court of Federal Claims in Reese347 sided with the Fourth
have relied to his detriment on a prior agency ruling.". . . There is nothing about
Miller's alleged detrimental reliance that distinguishes it from any other taxpayer's
detrimental reliance. Hence, the retroactive change in the Commissioner's position
here was permissible.
Id. at 591-92 (citations omitted).
340. Id. at 591 (citations omitted).
341. 24 F.3d 228 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
342. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2501 (1981) (hereinafter DCHRA). The jury verdict was re-
flected in a subsequent settlement agreement that also addressed Reese's additional claim for
attorneys' fees and costs.
343. Reese v. United States, 28 Cl. Ct. 702, 703 (1993).
344. Compare Green v. American Broadcasting Co., 647 F. Supp. 1359 (D.D.C. 1986)
with Thompson v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 614 F. Supp.
1002 (D.D.C. 1985).
345. Reese, 28 Cl. Ct. at 703-04.
346. Id. at 704-05. By this time, the Tax Court's decision in Horton v. Commissioner,
100 T.C. 93 (1993), had been issued, creating a conflict with the Fourth Circuit's decision in
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Circuit and adopted the Miller analysis, taxing Reese on her punitive damage
recovery.
The Court of Federal Claims rejected the Tax Court's "plain meaning"
construction of § 104(a)(2) in Miller and agreed with the Fourth Circuit that
the statute was ambiguous. 48 The court resorted to "alternative bases" for
construing § 104(a)(2). 9 Similar to the Fourth Circuit, the court noted that
"income" is to be broadly defined, while exemptions from income are to be
narrowly construed. 5 °
Second, following the Fourth Circuit in Miller, the court pointed to the
title of I.R.C. § 104, which is entitled "Compensation for injuries or sickness."
Consistent with its title, § 104 sets out various categories of exclusions which
"generally are received as compensation for financial loss" resulting from
injury or sickness such as worker's compensation, accident or health insur-
ance, and disability.35" ' This indicated to the court that the section was not in-
tended to apply to noncompensatory payments or recoveries, and that taxing
punitive damages would be consistent with this perceived purpose.
Relying on authority supporting the view that punitive damages were not
recoverable under the DCHRA, Reese claimed that her award must necessarily
be compensatory in nature. The Court of Federal Claims disagreed with this
position, first pointing out that there was authority in the District of Columbia
for allowing punitive damages under the DCHRA. 2 The Court of Federal
Claims then quoted at length the jury instructions relating to Reese's
claims,35 which clearly demonstrated that the award received by Reese had
no compensatory purpose but was founded on theories of punishment and
deterrence.
Finally, unlike the Fourth Circuit, the Court of Federal Claims examined
the legislative history of the 1918 enactment of the predecessor of I.R.C. §
104(a)(2)3"4 and concluded that Congress did not have the tax consequences
of punitive damages in mind when it enacted the provision; rather, it was
codifying, or was at least cognizant of, some of the old "return of capital"
opinions, such as Attorney General Opinion 304, discussed in Part II
above.355 However, the court concluded that those old administrative opin-
ions, even if valid, do not support an exclusion of punitive damages: "Non-
compensatory punitive damages are not in any sense a return of capital and
hence, under the Attorney General's analysis, would constitute "income" sub-
ject to taxation. '
Miller.
347. Reese, 28 CI. Ct. at 702.
348. Id. at 705.
349. Id. at 706.'
350. Id.
351. Id. at 707.
352. See supra note 344.
353. Reese v. United States. 24 F.3d 228, 232 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
354. Reese, 28 CI. Ct. at 707-08.
355. Id. at 708.
356. Reese, 28 CI. Ct. at 708.
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By this time, the Supreme Court had announced its decision in Burke, and
so the Court of Federal Claims turned to the question of Burke's effect on the
application of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) to punitive damages. The court determined
that taxing punitive damages was not inconsistent with Burke. The court con-
cluded that the Burke "scope of the remedies" test only discussed the threshold
determination of whether a particular injury is tort or tort-like, and not to the
additional question whether the recovery in question was "on account of' that
personal injury:
The question before the Supreme Court was not whether the damages
were received "on account of" the violation of the statute and the
resulting injuries, but rather whether the "injuries" suffered as a result
of the violation of Title VII constituted "personal injuries" within the
scope of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).357
Thus, the Court of Federal Claims implicitly concluded that the Supreme
court neither adopted nor approved the Threlkeld analysis in Burke. Rather,
once it is determined whether the underlying claim was personal in nature
(i.e., whether it is tort or tort-type) under a scope-of-the-remedies analysis, the
Court of Federal Claims added a second question, neither considered nor pre-
cluded by the Supreme Court in Burke: whether the resulting recovery was
"on account of" that personal injury.35 Examining the nature of the punitive
damages recovered in this case, 59 and concluding that they served no com-
pensatory purpose but were intended only to deter and punish,"W the court
held the damage award was not "on account of' a personal injury and was
therefore taxable. 6'
Reese appealed,3 62 and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit af-
firmed. The Court adopted much of the reasoning of the Court of Federal
Claims below, thus siding with the Fourth Circuit and against the Tax Court.
On appeal, Reese argued that the causation implied by the phrase "on
account of' is a "but for" causation; 363 the government, on the other hand,
argued for a stricter causal link ("sufficient" causation). 3' Noting that both
interpretations "are plausible, 365 the Federal Circuit followed the lead of the
Fourth Circuit in Miller, stating that it was not possible to conclude that the
357. Id. at 710.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 710-11.
360. Id. at 711. The Court of Federal Claims placed significant emphasis on the District
Court's jury instructions, which so stated.
361. Id. Subsequent to Reese, punitive damages recovered in an insurance bad faith case
were held fully taxable in Estate of Wesson, 843 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
After noting that "[a] consensus on this issue within the federal judiciary is nonexistent",
Wesson, 843 F. Supp. at 1121, the District Court adopted the principles of Miller, 914 F.2d
586, and Reese, 28 Cl. Ct. 702, declining to follow the Tax Court's Horton decision.
Wesson, 843 F. Supp. at 1121-22.
362. Reese v. United States, 24 F.3d 228 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
363. Id. at 230.
364. Id. at 230-231.
365. Id. at 231.
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"plain meaning" of the statute clearly supported one interpretation to the ex-
clusion of the other.3" Similar to the Fourth Circuit in Miller and the Court
of Federal Claims, below, the Court of Appeals resorted to extrinsic aids to
construe the statute. The court first noted that the title of I.R.C. § 104 is
"Compensation for personal injuries or sickness," and consistent with its title,
§ 104 sets out various categories of exclusions which consistently "encompass
only the replacement of loss resulting from injury or sickness" such as
worker's compensation and accident or health insurance.367 Second, the court
acknowledged "an abiding principle of federal tax law" that exemptions from
income are to be narrowly construed.36
The Court of Appeals, like the lower court, also drew support for its
conclusion from two other sources. After examining the legislative history of
the 1918 amendment to the predecessor of I.R.C. § 104 in a manner similar to
the Court of Federal Claims, the Court of Appeals concluded that the legisla-
tive history "support[s] the conclusion that punitive damages are not
excludable from gross income." 3" The legislative history and its foundations
in the return of capital theory led the court to conclude:
[I]t would be inconsistent with the legislative history to treat punitive
damages as excludable from income, since punitive damages in no
way resemble a return of capital .... [P]unitive damages represent a
pure accession to a taxpayer's wealth and cannot be excluded as
compensation for personal injury.37°
The taxpayer argued, as she had in the court below, that the DCHRA did
not even allow for the recovery of punitive damages. The Court of Appeals,
however, held that subsequent to the lower court's decision in Reese, the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals had determined that punitive damages
are available under the DCHRA,37 thus "blunting the force of Reese's
argument." '372 As the Court of Federal Claims had done, the Court of Ap-
peals examined the jury instructions and concluded that Reese's punitive
damage recovery did not exhibit any compensatory characteristics. Thus, the
return of capital theory as reflected in the legislative history weighed against
excluding Reese's punitive damage recovery.
The court also explained that the Supreme Court's opinion in Burke did
not call for a different result. Like the court below, the Federal Circuit con-
cluded that Burke only addressed the question of whether damages are award-
ed for a tort or tort-like action. Punitive damages were not present in Burke,
and the case did not present the Supreme Court with the opportunity to con-
sider whether there is an additional question whether punitive damages are




369. Id. at 232 (citations omitted).
370. Id. at 233.
371. Arthur Young & Co. v. Sutherland, 631 A.2d 354 (D.C. 1993).
372. Reese, 24 F.3d at 232.
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The Burke case, however, did not present facts requiring the Court to
determine whether punitive damages awarded in a personal injury
action are received "on account of' personal injury so as to be
excludable from gross income by virtue of section 104(a)(2). The
case did not involve punitive damages; thus, we do not regard Burke




Interestingly, Reese had argued that because the Supreme Court in Burke
had relied upon the presence of punitive or exemplary damages in articulating
the hallmarks of traditional concepts of tort liability and recovery,74 and be-
cause the presence of such damages may therefore be helpful in reaching the
threshold conclusion that a claim or injury is "tort or tort-type" for purposes of
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), it would be inconsistent and illogical to conclude that such
damages do not fall within the scope of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).31 5 The Court of
Appeals rejected this argument, stating that the Supreme Courts reference to
punitive damages "was merely part of a broad definition of tort liability rather
than a holding that" punitive damages should be excludable.376
The Court of Appeals thus held Reese's punitive damage award to be
taxable. Interestingly, while relying largely on the Fourth Circuit's opinion in
Miller, the court made no mention of the Tax Court's contrary holding in
Horton.
Like Miller, Reese may be read as a rejection of the Threlkeld beginning-
and-end-of-the-inquiry analysis, and another vote in favor of the approach that
asks a second question: are the punitive damages really received "on account
of' a personal injury? As did Miller, Reese answered that question in the
negative. Reese adds to this analysis its view that Burke does not preclude this
second question-that Supreme Court in Burke did not implicitly approve the
beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry analysis used by the Sixth Circuit."'
D. Hawkins v. United States378
The taxpayer in Hawkins totalled her $8,000 automobile. 79 Her insurer,
Allstate Insurance Company, pressured her into buying an inferior, less expen-
373. Id. at 234.
374. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
375. Reese, 24 F.3d at 234.
376. Id.
377. The two-step analysis employed in Reese v. United States, 24 F.3d 228 (Fed. Cir.
1994) was followed in Bennett v. United States, 30 Cl. Ct. 396 (1994). After concluding
that ADEA claims are "tort-type" under the Burke "scope of the remedies" test, the court
went on to consider whether the liquidated damages portion of the award should nevertheless
be taxable, as asserted by the government, because it served merely a punitive purpose and
was not awarded "on account of" personal injury. However, the court concluded that liquidat-
ed damages under the ADEA do in fact serve a compensatory purpose, and are therefore
excludable.
378. 30 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 1994).
379. Id. at 1078.
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sive replacement car, and failed to equip it properly.38 Hawkins sued
Allstate for insurance bad faith (breach of good faith and fair dealing, and bad
faith litigation), and she recovered $15,000 in compensatory damages and $3.5
million in punitive damages." 1 Hawkins's state court action ultimately
reached the Arizona Supreme Court,382 which affirmed the punitive damages
award.383 After the Service included the punitive damages award in her tax-
able income, Hawkins paid the deficiency and initiated a refund suit in the
District Court for the District of Arizona.
In a brief Memorandum and Order, the District Court concluded that the
plain language of § 104(a)(2) extends to both compensatory and punitive
dames, and held that the punitive damages received were on account of per-
sonal injuries Hawkins suffered (arising out of insurance bad faith) and were
therefore excludable. The Ninth Circuit, which had previously held punitive
damages to be excludable in Roemer,3" reversed in a split decision, holding
Hawkins's punitive damage award to be taxable. Much of the Ninth Circuit's
majority opinion is set over to addressing arguments advanced by Judge
Trott's vigorous dissent.
Judge Goodwin, writing for the majority, first noted that both parties were
in agreement that Hawkins's bad faith lawsuit was a tort-type action under
Arizona law. 8 This was not disputed by Judge Trott's dissent. Moreover,
both the majority and dissent agreed that the Tax Court had held consistently
that punitive damages were excludable, while the position of the Service had
been less consistent. 86 Beyond this, the majority opinion and the dissent
found little common ground. The two opinions highlight the major arguments
380. Id. at 1079.
381. Id.
382. Hawkins v. Allstate Insurance Co., 733 P.2d 1073 (Ariz. 1987).
383. In affirming, the Arizona Supreme Court stated that in Arizona it was clear that
"[tihe purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate the plaintiff, but to express
society's disapproval of outrageous conduct and to deter such conduct by the defendant and
others in the future." Hawkins, 733 P.2d at 1080 (citations omitted). Given this background,
in the Hawkinses' ensuing federal tax refund case the taxpayers did not even attempt to
argue that their punitive damages award served a compensatory purpose. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at
1079. Thus, the nature and purpose of the taxpayers' punitive damage award was not an
issue in Hawkins.
384. The Ninth Circuit ultimately distinguished its Roemer opinion on the grounds that it
relied on Revenue Ruling 75-45, a ruling that contradicted the government's own position in
Roemer. But, as Revenue Ruling 75-45 has since been overruled, the court no longer felt
constrained to follow Roemer's lead. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1081-82; see also Rice v. United
States, 834 F. Supp. 1241 (E.D. Cal. 1993), in which a district court located in the Ninth
Circuit declined to follow Roemer for essentially the same reasons, and held a punitive dam-
ages award to be taxable:
But Roemer relied solely (and perhaps reluctantly) on the 1975 Revenue Ruling that
was subsequently revoked. Before that ruling, it was well-settled that punitive
amages were taxable income because they represented an accession to wealth rather
that restoration of capital. Because the Ruling has been revoked, punitive damages
are again taxable income.
Rice, 834 F.Supp. at 1246 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
385. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1079.
386. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1080 & n.2.
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in favor of and against extending the § 104(a)(2) exclusion to punitive damag-
es.
Judge Trott first asserted that the plain meaning of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2),
particularly as evidenced by its use of the phrase "any damages," "simply does
not permit a distinction between compensatory and punitive damages." '387
Had Congress intended that I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) extend only to compensatory
damages, Judge Trott wrote, "it certainly could have made that distinction ex-
plicit." ' The majority, on the other hand, was "not convinced that the 'plain
meaning' of § 104(a)(2) compels exclusion of punitive damages." '389 The ma-
jority concluded:
[Tihe phrase "on account of' does not necessarily mean "but for
causation." ... Rather, 'on account of' could mean what the Miller
court called "sufficient causation"- i.e. all damages to which a liti-
gant is entitled because of her injuries, but not those which serve
solely to punish the wrongdoer."
Turning to the impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Burke on the
punitive damages question, the majority simply distinguished Burke by stating
that the taxpayers in that case "had not received punitive damages, and the
Court did not address the excludability of punitive damages."39' According to
the majority, the phrase "on account of" qualifies the remainder of I.R.C. §
104(a)(2) and establishes an independent test for exclusion, contrary to the
Threlkeld analysis. 92 Judge Trott's dissent pointed out that the Supreme
Court had "agree[d] with the [Sixth Circuit] Court of Appeals' analysis insofar
as it focused ... on the nature of the claim" underlying the damages
award.393 Judge Trott interpreted this to mean that the Supreme Court had
approved implicitly the Threlkeld beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry analysis as
employed by the Sixth Circuit in Burke: "the import of the Court's analysis is
clear. The focus should be on the nature of the underlying claim. The Burke
Court did not mention any additional requirements for exclusion under §
104(a)(2). ' ' "9
The majority did not agree:
[T]he Court did not state that courts should look exclusively at the
nature of the claim underlying the damage award. The Court's alleged
failure to "mention any additional requirements for exclusion under §
104(a)(2)" means little, given that the Court concluded that the
387. Id. at 1084 (Trott, J., dissenting).
388. Id.
389. Id. at 1080.
390. Id. at 1080 n.3 (citations omitted).
391. Id. at 1081.
392. As the dissent summarized, '[tlhe majority believes § 104(a)(2) requires the taxpay-
er to proves both (1) the damages were recovered in a tort-like suit [under the Supreme
Court's scope-of-the-remedies test] and (2) the damages were received on account of personal
injury." Id. at 1085 (Trott, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
393. 1I.; see supra note 246 and accompanying text.
394. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1085 (Trott, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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taxpayers' underlying cause of action was not "tort-like." The Court
had no occasion to discuss any such additional requirements.39
As in Reese, the taxpayers in Hawkins argued that the Supreme Court in
Burke "described the availability of punitive damages as one of the indicia of
traditional tort liability" and relied, in part, on the unavailability of punitive
damages in a Title VII case in holding that Burke's recovery was taxable."l
Given that the Supreme Court viewed the concept of traditional tort liability as
"inextricably bound up with remedies,"'397 including punitive damages,
Hawkins argued that "it follows that punitive damages are received 'on ac-
count of personal injury."'" Judge Trott agreed with this analysis.' 9
The majority acknowledged that punitive damages were certainly one of
the hallmarks of traditional tort concepts of liability and recovery.' ° Howev-
er, the majority was unable to reach the same conclusion as the dissent, noting
that "[p]unitive damages may be an indicia of a tort-like cause of action with-
out themselves being damages received on account of personal injury." ''
In Hawkins, for the first time, the question of congressional intent in
amending I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) as part of RRA '89402 came to the fore. Predict-
ably, this added to the confusion surrounding the taxation of punitive damages.
Judge Trott construed the legislative history to RRA '89 in a manner that, to
him, "offer[ed] a consistent explanation of both the pre-1989 and post-1989
law. 4 °3 According to Judge Trott, the reasonable implication of amending §
104(a)(2) to explicitly tax punitive damages received after RRA '89 on ac-
count of nonphysical injuries is that not all punitive damages received prior to
RRA '89 are taxable. In light of the obvious legislative purpose to narrow the
scope of § 104(a)(2), this suggests:
Before 1989, all punitive damages received in personal injury cases
were excludable from gross income. After Congress's narrowing of
the exclusion in 1989, only punitive damages received in personal
injury cases involving physical injury or sickness were
excludable.0 4
Judge Goodwin likewise reviewed the legislative history to the RRA '89
395. Id. at 1081 (emphasis added).
396. Id. at 1085-86.
397. United States v. Burke, 112 S.Ct. 1867, 1872 n.7 (1992).
398. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1086 (Trott, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
399. Judge Trott declared that "Itlo conclude otherwise, as the majority does, is to say
that although the availability of punitive damages makes the claim tort-like, . . . the punitive
damages themselves are unrelated to the personal injury and should be taxable. I am reluc-
tant to reach such an illogical conclusion." Id.
400. Id. at 1081.
401. Id.
402. See supra note 10.
403. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1086 (Trott, J., dissenting). Judge Trott's interpretation of the
legislative history of RRA '89 is consistent with Interpretation #1 described supra note 284
and accompanying text.
404. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1086 (Trott, J., dissenting).
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amendment to § 104(a)(2),4"5 and concluded that there were several possible
interpretations of congressional intent underlying the amendment. For example,
Congress could have been restating existing law (that is, both before and after
the amendment, punitive damages are understood by Congress to be taxable if
awarded for a nonphysical injury, but not taxable if they arise out of a physi-
cal injury).4 ' Alternatively, Congress may have been aware of the cases that
had recently held excludable punitive damages for nonphysical injury,4 7 and
believing these cases to be inconsistent with its understanding of the law and
incorrectly decided, it amended the statute to make its disapproval clear. While
the majority admitted the weaknesses of these interpretations, the dissent's
view of the legislative history is not the only plausible interpretation.
The majority was therefore unwilling to admit that the effect of the RRA
'89 amendment to § 104(a)(2) was anything other than its one stated effect:
that punitive damages for nonphysical injuries after 1989 are now clearly
taxable. Significantly, the majority would not even concede that the implied
post-1989 effect of RRA '89 makes punitive damages for physical injury
excludable. Judge Goodwin noted that if in fact this is the implication of the
1989 amendment, "this implication could be inadvertent."' Alternatively,
Congress could have declined to consider the question of the taxation of dam-
ages for physical injury at all, since the legislative history "indicates that Con-
gress was not concerned with punitive damages, but with non-physical injury





Judge Trott found this result unacceptable. If in fact the courts ultimately
do determine that pre-1989 punitive damages for both physical and nonphysi-
cal injuries to be taxable, as the majority opinion holds, and if the effect of
RRA '89 is to make punitive damages for physical injury excludable as the
Supreme Court has seemingly held,"' then RRA '89 expanded the scope of
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), 412 a result that Judge Trott found untenable." 3 Accord-
ing to Judge Trott, the only reading of congressional intent that satisfactorily
explains the majority's view was that prior to and after RRA '89, all punitive
damage awards, both for physical and nonphysical injuries, are taxable.
41 4
This, however, means that the amendment was completely without effect, an
indefensible position." 5 Judge Trott concluded:
405. Id. at 1082.
406. This interpretation is suggested by Interpretation #4. See supra note 291 and accom-
panying text.
407. See supra note 292.
408. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1082 n.7.
409. Id. at 1082 n.6.
410. This interpretation is consistent with Interpretation #5. See supra note 296 and ac-
companying text.
411. See supra note 285.
412. This result is discussed as Interpretation #2. See supra note 288 and accompanying
text.
413. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1087 (Trott, J., dissenting).
414. This is discussed as Interpretation #3. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
415. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1086-87 (Trott, J., dissenting).
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The rule the majority announces-damages representing a windfall
are taxable-will undoubtedly be cited in support of the proposition
that all punitive damages are taxable. This court will then have to
chose between rendering the 1989 amendment meaningless or im-
properly construing the amendment as expanding the § 104 exclusion.
My interpretation of § 104(a)(2) avoids that dilemma. 6
The final area of contention over which the majority and dissent differed
concerned the application of the return of capital theory. According to the
majority, I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) "was enacted to exclude damages which compen-
sate a taxpayer for injuries."4 7 The court emphasized that the underlying
rationale of I.R.C. § 104 is that "damages paid for personal injuries are ex-
cluded from gross income because they make the taxpayer whole from a
previous loss of personal rights - because, in effect, they restore a loss to
capital."4 8 This was not the case with Hawkins: the punitive damages were
awarded on account of Allstate's misconduct and the potential harm to other
insureds."9 Hawkins never contended that the punitive award had any com-
pensatory purpose. The court concluded: "[tihe $3.5 million does not compen-
sate the Hawkinses for any injury, economic, intangible, or otherwise. It is a
pure windfall, as much an accession to wealth as a successful lottery ticket or
a game show winnings. The Hawkinses have not been made whole; they have
won the litigation lottery.""42 Under these circumstances, stated the majority,
"the restoration of capital rationale is simply inapplicable."
'4 2
Judge Trott, on the other hand, found the majority's invocation of the
return of capital theory troubling and unpersuasive, pointing out some of the
defects of the theory when applied to the Code's treatment of other transac-
tions, such as the recovery of lost wages.422 Given the weaknesses of the
return of capital theory, Judge Trott concluded: "[a]though I agree that the
majority's restoration of capital rule may make sense as a matter of policy, I
don't think the text of § 104(a)(2), its legislative history, or the case law can
be squared with the majority's interpretation. '423
As noted, the Ninth Circuit majority opinion and dissent in Hawkins high-
light the various factors and corresponding arguments that affect the determi-
nation whether I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) acts to exclude punitive damage awards.
416. Id. at 1087.
417. Id. at 1083.
418. Id. (quoting Starrels v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 574, 576 (9th Cir. 1962)).
419. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1083.
420. Id. at 1083-84.
421. Id. at 1084.
422. Id. at 1087. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
423. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1084.
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E. Horton v. Commissioner424
In Horton,25 the Tax Court addressed whether to abandon its holding in
Miller or to stand by its earlier conclusion, maintaining that punitive damages
are excludable under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).426
The Horton's house had exploded in the early morning after the gas com-
pany failed to detect a leak.427 The Hortons, home at the time, suffered phys-
ical injuries 428 and sued the power company under tort theories of negligence
and gross negligence. The Hortons were awarded $103,552 in compensatory
damages and $520,000 in punitive damages.429 The Kentucky Supreme Court
ultimately upheld the award, affirming the punitive damages award over the
gas company's objections that (i) the awarding of punitive damages is an
outdated concept and should be abandoned in Kentucky and (ii) in any case,
the gas company's conduct did not warrant the imposition of punitive damag-
es.430 In justifying the award of punitive damages in Kentucky, the Kentucky
Supreme Court noted that "[tihe concept of permitting punitive damages in
addition to compensatory damages is one of longstanding in Kentucky"43'
and that many of the older Kentucky cases "recognize and approve the award
of punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages. 432
The foregoing description of punitive damages by the Kentucky Supreme
Court appears consistent with a notion that punitive damages do not serve a
compensatory purpose under Kentucky law but are purely penal. Such a view
was also expressed in early Kentucky decisions, which had noted that punitive
damages "are allowed as a punishment of the defendant and to discourage the
defendant and others from similar conduct in the future. 4 3 Under Kentucky
law, it is said: "[plunitive damages represent a sum over and above the
amount a claimant is entitled to receive as compensation for a loss suffered by
him. In theory, they are allowed as a punishment of a defendant for outra-
geous conduct or to deter such conduct in the future. 43'
These statements would seem to indicate that Kentucky follows the major-
424. 33 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1994).
425. Horton, 100 T.C. 93 (1993).
426. At the time the Tax Court considered Horton, the Ninth and Federal Circuits' de-
cisions in Hawkins and Reese had not yet been issued.
427. Horton, 100 T.C. at 93.
428. While the nature of the Hortons' injuries are not described in detail in the reported
decisions, it can be inferred from the description of the facts that they were physical inju-
ries. See Horton v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 690 S.W.2d 382, 386 (Ky. 1985); see
also Horton, 33 F.3d at 631 ("Here, the underlying claim is one for personal, physical inju-
ry.").
429. Horton, 690 S.W.2d at 384.
430. Id. at 390.
431. Id. at 388 (emphasis added).
432. Id. (emphasis added).
433. Harrod v. Fraley, 289 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Ky. 1956) (citations omitted); see also
Ashland Dry Goods Co. v. Wages, 195 S.W.2d 312, 315 (Ky. 1946).
434. Federal Kemper Ins. Co. v. Hornback, 711 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Ky. 1986) (Vance, J.,
concurring).
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ity view concerning the purpose and nature of punitive damages. However, in
Horton, the Kentucky Supreme Court went on to note:
There is a reason for paying the punitive damages to the injured
party. It is because "the injury has been increased by the manner in
[which it] was inflicted. In Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Roth, 130 Ky.
759, 114 S.W. 264, 266 (1908), we explained that although "punitive
damages are awarded as a civil punishment upon the wrongdoer,
rather than as indemnity to the injured party ... it might with much
propriety be said that they are allowed by way of remuneration for
the aggravated wrong done." Thus there are sound legal reasons of
longstanding supporting both the award of punitive damages and their
payment to the injured party in addition to compensatory damag-
s.435
es.
Under this theory, punitive damages serve, at least in part, a compensatory
purpose as "remuneration" for the increased injury suffered from the
tortfeasor's egregious act. This theory would place Kentucky in the minority
view, under which punitive damages are not solely penal in nature. This theo-
ry also distinguishes the nature of the punitive damages received by the tax-
payers in Horton from those recovered by the taxpayers in Miller, Reese, and
Hawkins.
The Hortons received their award in 1985. After the IRS sought to include
the punitive damage element in the Hortons' gross income, the taxpayers
petitioned the Tax Court.
Acknowledging that the Fourth Circuit had reversed the Tax Court in
Miller, the Tax Court nevertheless concluded that its original decision in Mill-
er was correct and declined to follow the Fourth Circuit. In a relatively brief
opinion, the Tax Court majority held that the punitive damages were
excludable from gross income:
After careful consideration of the views of the Fourth Circuit, we
reaffirm our holding in Miller that punitive damages received as a
result of a personal injury claim are excludable under section
104(a)(2). The beginning and end of the inquiry should be whether
the damages were paid on account of "personal injuries." This inquiry
is answered by determining the nature of the underlying claim. Once
the nature of the underlying claim is established as one for personal
injury, any damages received on account of that claim, including
punitive damages, are excludable.436
Similar to Judge Trott's dissent in Hawkins, the Tax Court concluded that
its decision was supported by the Supreme Court's opinion in Burke, which
allegedly embraced the beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry approach applied by
the Tax Court in Threlkeld and followed by the Sixth Circuit in Burke. The
Supreme Court's opinion in Burke was thus seen as quarrelling only with the
435. Horton, 690 S.W.2d at 390 (citations omitted).
436. Horton v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 93, 96 (1993) (emphasis added) (footnote omit-
ted), aff d, 33 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1994).
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manner in which the Sixth Circuit went about identifying "tort-type"
injuries,437 an interpretation of Burke arguably adopted in O'Gilvie v. United
States.4"'
The Tax Court also argued (as did Judge Trott) that because the Supreme
Court had singled out punitive damages as one of the hallmarks of a tort-type
action-according to the Supreme Court, punitive damages are "inextricably
bound up" with the concept of tort rights and one of the prime determinants of
whether a claim reflects traditional concepts of tort liability439-it was
"logical to conclude that punitive damages are received 'on account of' such
claims."'
The Tax Court finally noted that the Fourth Circuit's approach in Miller
can prove unworkable." Under Miller, a court is required to analyze the na-
ture of punitive damages as awarded in the particular case to determine if they
are intended to compensate the victim or merely to punish the actor. This
involves resorting to state law where the recovery was obtained under a state
law claim. Here, after examining Kentucky law, including the very Kentucky
Supreme Court opinion affirming the Hortons' award,"2 the Tax Court con-
cluded that "in Kentucky, punitive damages serve both to compensate the
injured party and punish the wrongdoer."" The Tax Court professed itself
in a complete quandary as to how the Miller test ought to be applied in such a
circumstance.444 In any case, under the Tax Court's beginning-and-end-of-
the-inquiry test, the fact that Kentucky might follow the minority rule as to the
nature of punitive damages was not relevant to the outcome.
437. Id. at 97-98.
438. Id. at 98. In O'Gilvie v. United States, U.S. Tax Cas. 1 50,567 (D. Kan. 1992), the
district court had originally held a punitive damage award in a wrongful death case to be
taxable. O'Gilvie's wife died of toxic shock syndrome in 1983, and O'Gilvie obtained a
large punitive damage award against Playtex. See O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc., 609
F. Supp. 817 (D. Kan. 1985). Subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in Burke,
O'Gilvie filed a motion for reconsideration. In August, the District Court issued its opinion
on reconsideration, and reversed itself, holding for the taxpayer. In its brief opinion, the
court noted:
In our previous order, this court focused on the nature of the punitive damage
award itself, rather than the nature of the underlying claim. In light of Burke, we
believe our focus was misplaced. The Supreme Court's opinion makes it clear that
the proper inquiry for purposes of § 104(a)(2) is on the nature of the claim under-
lying the taxpayer's damages award. As we recognized in our previous order, the
underlying suit giving rise to O'Gilvie's recovery of punitive damages is
indisputedly tort-like in nature. Accordingly, the court believes its previous order is
contrary to Burke and must be reversed.
O'Gilvie, 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 50,568 (citations omitted). O'Gilvie did not conclude that a
separate question, whether the recovery was "on account of" the identified tort-like injury,
must also be asked, and therefore apparently views the Threlkeld beginning-and-end-of-the-
inquiry analysis as having survived Burke.
439. See supra note 397.
440. Horton, 100 T.C. at 99.
441. Id. at 99-101.
442. See supra note 428.
443. Horton, 100 T.C. at 100 (emphasis added).
444. li. at 101.
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In a lengthy dissent joined by two other judges, Judge Whalen (who had
dissented in the Tax Court's opinion in Miller) concluded that the punitive
damages award should be taxable. 5 Similar to the courts of appeals' majori-
ty opinions in Reese and Hawkins, Judge Whalen argued that the Supreme
Court in Burke had not necessarily approved the Tax Court's beginning-and-
end-of-the-inquiry approach to § 104(a)(2). Judge Whalen argued that the
Supreme Court had merely provided a test for the threshold question of
whether a particular claim is tort or tort-like. If that question is answered in
the negative, as in Burke, the taxpayer cannot rely on § 104(a)(2). But the
Supreme Court did not give any definitive clue as to what it would do if the
question is answered in the affirmative. 46 The Tax Court majority would
cling to its approach that an affirmative answer is the beginning and end of
the inquiry, and all resulting damages, including punitive damages, are
excludable. Judge Whalen found no express support for this approach in Burke
and concluded that, in fact, there is an additional inquiry: whether the particu-
lar award was paid "on account of' the tort claim. 4 7 Judge Whalen found
the Fourth Circuit's approach in Miller to be the correct one. Moreover, deter-
mining whether an award is "on account of' a tort-like claim requires one to
examine what the recovery was intended to accomplish. This in turn necessi-
tates a review of applicable state law. 45 If the recovery is intended to com-
pensate the victim, then it is excludable. But if the recovery is intended merely
to punish and deter, then the award is not "on account of' of the tort claim at
all, but instead is "on account of' the egregious acts of the tortfeasor. Looking
to Kentucky law, Judge Whalen concluded-despite the statements of the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court in Horton itself-that in Kentucky an award of punitive
damages has only punishment and deterrence as its purpose. 49 Thus, Judge
Whalen would have taxed the $500,000 punitive damages award in its entire-
ty. .450
445. Id. at 104-14.
446. Id. at I11.
447. Id. at 108. Judge Whalen continued:
[T]he statute imposes at least two requirements for eligibility to exclude an amount
from gross income. First, the amount must have been received through prosecution
of a "tort-like personal injury." Second, the amount at issue must have been paid
"on account of' that injury. Petitioners must meet both requirements to qualify for
the exclusion.
Id. (citations omitted).
448. Id. at 107-08.
449. Id. at 105-107. Judge Whalen therefore would not have experienced the same diffi-
culty as the majority professed to face in applying the Fourth Circuit's Miller analysis to the
punitive damages recovery in Horton. See siipra note 444 and accompanying text.
450. In maintaining that the Threlkeld beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry analysis did not
survive Burke, Judge Whalen is supported by Judge Halpern, who joined Judge Whalen's
dissents in Miller and Horton, and who separately dissented (joined by Judge Whalen) in
Kovacs v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 124, aftid, 25 F.3d 1048 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 424 (1994), stating: "I do not think the sole condition for exclusion contained in section
104(a)(2) is that an amount constitute damages received in a suit involving such tortlike
personal injury. Another necessary condition contained in section 104(a)(2) is that the damag-
es be received 'on account of personal injuries or sickness."' Kovacs, 100 T.C. at 139
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Notwithstanding the recent pro-government decisions in Reese and
Hawkins, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court in Horton.4"' Siding with
the Tax Court in a split decision, the Sixth Circuit broke with the Fourth,
Ninth, and Federal Circuits, thus deepening the division among the courts. The
Sixth Circuit's opinion in Horton reflects the court's strong belief in the
Threlkeld beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry analysis, on which it had previous-
ly relied in Burke.
After summarizing the arguments and conclusion in Miller, Reese, and
Hawkins,"2 the Sixth Circuit turned to the Supreme Court's holding in
Burke, which had reversed the Sixth Circuit in 1992. Using this as a starting
point, the Sixth Circuit interpreted that reversal as nonetheless approving the
Sixth Circuit's approach to analyzing § 104(a)(2), that is, the Threlkeld begin-
ning-and-end-of-the-inquiry approach.453
The Sixth Circuit thus viewed Burke as simply establishing a new thresh-
old test, the scope-of-the-remedies test, for determining whether a claim is
tort-like, but not otherwise altering the resulting beginning-and-end-of-the-
inquiry analysis to applying § 104(a)(2). Applying this approach, and finding it
mandated by the "plain meaning" of the statute, 414 the Sixth Circuit con-
cluded: "Here, the underlying claim is one for a personal, physical injury;
therefore, the taxpayers' entire recovery is excludable. The Hortons' damag-
es-both compensatory and punitive-were received "on account of their"
personal injuries from the explosion."4"5
As support for its conclusion, the Sixth Circuit reviewed the 1989 amend-
ment to I.R.C. § 104(a), noting that the Supreme Court in Burke had viewed
the amendment as establishing that, subsequent to 1989, punitive damage
recoveries for physical injuries are excludable:5 6
Since punitive damages in a case not involving physical injury or
physical sickness are singled out as being includable in gross income,
the clear implication of Congress' phraseology is that punitive damag-
es in a case involving physical injury or physical sickness are
excludable, and were excludable even before the amendment.457
The Sixth Circuit also noted that, under Kentucky law-in fact, as stated
(Halpern, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
451. Horton v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1994). To summarize the Sixth
Circuit's holding:
They meant what they said
and said what they meant.
The Tax Court's correct:
One hundred percent!
With apologies to DR. SEUSs, HORTON HATCHES THE EGG (1940).
452. Horton, 33 F.3d at 628-29.
453. Id. at 630.
454. Id. at 631.
455. Id.
456. See supra note 285.
457. Horton, 33 F.3d at 631 n.12 (emphasis added). This position is reflected in Inter-
pretation #1. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
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by the Kentucky Supreme Court in upholding the damage award in this very
case458--punitive damages serve both a compensatory and a punitive pur-
pose. The Kentucky Supreme Court had stated that "although 'punitive damag-
es are awarded as a civil punishment upon the wrongdoer, rather than an as
indemnity to the injured party ... it might with much propriety be said that
they are allowed by way of remuneration for the aggravated wrong done.' 4. 9
This served to distinguish Miller and Hawkins, where it was determined that
under Maryland and Arizona law, respectively, punitive damages serve no
compensatory purpose.
The Sixth Circuit's reliance on the dual nature of punitive damages under
Kentucky law, while buttressing the majority's ultimate holding, is unfortunate
in that any court disinclined to follow Horton may seek to distinguish it in
cases where the punitive damage recovery in question served no compensatory
purpose. Horton thus arguably becomes a less compelling precedent. On the
other hand, Horton's resort to the dual nature of punitive damages under Ken-
tucky law seems unnecessary to the holding: even if the award served a solely
punitive purpose, the beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry analysis would still
lead to the same result. Thus, even in cases where the punitive damages serve
no compensatory purpose whatsoever, the Sixth Circuit would still presumably
hold the damages to be excludable.
Finally, the court was "not persuaded" by the Commissioner's "return of
capital" theory, under which only damages which serve to make the taxpayer
"whole" should be excludable, and those that are accession to wealth should
not." The court viewed this as
a false dichotomy. For example, a plaintiff in a personal injury suit
who is permanently maimed is really not "made whole" by compen-
satory money damages. That money damages make the injured person
whole in merely a legal fiction. Those money damages do not make
the physical injury disappear; the money is therefore arguable an
"accession to wealth." There is really no bright-line distinction, then,
as the Commissioner contends, between damages which make plain-
tiffs whole and damages which are accessions to wealth.46" '
This statement, too, is unfortunate. It is certainly true that money damages
can never fully compensate the victim of a crippling or disfiguring injury, at
least in a nonmonetary sense. However, it is a hallmark of our system of civil
justice that juries are presumed to attempt to do just that; that is, measure the
immeasurable and place a dollar value on a tort victim's suffering, humilia-
tion, and anguish. Whether or not this is merely a "legal fiction" is of no
moment, and the Sixth Circuit's statements in this regard are not persuasive.
Judge Trott's dissent in Hawkins more tellingly criticizes the return of capital
theory.462 The Sixth Circuit's criticisms, on the other hand, simply miss the
458. Horton v. Union Light, Heat, & Power Co., 690 S.W.2d 382, 390 (Ky. 1985).
459. Id. (quoting Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Roth, 114 S.W. 264, 266 (Ky. 1908).
460. Horton, 33 F.3d at 632.
461. Id. (footnote omitted).
462. See supra note 422 and accompanying text.
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mark.
In a brief dissent, Judge Kennedy found the conclusions reached by the
Fourth, Ninth, and Federal Circuits more persuasive-particularly Judge
Goodwin's majority opinion for the Ninth Circuit in Hawkins-and would
have held the Hortons' punitive damage award to be taxable as income."6
The Tax Court now seems deeply committed to the analysis it articulated
in Miller and Horton.4 The Tax Court's approach after Horton and Burke is
to determine if the taxpayer's claim sought to vindicate "tort or tort-type"
rights by focusing on the remedies available to the taxpayer in respect of the
claim pursued. If those remedies are sufficiently broad so as to reflect tradi-
tional concepts of tort liability and recovery, the claim will be seen as tort or
tort-type: that will be the "beginning and end of the inquiry ' and all com-
ponents of any award or settlement will be excludable under I.R.C.
§ 104(a)(2), including punitive damages. The Sixth Circuit seems committed
to a similar approach, founded on the Threlkeld beginning-and-end-of-the-
inquiry analysis the Sixth Circuit embraced in Burke.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The federal courts stand hopelessly divided on an important question:
whether I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) applies to exclude punitive damage recoveries from
gross income. The Tax Court"6 and the Sixth Circuit"6 have concluded
463. Horton, 33 F.3d at 632; see also Kemp v. Commissioner, 771 F. Supp. 357 (N.D.
Ga. 1991). The taxpayer in Kemp had received certain amounts in 1986 after successfully
prosecuting a § 1983 action. The recovery included a punitive damages element. The District
Court held the punitive damages to be taxable, basically accepting the government's position
in full:
Although the court agrees that plaintiff's damages derived from violation of a tor-
tious injury, punitive damages are not awarded "on account of" such personal injury
within the meaning of section 104(a)(2). The Supreme Court has recognized that
punitive damages in a section 1983 action "are awarded in the jury's discretion 'to
punish (the defendant] for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like
him from similar conduct in the future."' Thus, punitive damages are awarded when
the "tortfeasor's conduct . . . calls for deterrence and punishment over and above
that provided by compensatory awards."
Punitive damages awarded under section 1983 clearly serve no "compensato-
ry" purpose. The court therefore agrees with the Fourth Circuit's recent decision in
[Miller]. The court in Miller held that the portion of the plaintiffs settlement that
represented punitive damages was "a 'windfall,' ... being 'over and above any
award of compensatory damages,' . . and therefore, fleIll beyond § 104(a)(2)'s
reach." Punitive damages therefore constitute gross income pursuant to I.R.C. §
61(a).
Id. at 359 (citations omitted).
464. See, e.g., Estate of Moore v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 1925 (1994) (holding
pre-RRA '89 punitive damages received in a malicious prosecution and invasion of privacy
lawsuit to be excludable from gross income).
465. As previously noted, the underlying injury must of course be personal in nature.
See supra note 160; supra note 212 and accompanying text.
466. The Tax Court is, of course, a court of national jurisdiction, and taxpayers from all
parts of the United States may bring their case there. However, in cases appealable to the
Fourth and Ninth Circuits, the Tax Court will find itself constrained to rule against the tax-
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that such damages are excludable, while the Fourth, Ninth, and Federal4
Circuits have held that punitive damages are taxable. Resolution of the puni-
tive damages controversy turns on one's view of the outcome of several con-
tributing considerations: Has the Threlkeld beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry
test survived the Supreme Court's decision in Burke? Does the return of capi-
tal theory point to a clear answer? What was Congress' intent in amending
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) as part of RRA '89?
It is impossible to declare a clear "winner" among the courts' various
positions. However, it is submitted that on balance-and a very delicate bal-
ance it is-Horton seems more correctly decided. First, while the return of
capital theory would provide a compelling model if the courts were writing on
a clean slate, it must be acknowledged that they are not. The manner in which
the Internal Revenue Code operates in the area of personal injury damages
simply does not admit of an argument that the return of capital theory has in
any way been incorporated into the Code or has unambiguously influenced
past administrative and judicial interpretations of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) and its
predecessor.46 The decisions in Miller, Reese, and Hawkins rely greatly on
the return of capital theory, and it is difficult to deny its underlying validity.
However, reliance on the return of capital theory at this late stage of the law's
development surrounding personal injury damages taxation seems hazardous
and unconvincing.
Second, the least strained and most reasonable interpretation of congres-
sional intent in amending I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) is that, subsequent to RRA '89,
punitive damages recovered for nonphysical personal injuries are now taxable,
and that punitive damages recovered for physical injuries are excluded. This is
the view expressed by the Supreme Court. 7 Given that Congress fairly
clearly intended to narrow the scope of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) in RRA '89, it
follows that pre-RRA '89 punitive damage recoveries for both physical and
nonphysical injuries are excludable.47' While there may be other plausible
explanations of congressional intent, this interpretation is the most defensible
of the alternatives.
Finally, it is reasonable to conclude that the Supreme Court did in fact
leave intact the Threlkeld beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry test: the Supreme
Court took pains to state that it agreed with the Sixth Circuit's analysis "inso-
payer, under the so-called -'Golsen doctrine." See Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742
(1970), affid, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971), cert denied. 404 U.S. 940 (1971).
467. It is submitted that the Third Circuit. which so completely embraced the Threlkeld
beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry analysis in Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir.
1990), would be compelled to follow Horton if the question were raised in that Circuit.
468. Like the Tax Court, the Court of Federal Claims is also a court of national juris-
diction. Given the pro-govemment position of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
however, forum shoppers are unlikely to turn to the Court of Federal Claims if the tax
treatment of punitive damages is at issue.
469. See supra note 86 and accompanying and following text.
470. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
471. See supra note 284 and accompanying and following text.
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far as it focused ... on the nature of the claim," '472 did not explicitly or im-
plicitly criticize the test, and did not indicate that the approach of any other
appellate court was more attractive. There is no hint in Burke of a two-part
test under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2); in other words, that after determining whether a
particular injury is "tort or tort-type," it must also be determined whether the
resulting recovery is "on account of' that personal injury. Moreover, the ma-
jority opinion in Burke seems to assume that if the dissent was correct and the
underlying claim had been found to be tort or tort-type, the back pay award
would have been excludable. The only disagreement between the majority and
the dissent related to the manner in which a tort or tort-type injury is identi-
fied. If the majority felt that the dissent was only addressing the first half of a
two-part test, and that even if the dissent was correct the question of whether
the recovery was "on account of" that injury would remain, it would have
been logical for the majority to say so. Fairly read, the Burke analysis simply
seems more consistent with the Threlkeld approach.
When applied to punitive damage recoveries, utilization of a two-part test
after Burke also creates the undesirable result that the income tax consequenc-
es of such a recovery may vary from state to state, depending upon whether
state law applicable to the particular tort action views punitive damages as
wholly penal in nature, or conversely, as encompassing a compensatory ele-
ment. As the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Miller teaches, application of the
second prong of the two-part test requires one to examine whether or not
punitive damages have a compensatory element.473 If so, the recovery will be
excludable to that extent,474 but if the recovery serves no compensatory pur-
pose it will be taxable. The two-part test would therefore require a case-by-
case analysis of the purpose of the punitive damages award in question, poten-
tially resulting in a patchwork treatment of such awards depending upon rele-
vant state law and undercutting a uniform application of federal income tax
law.
Moreover, use of a two-part test may result in inconsistent treatment of
awards received under the federal antidiscrimination statutes described in Part
IV.B.2. above. For example, in evaluating the tax treatment of ADEA recover-
ies, the question arises whether an award of liquidated damages under ADEA
is in the nature of punitive damages-that is, wholly penal in nature--or
whether such an award serves a compensatory purpose. As has been noted,475
the treatment of ADEA recoveries since Burke has been inconsistent and un-
predictable. One of the major points of contention in this debate is whether a
two-part analysis is warranted after Burke, or whether the Threlkeld beginning-
and-end-of-the-inquiry analysis has continuing vitality. Assuming for the mo-
ment that a two-part test is employed, and that the first test, whether the claim
472. See supra note 246.
473. See supra note 338 and accompanying text.
474. Where state law indicates that punitive damages have a mixed nature, serving both
a compensatory and penal purpose, it is unclear how a punitive damage recovery is to be
allocated between such purposes, if at all. See supra notes 441-44 and accompanying text.
475. See supra notes 259-71 and accompanying text.
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is "tort-type," is satisfied, the next question becomes, on account of what are
liquidated damages under ADEA awarded? That is, what is the nature and
purpose of ADEA liquidated damages? If such damages are punitive and are
awarded on account of the employer's egregious actions,476 then they should
be taxable. On the other hand, if ADEA liquidated damages serve a compensa-
tory purpose, they should be excludable.
This problem was at the center of the recent Schmitz4. case, in which
the Ninth Circuit held, as in Hawkins, that a two-part test should be applied in
evaluating ADEA recoveries. Once again, Judge Goodwin's and Judge Trott's
differing views on the matter highlighted the issues at stake. In holding
excludable both the back pay and liquidated damage awards, Judge Goodwin,
writing for the majority, first determined that an ADEA claim is indeed tort or
tort-type, thus satisfying the first prong of the two-part test.47 Addressing
the second part of the two-part analysis, the government had argued that liqui-
dated damages are awarded "on account of" the employer's willful miscon-
duct, rather than "on account of" the taxpayer's personal injury, and therefore
have no compensatory purpose. Judge Goodwin concluded, however, that a
liquidated damages award recovered in a successful ADEA lawsuit serves, at
least in part, to compensate for nonpecuniary losses.479 Thus, Judge Goodwin
concluded that liquidated damages under ADEA serve both a compensatory as
well as punitive purpose. On this basis, Judge Goodwin held the liquidated
damages award excludable.
Judge Trott's concurring opinion in Schmitz, consistent with his dissent in
Hawkins, argued once again that under Burke, once the ADEA claim is found
to be tort or tort-type, the inquiry is complete and all damages, including
liquidated damages, are excludable. Under Judge Trott's view, the Threlkeld
analysis has survived Burke-in fact was specifically approved in Burke-and
as in Horton, no second test is required. Because Judge Trott agreed with the
majority that an ADEA claim is tort or tort-type, Judge Trott concurred in
Judge Goodwin's conclusion that both the back pay and liquidated damages
component of the taxpayer's award were excludable. However, the
Threlkeld/Horton test used by Judge Trott to reach this result remains at odds
with the Ninth Circuit majority's two-part test. Criticizing the majority in
Schmitz, Judge Trott stated that ADEA liquidated damages are indistinguish-
able from punitive damages, and therefore are not awarded "on account of"
personal injury. Thus, according to Judge Trott, under the majority's own two-
part test Schmitz's liquidated damage award should have failed the second test
and have been declared taxable.48 Judge Trott stated that the Schmitz court's
476. See supra note 175 (award of liquidated damages under ADEA requires a showing
that the employer's violation of ADEA was willful).
477. Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790. 792 (9th Cir. 1994).
478. Id. at 794; see also supra note 266 and accompanying text.
479. Judge Goodwin concluded that liquidated damages under ADEA differ from com-
mon law punitive damages in "significant ways." Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 795. Moreover, such
damages, being equal in amount to the underlying back pay award, are "proportionate to the.
personal injury suffered"; they are not computed in a manner specifically designed to punish
the employer. Id.
480. Judge Trott noted:
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division on the purpose of liquidated damages under ADEA was ample evi-
dence of the basic unworkability of the two-part test, which requires case-by-
case determinations and leads to inconsistent and conflicting results.
A further criticism of the two-part test is reflected in its treatment of back
pay awards under the ADEA. Again, if one is to engage in an analysis of the
true nature and purpose of each element of recovery under an ADEA action to
determine "on account of" what the damages are awarded, it is difficult to see
why a back pay recovery should be excludable. Such an award is merely a
wage or salary substitute and should be taxed as such. Back pay recoveries do
not compensate for any personal injury suffered; they merely replace wages
that should have been paid. Burke teaches, however, that the focus of the
analysis should always be on the nature of the claim, not the consequences of
the injury. The two-step analysis is inconsistent with that teaching.
Concededly, reasonable minds may differ-and have differed--over these
various conclusions. It is impossible to be overly critical of any of the out-
comes reached by the various courts that have recently wrestled with this
issue. The courts are constrained to apply the law as they find it, and in this
area the law is in hopeless confusion: the courts find themselves, as it is said,
in a Syrtis bog, not knowing whether they stand on dry land." ' Seemingly
every important factor impacting the resolution of the controversy is suscepti-
ble of alternate interpretations, and no compelling answers are to be found. In
attempting to unravel these factors and impose order from the punitive damag-
es chaos, the courts are simply "at sea without rudder or compass." '482
Horton is correctly decided as a statement of the law as it now stands.
However, it must be acknowledged that current law is largely indefensible as a
matter of sound tax policy. Although the courts should align themselves with
the Horton analysis, current law as reflected in Horton is in need of
change.483 Legislative action is now required to provide the rudder and the
compass so desperately needed. As Judge Trott has implored, "Congress
should straighten out this mess."4" However, if Congress was to revisit the
Because the majority held in Hawkins that punitive damages are taxable, a logical
application of that rule suggests that ADEA liquidated damages are also taxable.
ADEA liquidated damages, like punitive damages, are only awarded in cases of
willful violation. ADEA liquidated damages, like punitive damages, are intended to
punish and deter.
The majority tries to distinguish ADEA liquidated damages by claiming they
"have both a compensatory and a punitive purpose." What compensatory purpose?
Under the law of this circuit, ADEA liquidated damages do not compensate for the
loss of the use of the money, emotional distress, or pain and suffering. Realistical-
ly, what's left to compensate?
Id. at 798 (Trott, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
481. See JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST, Book I1, reprinted in 4 HARVARD CLASSICS,
THE COMPLETE POEMS OF JOHN MILTON (1909).
482. MCCULLOCH, TAXATION AND THE FUNDING SYSTEM (1845).
483. See remarks of Ulysses S. Grant in his inaugural address on March 4, 1869: "
know of no method to secure the repeal of bad or obnoxious laws so effective as their
stringent execution."
484. Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077. 1087 (9th Cir. 1994) (Trott, J., dissenting).
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question, the question becomes: what is the appropriate federal income tax
treatment of punitive damages?
If defensible and internally consistent conclusions are to be reached in this
area, one must have reference to a theory by which the results obtained can be
evaluated, and perhaps criticized. 85  Such guidance can be-and has
been-found in the return of capital theory. The decisions of the Fourth,
Ninth, and Federal Circuits are all greatly influenced by the return of capital
theory. This is understandable, because the theory goes a long way toward
explaining how personal injury recoveries, and particularly punitive damages,
should be treated for income tax purposes.
Imperfections in the return of capital theory have been previously dis-
cussed,486 and it is certainly acknowledged that the theory is not without its
defects. The most damaging criticisms state that the theory does not adequate-
ly or accurately describe certain outcomes under today's Internal Revenue
Code. For example, under the return of capital theory, it can be argued that
recoveries for lost wages should always be taxable, yet this is not the result
that the Service and the courts have reached. The post-RRA '89 treatment of
punitive damages for physical injury, which now appear excludable from gross
income, is also inconsistent with the theory. While these are serious flaws,
they can be rectified, were Congress to address those issues in a top-to-bottom
revision of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).
The current confusion over the taxation of personal injury punitive dam-
age recoveries presents Congress with the opportunity to revisit I.R.C. §
104(a)(2) in its entirety and amend the statute, not only to address that confu-
sion, but also to resolve the federal income tax treatment afforded other com-
ponents of a personal injury recovery, providing the internally consistent rules
that are so urgently needed. With this in mind, the following rules487 are
submitted for consideration.488
485. The "aim of theory is to lay down clear and consistent general principles ... on
the basis of which the popular use of concepts can be criticized." NICHOLAS KALDOR, AN
EXPENDITURE TAX (1955).
486. See supra Part III.B.
487. For an argument that I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) should simply be repealed in toto, see
Matlow, supra note 121, at 391-94. Burke and Friel counter by observing that such a result
would be inconsistent with companion provisions in I.R.C. §§ 104 and 105, which exclude a
broad range of recoveries for injury and sickness. Burke and Friel, supra note 70, at 46-47.
488. The following discussion assumes that a damage award can be rationally broken
down into its various components. This may be a hopeful assumption. For example, the
typical employment discrimination claim will usually be accompanied by state law claims of
wrongful termination, age, race, or gender discrimination, sexual harassment, mental anguish,
defamation, pain and suffering, etc. It can be extremely difficult to identify the components
of a lawsuit and more difficult to allocate any resulting recovery among them, especially
where the matter is settled prior to trial, and even more especially where the plaintiff deliv-
ers a blanket release of all claims. See Henry, supra note 70, at 730-34; Morgan, supra note
121, at 888-95; Wood, supra note 121, at 366-67; Yorio, supra note 70, at 707-09. For a
recent case involving a blanket release and a failure by the taxpayer to carry his burden of
proof as to the allocation of his recovery among his purported claims, see Taggi v. United
States, 835 F. Supp. 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (where taxpayer cannot carry his burden as to the
proper allocation, the court will not make an allocation for him; entire recovery held tax-
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1. Punitive damages should be fully taxable. Under the generally accept-
ed view, they do not compensate the victim for any monetary or nonmonetary
loss and serve only to punish the wrongdoer for malicious or egregious con-
duct and deter similar conduct by others. Under no reading of the return of
capital theory can punitive damages be viewed as excludable.489 For the sake
of uniformity,4" equity,49' and practicality, punitive damages should be
taxed in full, regardless of whether such damages arguably serve a compensa-
tory purpose under state law concepts. Thus, the Fourth Circuit's approach in
Miller, under which a review of state law is required to determine if a punitive
damages award is actually compensatory in some fashion, would be rejected.
2. Recoveries for past lost income should also be fully taxable.49 To
able).
489. This is consistent with the overwhelming view of the commentators. See, e.g.,
Brooks, supra note 70, at 785-86:
Punitive damages do not compensate the plaintiff. Instead, they penalize the defen-
dant for wrongful conduct. A damage award should be includable if it replaces
something taxable that the taxpayer had and lost before it could be taxed, or if it
substitutes for ordinary income not previously taxed. Punitive damages do not re-
place something the taxpayer had and lost; they arise from the lawsuit and are
intended to punish the defendant for wrongful conduct. . . . A punitive damage
award . . . does not represent recovery of a nonincludable value, and can be re-
garded as a windfall that is ordinary income under the Glenshaw test. Income theo-
ry supports the taxation of punitive damages.
See also Blackburn, supra note 70, at 690; Chapman, supra note 21, at 408; Dodge, supra
note 70, at 180:
As a matter of tax policy, there is little doubt that punitive damages should be
included in gross income. Such damages represent an economic windfall, and do
not compensate for any loss whatsoever. Punitive damages represent a pure accre-
tion to wealth. . . . Punitive damages . . . as opposed to recoveries for human
capital, should not be excluded from income. Such an exclusion is an unwise tax
expenditure with no sound basis in either tax theory or general policy.
Id.; see also CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 101, at 42; J. Martin Burke & Joseph M. Friel, Recent
Developments in the Income Taxation of Individuals, 9 REV. TAX'N INDIVS. 292, 304-305
(1985); Henry, supra note 70, at 741 n.247, 742; Yorio, supra note 70, at 735-36; cf Mor-
gan, supra note 121, at 930 (arguing that punitive damages should be excludable, but only
on the basis of the current wording of the statute referring to "all damages").
490. While state law may create legal interests, relationships, and rights, federal law
determines how and when they are to be taxed. Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80
(1940); Bumet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932) (goal is to "give a uniform application
to a nation wide scheme of taxation").
491. It is commonly asserted that taxpayers with equal ability to pay taxes should pay
equal amounts of tax and, correspondingly, in comparing any two taxpayers with different
levels of ability to pay, the taxpayer with a greater ability to pay should pay more tax than
the other. This concept is sometimes called "horizontal equity." See, e.g., J. PECHMAN, FED-
ERAL TAX POLICY (5th ed. 1987). It has been stated that "horizontal equity in the treatment
of taxpayers requires that the determination [of the underlying character of punitive damages]
be a federal one" so that persons with equal abilities to pay tax are not treated unequally.
Brooks, supra note 70, at 762.
492. See, e.g., Chapman, supra note 21, at 408. Complications arise when the jury com-
putes the lost wages award on an after-tax basis, thus effectively imposing the tax on the
plaintiff and under-penalizing the defendant. As discussed infra note 496, juries should be
allowed to consider the tax effects of an award, although the states have been slow to adopt
this view. The most logical approach to recoveries for lost wages is that (i) they should be
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alleviate the harsh tax result that arises under progressive tax rates from
"bunching" the recovery in one taxable period, relief from the progressive
rates should be provided.49' For example, the recovery could be subjected to
a maximum 28% tax rate, and treated in a manner similar to that afforded net
capital gains under current law.4" As a related matter, juries should be al-
lowed, and therefore instructed, to consider the tax treatment of lost income
recoveries in establishing the damage award.495
3. Recoveries for reduced future earning capacity should likewise be
taxed, although the arguments are not one-sided.4"
subject to income tax, thus placing the victim in exactly the same position she would have
been in had she never been injured (and coincidentally penalizing the wrongdoer for the
appropriate amount), and (ii) the jury should compute the award on a before-tax basis, hav-
ing been informed that the award will be taxed when paid.
493. On the "bunching" issue, see Cochran, supra note 70, at 49; Yorio, supra note 70,
at 714-19, 734-35.
494. See I.R.C. § 1(h) (1994).
495. This important question is beyond the scope of this article. In general, however, the
problem is that if the jury ignores the tax treatment of the award, the recovery awarded can
over-compensate or under-compensate the victim. The problem is especially acute under cur-
rent law, where lost income recoveries are in many cases tax-exempt. Even if the jury were
to take the tax-free nature of an award of lost income into account and appropriately set the
award at an after-tax (i.e., "net") level, this can be seen as under-penalizing the tortfeasor,
who need only pay the after-tax value of the victim's claim, thus shifting to the wrongdoer
the subsidy effect of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). On the other hand, if the award is set at pre-tax
(i.e., "gross") levels, under current law the excludability of lost income recoveries provides
an artificial incentive for plaintiffs to pursuant doubtful or meritless claims, because the gross
award will not in fact be subject to tax. This inappropriately distorts the behavior of both
the tort plaintiff and her attorney. The Supreme Court has held that in the context of certain
federal actions, the jury may in fact be instructed as to the tax treatment of a particular
damage award. Norfolk and Western Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 (1980). However, the
majority of the states appear to have concluded otherwise. See generally Robert E. Burns, A
Compensation Award for Personal Injury or Wrongful Death is Tax Exempt: Should We Tell
the Jury?, 14 DEPAUL L. REV. 320 (1964-65); Chapman, supra note 21, at 417-423;
Cochran, supra note 70, at 61-62; Lawrence A. Frolik, The Convergence of I.R.C. Sec.
104(a)(2), Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Liepelt and Structured Tort Settlements: Tar
Policy "Derailed", 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 565, 587-88 (1982-83) (surveying state law);
Matlow, supra note 121, at 380-82; Robert J. Nordstrom, Income Taxes and Personal Injury
Awards, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 212 (1958); Steven T. Potts, Comment, Income Tax Issues in Per-
sonal Injury Litigation, 46 MONT. L. REV. 59, 72 (1985); Annotation, Propriety of Taking
Income Tax Into Consideration in Fixing Damages in Personal Injury or Death Actions, 63
A.L.R. 2d 1393 (1959) and 16 A.L.R. 4th 589 (1982 & 1994 Supp.).
496. Reduced to its essentials, the argument against taxing lost future earning capacity
goes something like this. Assume Taxpayer M owns ten life annuities, each of which is to
pay her an annual amount of $10,000 for the rest of her life. The value of each annuity
today is merely a function of the present value of the annual payments anticipated to be re-
ceived in the future, discounted at prevailing interest rates. Assume this value is $100,000
per annuity. If Taxpayer M suffers a loss of three of those annuities, she will be fully com-
pensated if she recovers $300,000, which she can use to replace the annuities. This
$300,000, of course, merely represents the present value of the future income stream antici-
pated to be earned on the annuities. Despite this fact, no one would characterize the
$300,000 recovery as a recovery of lost future income and thereby taxed. To the contrary, it
is simply assumed that Taxpayer M will invest the $300,000 recovery in new annuities. The
$300,000 recovery is treated as a return of capital, not income, and is so considered for
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4. Recoveries for general compensatory damages, such as pain and
suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, humiliation, and the like, should be
excludable, largely on the strength of the return of capital theory and the Haig-
Simons definition of taxable income. Such recoveries actually do compensate
the taxpayer for difficult-to-measure losses of human capital and should right-
fully be excluded from gross income under the return of capital theory." 7
income tax purposes. The income later earned off the replacement annuities will be taxed
when received.
Imported into the personal injury arena, this argument has important implications. If
Taxpayer N, a tort victim, receives a $300,000 recovery for loss of future earning capacity,
this recovery is analytically equivalent to the loss and recovery of the future annuity pay-
ments described above: the recovery merely represents the present value of lost earnings
suffered by Taxpayer N as a result of his injury. Just as the amount recovered by Taxpayer
M for the lost annuity payments represents a return of capital in respect of the annuity
contracts, Taxpayer N's recovery for lost income merely replaces the human capital he en-
joyed and utilized to produce income each year in the conduct of his trade or profession.
The $300,000 is, therefore, merely return of capital to Taxpayer N, and should be excluded.
Should Taxpayer N invest the $300,000 so as to produce investment income to replace his
lost future earnings, such investment income would be taxed as received.
The problem with this theory is that, by analogizing Taxpayer N's future income
stream to an annuity, he is essentially treated as a investor in a wasting asset, rather than a
wage earner. As a wage earner, Taxpayer N is simply utilizing his human capital to throw
off income each year. Although Taxpayer N can be seen as having an unacknowledged
"basis" in his human capital derived from expenditures for items such as food, routine medi-
cal care, and the like, he receives neither a current deduction nor an amortization write-off
for those items. Thus, from a tax standpoint, his human capital is not a wasting asset: his
"basis" remains intact until his death (unless, of course, he is tortiously injured).
This view of Taxpayer N does have implications for those who insist on treating Tax-
payer N as an investor rather than a wage earner. While it is possible to prove that the
annuity analogy can place Taxpayer N in the same position, on a present value basis (as if
he had never been injured), see Dodge, supra note 70, at 155-167, the annuity analogy
never exactly duplicates the overall economic consequences to both Taxpayer N and the tax-
collecting government that would have obtained had Taxpayer N never been injured, unless
one assumes that the entire annual annuity payment is taxable. While such an assumption
would be consistent with the treatment of Taxpayer N's ignored basis in his human capital,
it does run counter to the existing tax rules governing annuities. These problems can be
resolved if Taxpayer N is viewed as replacing his lost human capital not with an annuity
but with a non-level payment (i.e., non-amortizing) bond. Such a bond pays an annual
amount of interest, analogous to Taxpayer N's annual wage, with no principal reductions un-
til the bond "balloons" at maturity. The principal of this non-amortizing bond is much more
analogous to one's non-wasting human capital than is an annuity, at least insofar as such in-
vestments are treated for federal income tax purposes. By substituting such a corporate bond
for the annuity in the foregoing discussion, the proper result is reached: Taxpayer N's recov-
ery for lost future income is still excludable, and moreover, assuming Taxpayer N is
analogized to an investor who purchases corporate bonds to make up for the lost income,
the income generated each year exactly replicates (before and after taxes) the result that
would have obtained had he never been injured. In a sense, Taxpayer N is treated like a
bond, rather than as an investor in a bond. The fact that Taxpayer N, if he were to replace
his lost human capital with a bond, has something to pass to his heirs when he
dies-something he cannot do with human capital itself-merely underscores the inappropri-
ateness of analogizing him to an investor rather than an income producer in the first place.
For other views on this debate, see Brooks, supra note 70, at 776-777.
497. It is not suggested that the Code be amended to allow hypothetical Taxpayer C
(described in supra note 86 and accompanying text) a deduction for the value of her loss in
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5. As under present law, recoveries for medical expenses should be
excludable, subject to inclusion in the event the expenses have been previously
deducted under I.R.C. § 213 and a tax benefit thereby derived.
6. Recoveries for statutory interest on a judgment merely represent com-
pensation for the time value of money, and should be taxable accordingly.49 s
7. The current statutory rule under which a "structured settlement" pro-
viding for deferred payments4 is fully excludable should be amended to tax
the interest element, imputed or stated, in the deferred payments."°
8. No distinction between physical injury and nonphysical injury should
be observed in applying these rules. Therefore, so long as the nature of the
underlying claim sounds in tort"°' and is "personal" in nature," 2 exclusion
human capital. Such a provision would simply be impractical to administer and would run
counter to the pervasive principles reflected in I.R.C. § 262(a), which generally denies a
deduction for personal, living, or family expenses. Closely allied to this concept is the notion
of a person developing a "basis" in her human capital. See supra note 101 and accompany-
ing and following text. If a taxpayer is in some fashion contributing to this basis with after-
tax dollars because her everyday consumption expenditures such as food, vitamins, shelter,
clothing, and education are not deductible, it seems unwise and inconsistent, as well as un-
fair, to require her to later prove those costs in showing that a subsequent personal injury
recovery in respect of human capital does not exceed that basis. This "no deduction, no
inclusion" approach is consistent with the Code's treatment of other transactions, most nota-
bly its treatment of life insurance (no deduction for life insurance premiums by virtue of
I.R.C. § 262(a), no inclusion of life insurance proceeds by virtue of I.R.C. § 101(a)). See
Michael J. Graetz, hnplementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1575,
1611-1612 (1979) (describing the "yield exemption" treatment of life insurance and its rela-
tionship to an expenditure tax).
498. This rule would codify the result reached by the Tax Court in Kovacs, 100 T.C.
124 (1993). In Kovacs, the Tax Court held that prejudgment interest awarded to the taxpay-
ers under Michigan law as a component of recovery in a wrongful death action was "inter-
est" and not "damages" for purposes of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), and was therefore taxable.
Kovacs was followed in Rice v. United States, 834 F. Supp. 1241 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
Judge Beghe filed a lengthy dissent in Kovacs, arguing that (i) although statutory
interest does carry the label of "interest," nevertheless it is simply a component of the dam-
ages awarded to the taxpayers, and therefore falls within the scope of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), and
(ii) under the Threlkeld beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry analysis, such interest is excludable
under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) since the underlying wrongful death action is concededly tort or
tort-type. Kovacs, 100 T.C. at 139 (Beghe, J., dissenting).
The District Court for the District of Colorado has declined to follow Kovacs, holding
that mandatory prejudgment interest awarded under COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-101(1) (1982)
in a tort case falls within the phrase "any damages received on account of personal injury"
and is therefore excludable under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). Brabson v. United States, 859 F. Supp.
1360 (D. Colo. 1994). The District Court's opinion specifically adopted the views expressed
by Judge Beghe in his dissent in Kovacs.
499. See generally DANIEL W. HINDERT, ET. AL., STRUCTURED SETTLEMENTS AND PERI-
ODIC PAYMENT JUDGMENTS (1994).
500. Under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), recoveries otherwise falling within the scope of the statute
are excludable no matter how received, "whether as lump sums or as periodic payments."
Under this rule, added to the Code by the Periodic Payment Settlement Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-473, 96 Stat. 2605 (1982), the interest element in a deferred "structured settlement"
arrangement is excluded along with the principal amount of the award. This result cannot be
defended on sound tax policy grounds, and should be repealed. See generally Frolik, supra
note 496. See also Blackburn, supra note 70, at 683-686.
501. The "scope of the remedies" test as fashioned by the Supreme Court in Burke
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would be appropriate if called for under the enumerated rules.
These rules would effectively abandon the Threlkeld beginning-and-end-
of-the-inquiry analysis, and give separate meaning and import to the phrase
"on account of' as now set forth in I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).
Absent congressional action, the tax treatment of punitive damages, as
well as other components of personal injury damage recoveries, likely will
remain uncertain and contentious," 3 leaving taxpayers and their advisors in
the dark, inappropriately affecting the behavior of tort litigants, and encourag-
ing further disputes between taxpayers and the government.
Notwithstanding the need for legislative action, the United States Supreme
Court may soon provide further guidance in this area. In November 1994, the
Court granted certiorari in Commissioner v. Schleier, an unreported Fifth Cir-
cuit case involving the application of the Court's decision in Burke to ADEA
recoveries of back pay and liquidated damages."° This action may clarify the
would control this determination, although its importance would be greatly mitigated if the
enumerated rules were followed.
502. See supro note 160.
503. It is not entirely clear how the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals would rule on the
question whether punitive damages are excludable under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), if presented with
the issue. Two District Courts in the Tenth Circuit have adopted analyses consistent with the
Threlkeld beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry test, one specifically in the area of punitive dam-
ages, see O'Gilvie v. United States, 92-2 USTC 1 50,567 (D. Kan. 1990) and one in the
area of statutory interest, see Brabson v. United States, 859 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Colo. 1994).
The emerging law in the Tenth Circuit, therefore, is consistent with Horton and Threlkeld.
In the only recent Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision relevant to the question,
Wulf v. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1989), the court held that an award of
damages specifically allocated to back pay as a result of a wrongful discharge was nontax-
able under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). Wulf was not a federal tax case. Wulf had recovered $160,000
against his employer in the underlying cause of action, a § 1983 case. The trial court added
$80,000 to the award as a 50% "enhancement" to cover presumed federal and state taxes
payable on the award. The defendant objected to the tax enhancement, claiming that the
award was not subject to income tax. The Tenth Circuit agreed, and remanded for a redeter-
mination of the award. In its brief discussion of the issue, the court weighed the contrary
authorities of Bent v. Commissioner, 835 F.2d 67 (3rd Cir. 1987) and Thompson v.
Commissoner, 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989), and sided with the Bent analysis. However,
although the Tax Court had decided Threlkeld by this time, the Tenth Circuit made no men-
tion of Threlkeld. Bent itself was a pre-Threlkeld case, so it is not accurate to assume that
the Threlkeld analysis is subsumed or reflected in Bent and therefore in Wulf. On the other
hand, Bent was decided by the Third Circuit, which has clearly adopted the Threlkeld ap-
proach in subsequent opinions. See supra note 467.
In Brabson, Judge Kane of the District Court for the District of Colorado unequivo-
cally adopted the Threlkeld test, stating that "excludability under § 104(a)(2) ...turns solely
on the nature of the underlying claim. . . . If the underlying claim sounds in tort, that is
the beginning and the end of the inquiry." Brabson, 859 F. Supp. at 1362 (emphasis added).
Judge Kane viewed Wulf as entirely consistent with this analysis, id. at 1363, and specifical-
ly approved Judge Beghe's approval of the Threlkeld test in his dissent in Kovacs. See supra
note 499.
Whether the Tenth Circuit would be compelled to follow Horton and therefore remain
consistent with the Third Circuit is problematic, although the developing view in the Tenth
Circuit, particularly as reflected in Brabson, is decidedly consistent with Horton.
504. Tax Court docket no. 22909-90; see supra note 268 and accompanying text.
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tax treatment of punitive damages, either directly or indirectly, by allowing the
Court to address the larger questions: (a) whether the Threlkeld beginning-and-
end-of-the-inquiry test, as employed in cases like Horton, Rickel, and Burke,
was in fact explicitly or implicitly approved by the Supreme Court in Burke,
or whether the two-part analysis used in cases like Miller, Reese, Hawkins,
and Schmitz is the proper one (or whether the Court has some other test in
mind), and (b) whether ADEA liquidated damages are punitive in nature, and
if so, how punitive damages should be taxed.
Several outcomes are possible under Schleier, including the following:
1. The Supreme Court may skirt the larger issues by following Downey
v. Commissioner," holding that the ADEA recovery scheme is analogous to
pre-amendment Title VII and does not afford the broad range of remedies
necessary to satisfy the "scope of the remedies" test. In this case, ADEA
claims would not be "tort or tort-type," and the Court would hold both back
pay and liquidated damages awards under the ADEA to be taxable. This
would leave the taxation of punitive damages in limbo.
2. The Court may hold that the "scope of the remedies" test is in fact
satisfied by the ADEA recovery scheme, and that under Threlkeld, this consti-
tutes the "beginning and end of the inquiry." Therefore, both back pay and
liquidated damages under the ADEA would be excludable, without reference
to their underlying purposes (and as to liquidated damages, irrespective of
whether they are compensatory, punitive, or both). This outcome would estab-
lish Horton as the law governing punitive damages.
3. The Court may conclude, with the majority view in Schmitz, that the
"scope of the remedies" test is satisfied by the ADEA recovery scheme, and
that under cases like Miller, Reese, and Hawkins, a second inquiry must be
undertaken---on account of what are the damages awarded? In that case, the
back pay award would be excluded." However, as the debate between Judg-
es Goodwin and Trott in Schmitz indicates," 7 the courts are divided over
whether liquidated damages under ADEA are punitive or compensatory."
Two outcomes may be reached:
a. The Court may conclude, as did the majority in Schmitz, that
liquidated damages serve (at least in part) a compensatory purpose, are not
wholly penal, and are therefore excludable. This would establish that Horton is
not the law, although it would not necessarily clarify the taxation of true puni-
tive damages awarded in non-ADEA contexts.
b. The Court may alternatively conclude that liquidated damages
under the ADEA are entirely punitive and are taxable, according to their non-
compensatory nature.5°
505. 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Shaw v. United States, 853 F. Supp. 1378
(M.D. Ala. 1994); Maleszewski v. United States, 827 F. Supp. 1553 (N.D. Fla. 1993); Drase
v. United States, 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 50,463 (N.D. I11. 1994).
506. As discussed in Part IV, supra, this result runs counter to a strict application of the
"on account of" test, but is compelled by existing rulings and case law.
507. See supra note 478 and accompanying text.
508. See Downev, 33 F.3d at 839, and cases cited therein.
509. As of this writing, no reported post-Burke opinion has held back pay excludable
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Outcome # 3 would essentially bring closure to the debate, at least regard-
ing punitive damages received prior to RRA '89. However, it would not an-
swer whether RRA '89's amendment of I.R.C. § 104(a) means that post-RRA
'89 punitive damage recoveries are excludable if awarded in respect of a phys-
ical injury, discussed in Part V.C. above.
Depending on the course taken by the Supreme Court, Schleier may ulti-
mately answer the question of the taxation of punitive damages. Irrespective of
the outcome in Schleier, however, a congressional overhaul of I.R.C. §
104(a)(2) is greatly needed.
while at the same time taxing liquidated damages.
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